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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal legislation governing bank holding companies
(“BHCs”) and savings and loan holding companies (“SLHCs”) share
several public policy objectives.1 The Bank Holding Company Act of
1956 (“BHCA”)2 and Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments
of 1967 (“SLHCA”)3 both sought to preserve competition, prevent undue
concentration, and separate banking from commerce. 4 In subsequent
legislation, Congress brought further parity to the regulation of BHCs and
SLHCs related to affiliations with securities firms, transactions with
1. Key terms and acronyms are defined when first used in this article and are collected in
Appendix A.
2. Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (1956).
3. Pub. L. No. 90-255, 82 Stat. 5 (1968); see also H. REP. No. 90-997, at 1–5 (1967).
4. See infra Sections IV.B.5. and IV.C.1.
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affiliates, permissible activities, separation of banking and commerce,
and capital requirements.5 The convergence in the regulation of BHCs
and SLHCs raises the question: Is it time to unify the regulation of
depository institution holding companies (“DIHCs”)?
This article
answers that question in the affirmative based upon its historical review
of divergence and convergence in the regulation of DIHCs, as well as the
benefits of a unified statutory scheme for the regulation of DIHCs.
During the twentieth century, the ownership of depository
institutions became concentrated in DIHCs. At the beginning of the
twentieth century, it appears that no companies controlled depository
institutions.6 However, companies began to acquire banks in the first
decade of the century. 7 By 1929, twenty-eight banking groups controlled
511 banks in the United States.8 In the early 1930s, Congressional
concerns about “group banking” led to limited regulation of what are now
called “bank holding companies” or “BHCs”.9 At the same time,
Congress prohibited bank affiliations with securities firms.10 In 1956,
Congressional concerns about further increases in the number of
companies controlling banks led to comprehensive regulation of BHCs—
defined as a company controlling two or more banks.11 In 1959,
Congressional concerns about companies beginning to acquire control of
savings associations led to enactment of legislation prohibiting the
formation of new holding companies controlling more than one savings

5. See infra Section IV.C.
6. Group Banking in the United States, 24 FED. RES. BULL. 92, 97 (1938).
7. GAINES T. CARTINHOUR, BRANCH, GROUP AND CHAIN BANKING 90–91 (1931); W. RALPH

LAMB, GROUP BANKING 81–82 (1961).
8. GERALD C. FISCHER, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 32 (1961); see also Branch, Chain, and
Group Banking, Hearings Under H.R. Res. 141 Before the H. Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 71st Cong., vol. 1, pt. 2 at 162–84 (1930) (listing the bank groups in operating in
the United States as of December 1929); Branch, Chain, and Group Banking, Hearings Under
H.R. Res. 141 Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 71st Cong. vol. 1, pt. 4 at 454–
55 (1930) (categorizing banking groups by size); Roll Call of Leading Bank Groups in the
United States, December 31, 1929, AM. BANKER, Feb. 20, 1930, at 7–12.
9. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 5(c), 19, 48 Stat. 162, 166, 186; SEN. REP.
NO. 72-584, at 10 (1932); SEN. REP. NO. 73-77, at 10 (1933); 77 CONG. REC. 3835 (May 20,
1933) (statement of Rep. Steagall); Regulation P, Series of 1933, Holding Company
Affiliates—Voting Permits, 19 FED. RES. BULL. 505 (1933).
10. Banking Act of 1933 §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. at 168, 179, 184, 188, 189, 194.
11. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (current version
at 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2018)); H. REP. N O. 84-609, at 1–6 (1955); SEN. REP. NO. 84-1095, at 1–
2 (1955).
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association.12 In 1968, Congressional concerns about further increases in
the number of SLHCs, which were defined as a company controlling one
or more savings associations, led to comprehensive regulation of
SLHCs.13 Holding companies began to acquire a large number of banks
and savings associations in the 1960s and 1970s.14
This article focuses on differentiation and convergence in the
regulation and supervision of DIHCs from the early years of the twentieth
century to the present.15 Part II reviews the current regulatory framework
for depository institutions and DIHCs.16 Part III summarizes areas of
differentiation and convergence in the regulation of depository
institutions.17 Part IV highlights areas of differentiation and convergence

12. Spence Act, Pub. L. No. 86-374, 73 Stat. 691 (1959); H. REP. NO. 86-679, at 1–4
(1959); SEN. REP. NO. 86-810, at 1–5 (1959). In 1957, only two companies were known to
control a savings association. Id. at 4.
13. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, 82
Stat. 5 (1968); REP. No. 90-997, at 2 (1967).
14. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967: Hearings on H.R. 1322,
H.R. 8696, and H.R. 12025 Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Fin. of the H. Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong 10 (1967) (statement of John E. Horne, Chairman, Fed.
Home Loan Bank Bd.) (“At the end of 1959, there were 44 holding companies controlling 93
associations, which possessed 7.2 percent of the assets of all insured associations. By the end
of 1966 [all] of those figures had increased very substantially; there were 98 holding
companies controlling 134 associations representing 12.5 percent of the whole industry.”);
FED. RESERVE BD., THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY MOVEMENT TO 1978: A COMPENDIUM
(1978), at 56, 62, 63 (“In 1956 there were only 117 unregulated one-bank holding companies,
with total deposits of $11.6 billion. By 1965, there were 550 one-bank holding companies,
but the major banks had not yet converted to that status. In 1956-59, 53 one-bank holding
companies were formed, but in 1960-66 there were 291 formations. From 1966 to June 1968,
201 more one-bank holding companies were formed, and from June 1968 to the end of 1970,
690 more were created. . . . By the end of 1976, bank holding companies were operating in
all fifty states and the District of Columbia. Just over one-quarter -- 25.8 percent -- of all
banks were owned by bank holding companies; one-bank holding companies owned 10.2
percent of all banks; and multibank holding companies, 15.6 percent. By the end of 1976,
66.1 percent of all commercial bank deposits were held by subsidiaries of bank holding
companies. Multibank holding companies held 34.2 percent of total deposits and one-bank
holding companies, 31.9 percent.”).
15. While credit unions are depository institutions, this article only addresses credit unions
in a cursory manner because it focuses on depository institution holding companies. Credit
union membership rules preclude control of a credit union by a holding company by limiting
each member to one vote at member meetings. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1760 (2018)
(“Irrespective of the number of shares held, no member shall have more than one vote.”). If
a credit union finds a holding company useful for execution of its business plan, the credit
union converts to a stock bank or thrift with a mutual holding company. James Wilcox, Credit
Unions, Conversions, and Capital, FED. RES. BANK S.F. ECON. LETTER, No, 2007-16, at 1–2
(June 22, 2007); see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a(o), 1785(b).
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
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in the regulation of DIHCs.18 Part V describes the areas of differentiation
and convergence in the supervision of DIHCs.19 Part VI recommends
that Congress unify regulation of all holding companies controlling a
depository institution insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”) under one statute of uniform application.20 In
short, it is time to unify the regulation of DIHCs.
II. CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The current statutory framework for depository institutions and
DIHCs developed in a patchwork manner, often in response to crises,
from the beginning of the twentieth century to the present.
A.

Regulators

The allocation of regulatory responsibility for depository
institutions and DIHCs is based on the type of charter of the depository
institution. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(“FRB”) regulates BHCs, SLHCs, and state member banks.21 The Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) regulates national banks,
federal savings banks, and federal savings associations.22 The FDIC
regulates state nonmember banks, industrial loan companies, (“ILCs”),
state-chartered savings banks,23 and state-chartered savings

18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
20. See infra Part VI.
21. 12 U.S.C. §§ 324–325 (2018) (state member bank); § 1467a(b) (SLHCs); id. § 1844

(BHCs). A state member bank is a state-chartered bank that elects to become a member of
the Federal Reserve System. Id. § 221.
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1(a) (national banks); 12 U.S.C. § 1(b) (federal savings banks and federal
savings associations); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 312, 124 Stat. 1376, 1522 (2010). All national
banks automatically become members of the Federal Reserve System.
23. The FDIC regulates state non-member banks, state savings banks, state savings
associations, and cooperative banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b). A state nonmember bank is a statechartered bank that does not elect to become a member of the Federal Reserve System. The
parent holding company of a state savings bank or cooperative bank that makes an election
pursuant to section 10(l) of The Home Owners’ Loan Act (“HOLA”) to be treated as a savings
association is not regulated as a BHC but as an SLHC. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(l). ILCs are subject
to FDIC regulation if they obtain FDIC insurance. 12 U.S.C § 1820(b). State laws usually
require that ILCs obtain FDIC deposit insurance. See e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 18521.5(b)
(2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-10.5-106(2)(a) (2019); NEV. REV. STAT.§677.247(a) (2019);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-8-3(4) (2019).
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associations.24 The National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”)
regulates federally insured credit unions chartered by the NCUA and
state-chartered credit unions insured by the National Credit Union Share
Insurance Fund.25 State-chartered institutions, whether a bank, thrift,
credit union, or industrial loan company, are regulated by their chartering
state.26 Most states also regulate the BHCs and SLHCs that control, or
propose to acquire control of, a depository institution in the state.27
B.

Forms of Ownership

Depository institutions and DIHCs are organized in stock or
mutual form. Stock institutions are owned by stockholders that usually
operate as for-profit organizations.28 Mutual institutions are “owned” by
the institution’s members, which are the depositors of the institution itself
or of a subsidiary.29 Mutual institutions are non-profit organizations that
benefit their members through dividends and access to services.30
Historically, thrift institutions strongly favored the mutual form of
ownership.31 However, depository institutions generally moved away
from mutual forms of ownership in the later part of the twentieth century
to raise low-cost capital and attract and retain qualified personnel. 32
24. Dodd-Frank Act, § 312c, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(b) (2018). Savings associations include
savings and loan associations, building and loan associations, cooperative banks, and
homestead associations. .
25. 12 U.S.C. § 1784(a) (covering insured credit unions). The fund was established in
1970. Act of October 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-468, § 203, 84 Stat. 994, 999 (1970) (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1783).
26. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 500(a), 1000(a) (2019); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14.1(k)–(o)
(2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1113.01, 1121.10 (West 2019).
27. CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF STATE CHARTERED BANKING
92–94, 118–121 (16th ed. 1996) (listing bank holding company requirements and interstate
bank holding company entry requirements by state as of December 31, 1995).
28. 1 KENNETH M. LAPINE ET AL., BANKING LAW §§ 1.05[1], 1.05[2], 1.05[3] (Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc., 2021); 3 LAPINE ET AL., supra § 69.02.
29. FRANKLIN H. ORNSTEIN, SAVINGS BANKING: AN INDUSTRY IN CHANGE 50, 53–54
(1985).
30. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1759, 1768 (2018); 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
31. Conversion of Savings and Loan Associations from Mutual to Stock Form: Hearings
on S. 3132 and S. 3234 before Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93rd Cong. 121 (1974) (statement of Thomas R. Bomar,
Chr., FHLBB) (practically all savings and loan associations organized as mutual associations
in 1933 and only 12% of all savings associations organized as stock associations as of 1974).
32. See generally Peter B. Saba & Robert B. Robbins, Savings and Loan Associations –
Mutual to Stock Conversions Under the Revised Regulations, 17 AKRON L. REV. 413, 416
(1984). In 1983, there were 3,126 savings associations of which 2,404 (77%) were mutual

8
C.

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 25

Charters

Depository institutions obtain special types of charters issued by
federal and state regulatory agencies empowering them to accept
deposits. This is a unique authority not available to other types of
entities. The agencies establish requirements for the issuance of a charter,
such as organizer qualifications, management expertise, capital
adequacy, and business plan sufficiency.33 Within the current regulatory
framework, the OCC issues charters for national banks, federal savings
banks, and federal savings and loan associations, 34 while state agencies
issue charters for banks, state savings banks, state savings associations,
and ILCs.35
DIHCs obtain general and special types of charters. BHCs and
SLHCs organizing in stock form obtain general charters under the
corporation or partnership law of the chartering state.36 SLHCs
organizing in mutual form obtain special charters from the FRB,37 and
BHCs organizing in mutual form obtain special charters from state

savings associations. By 1996, the number of mutual savings associations dropped to 565,
or 42% of all savings associations. Elijah Brewer III et al., Pricing IPOs of Mutual Thrifts
Conversions: Joint Effect of Regulation and Market Discipline 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi.,
Working Paper Series, WP-01-252001).
Between 1983 and 1988, 571 mutual savings
associations converted to stock form. Vojislav Maksimovic & Haluk Unal, Issue Size and
“Underpricing” in Thrift Mutual-to-Stock Conversions, 48 J. FIN. 1659 (1993). Federal
banking regulators review the terms of conversions from mutual to stock form, including
determinations of the fairness of the transactions to the mutual members. 12 C.F.R. § 143.8–
143.14 (OCC); § 333.4 (FDIC); § 239.50–239.62 (FRB). At the end of 2019, there were 468
mutual institutions.
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MUTUAL INSTITUTIONS AND STOCK
INSTITUTIONS OWNED BY MUTUAL HOLDING COMPANIES AS OF 12/31/2019,
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/mutual/mutuals.html [https://perma.cc/R4RMAF36] (downloaded Jan 22, 2021).
33. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING
MANUAL, CHARTERS 4–5 (2019), https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-bytype/licensing-manuals/charters.pdf [https://perma.cc/JV56-ZWPB]; Guide for Groups
Interested in Chartering a State Bank in California, CAL. DEP’T BUS. OVERSIGHT,
https://dbo.ca.gov/guide-for-groups-interested-in-chartering-a-state-bank-in-california/
[https://perma.cc/2CUU-VU76] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019); Commercial Bank: Information
and
Procedure,
N.Y.
DEP’T
FIN.
SERV.,
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/apps_and_licensing/banks_and_trusts/information_and_procedure
[https://perma.cc/5V9Q-TTVU] (last visited Nov. 29, 2019).
34. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21 (national bank), 1464(a) (federal savings bank and federal savings
association); see also 12 C.F.R. § 5.20.
35. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW, §§ 14 (commercial bank), 230 (savings bank), 375
(savings association) (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-8-3 (West 2020) (industrial bank).
36. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 101 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.04
(2019); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1306 (2019).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(o).
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regulatory agencies. 38 All BHCs and SLHCs are required to register with
the FRB.39 To register as an SLHC rather than a BHC, the holding
company must not control a bank, and any savings association subsidiary
must be a “qualified thrift lender” (“QTL”). 40
If a depository institution wishes to convert from one type of
charter to another, the institution must obtain the prior approval of the
regulatory agency of the resulting institution.41 For example, if a savings
association subsidiary of SLHC plans to convert to a national bank, the
approval of the OCC is required. In addition, the prior approval of the
FRB is required for the holding company of the proposed bank to become
a BHC.42
D.

Deposit Insurance

Deposit insurance was established to restore and maintain
confidence in the banking system.43 In 1933, federal deposit insurance
became available for bank deposits through the FDIC. 44 Federal deposit
38. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 524.1809 (2019); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 290 (2019); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1701.04 § 1116.02 (2019).
39. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a(b), 1844(a); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.5(a), 238.4(c).
40. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(a)(1)(D)(ii)(I), (b). To be a QTL under current law, the thrift must
maintain at least 65% of its portfolio assets in qualifying thrift instruments, which includes
home mortgage loans, mortgaged-back securities, educational loans, small business loans, and
credit card loans. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(m)(1), (3)(C).
41. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2). Federal law generally prohibits charter conversions by a
national bank, state bank, or federal or state savings bank or savings association while the
institution is subject to a cease and desist order (or other formal enforcement order) issued by,
or a memorandum of understanding entered into with, its current federal banking agency or
state bank supervisor with respect to a “significant supervisory matter. Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) § 612, 12 U.S.C. § 214d;
see also Fed. Reserve Bd. et al., SR 12-16/CA 12-12, Interagency Statement on Section 612
of the Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on Conversions of Troubled Banks (Nov. 26, 2012),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1216a1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8GKK-T7VM].
42. 12 U.S.C. § 1842; 12 C.F.R. § 225.11.
43. 77 CONG. REC. 3837 (1933) (statement of Rep. Steagall) (“[T]he purpose of this
legislation is to protect the people of the United States in the right to have banks in which
their deposits are safe. They have a right to expect of Congress the establishment and
maintenance of a system of banks in the United States where citizens may place their hard
earnings with reasonable expectation of being able to get them out again upon demand . . . .
Bankers . . . successful operation depends upon deposits and they must have the confidence
of the public to get deposits . . . .”).
44. Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, § 101, 49 Stat. 684 (1935) (amending § 12B
to FR Act, permanently establishing the FDIC and the FDIC deposit insurance fund); Banking
Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 168, 179 (1933) (adding § 12B(a) and (y)
to FR Act temporarily establishing the FDIC and the deposit insurance fund).

10

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 25

insurance became available for thrift deposits in 1934 through the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”). 45 Currently, bank
and thrift deposits are insured up to $250,000 per depositor, per
institution, and per ownership category by the deposit insurance fund
administered by the FDIC.46
E.

Regulation

Depository institutions and DIHCs are subject to regulations that
govern their operations. The federal laws and implementing regulations
specifically applicable to depository institutions and DIHCs include those
applicable to governance,47 capital,48 deposits,49 reserves, 50 branching,51
lending,52 margin stock loans,53 interbank liabilities,54 investments,55
permissible activities,56 management interlocks,57 insider and affiliate
transactions,58 privacy and data security,59 anti-money laundering,60
45. National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 403, 48 Stat. 1246, 1257 (1934).
46. 12 U.S.C § 1821(a)(1)(E); 12 C.F.R. pt. 330.
47. 12 U.S.C § 1831m; 12 C.F.R. § 363.5 (requiring independence of members of audit

committee). Public companies are subject to additional corporate requirements under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and stock exchanges rules. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(2002).
48. Capital adequacy: 12 U.S.C. § 1467a (SLHCs) § 1844(b) (BHCs); § 3907 (insured
depository institutions); 12 C.F.R. § 217.1 (SLHCs, BHCs, and state member banks); 12
C.F.R. § 3.1 (national banks); 12 C.F.R. § 324.1 (FDIC-supervised institutions). Small bank
holding company policy statement: 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, app. C (BHC); 12 C.F.R. 238.9 (SLHC).
Source of strength: 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.4(a) (BHC), 238.8(a) (SLHC). Prompt corrective action:
12 U.S.C. § 1831o (insured depository institution); 12 C.F.R. §§ 6.1 (national banks), 208.40,
(state member banks), 303.200 (state nonmember banks and state savings associations).
49. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4010; §§ 5001–5018; Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. pt. 229.
50. 12 U.S.C. § 461; Regulation D, 12 C.F.R. pt. 204.
51. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (national banks); § 321 (state member banks).
52. Id. § 84; 12 C.F.R. § 32.3.
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq; Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. pt. 221.
54. Federal Reserve Act § 23, 12 U.S.C. § 371b-2; Regulation F, 12 C.F.R. pt. 206.
55. 12 U.S.C. § 24(7); § 1464(c) (national bank and federal savings association
investments).
56. See, e.g., id. § 24(7), 92 (national banks); § 1843(c)(8), (k) (BHCs); § 1464 (federal
savings associations); § 1467a(c) (SLHCs).
57. Depository Institution Management Interlocks Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, Title II, 92
Stat. 3641, 3672 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3201–08); Regulation L, 12 C.F.R. pt. 212.
58. Federal Reserve Act § 22(g), (h), 12 U.S.C. §§ 375a, 375b (restricting loans to insiders);
Regulation O, 12 C.F.R. Part 215; Federal Reserve Act §§ 23A, 23B, 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c,
371c-1; Regulation W, 12 C.F.R. pt. 223 (restricting transactions with affiliates).
59. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), Title V, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338,
1436 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809); Regulation P, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1016.
60. Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 1970) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1951–1959, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5332); see also 31 C.F.R. pt. 1020.
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community reinvestment,61 unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or
practices,62 and consumer protection.63 Many of these laws and
regulations are addressed below with a focus on the differentiation and
convergence in the regulation of financial institutions.
F.

Supervisory Tools

Federal and state banking regulators use a number of supervisory
tools to assess and monitor the condition of financial institutions under
their jurisdiction; address violations of law, rule, and regulation; and
correct unsafe and unsound practices. First, banking regulators require
financial institutions to submit a variety of reports.64 Second, banking
regulators conduct examinations or inspections of financial institutions
under their jurisdiction, as well as assess or monitor the financial
condition of those institutions through visitations, reviews, off-site
surveillance, and collection of information from other regulators. 65
Third, banking regulators take enforcement action against institutions
under their jurisdiction.66 Fourth, banking regulators act upon the
61. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (“CRA”), Pub. L. No., 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147
(1977) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(“GLBA”) § 711, 113 Stat. at 1465 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1831y); Regulation
BB, 12 C.F.R. pt. 228; Regulation G, 12 C.F.R. pt. 207.
62. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), §
1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531. The Dodd-Frank Act also repealed the Board’s authority to
promulgate rules under Section 18(f)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Dodd-Frank
Act § 1092(2), 124 Stat. at 2095. Pursuant to its previous authority, the Board issued
Regulation AA. 50 Fed. Reg. 16695 (Apr. 29, 1985) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 227 (2015)).
The Board repealed Regulation AA effective March 21, 2016. 81 Fed. Reg. 8133 (Feb. 18,
2016).
63. See, e.g., Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521 (1974)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f) ; Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 94-200,
89 Stat. 1124, 1125 (1975) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2810); Electronic Fund Transfer
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat 3641, 3728 (1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r);
Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–
1667f (2018)); Truth in Savings Act, Pub. L. No. 102-242, §§ 261–274, 105 Stat. 2334, 2334–
2343 (1991) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4313); Consumer Credit Protection Act, Title
VII, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p); Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114,
1128 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x); Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (1974) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617); Regulation
B, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002; Regulation C, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1003; Regulation DD, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1030;
Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1005; Regulation M, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1003; Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R.
pt. 1026.
64. See infra Section V.C.
65. See infra Section V.A.
66. See infra Section V.E.
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applications filed by institutions to acquire control of depository
institutions and applications for an institution to engage in banking and
nonbanking activities.67 Finally, the federal banking agencies conduct
stress tests and engage in other forward-looking activities related to
capital, liquidity, and resolution planning to maintain the safety and
soundness of financial institutions and the stability of the financial
system.68
G.

Receivership

The federal or state agency that chartered the depository
institution is authorized to close a depository institution under its
jurisdiction for sufficient cause, such as the inability to pay its deposits
or debts. The National Bank Act (“NB Act”) requires the OCC to appoint
the FDIC as receiver for a failed national bank. 69 The FRB is authorized
to appoint the FDIC as receiver of a state member bank.70 State laws
permit the state banking regulators to appoint the FDIC or another
receiver. 71
In practice, the FDIC is almost always appointed as receiver of
depository institutions.72 If appointed as a receiver, the FDIC liquidates
the assets of the institution and distributes deposits to depositors up to the
insured amount or the FDIC transfers the assets and liabilities to a third
party or parties. If an institution’s insured deposits are purchased and
liability is assumed by a third party, the depositors will access their
deposits through the acquiring institution. The depositors are subject to
risk of loss for uninsured deposits unless the acquirer assumes liability
for all deposits.73

67. See infra Section V.D.
68. See infra Section V.B.5.
69. 12 U.S.C. § 191. This section is part of the NB Act, as amended. The Act of June 3,

1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99, 101—which built on the Act of February 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat.
665, 668—was designated the “national bank act” by the Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 343, § 1, 18
Stat. 123; see also Edward L. Symons, Jr., The “Business of Banking” in Historical
Perspective, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 676, 698–99 (1983).
70. 12 U.S.C. § 248(o).
71. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 5-8A-24 (2020); FLA. STAT. § 658.80 (2020); N.Y. BANKING
LAW § 634 (McKinney 2020); OHIO REV. CODE Ann. § 1125.20 (West 2020).
72.
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., RESOLUTION HANDBOOK
25
(2019),
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/resolutions-handbook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BZ7Q-JTSV].
73. Id. at 17.
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III. DIFFERENTIATION AND CONVERGENCE IN THE REGULATION OF
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
A.

Differentiation

During the first half of the twentieth century, federal and state
regulators chartered many types of depository institutions, including
banks, savings associations, credit unions, and ILCs. These depository
institutions served separate segments of the financial services market.
Banks offered deposit accounts to businesses and made commercial
loans.74 Savings associations offered savings accounts to individuals and
entered into share accumulation contracts or made home mortgage loans
to individuals.75 Credit unions opened share accounts and made loans to
members.76 ILCs issued investment certificates and made small loans to
low- and moderate-income workers. 77 This differentiation in activities
flowed from variation in (1) public policy of the early 1930s; (2)
availability of institution powers under various charters; (3) eligibility for
banking system membership; (4) geographic limitations on branching;
(5) restraints on deposit interest rates, affiliations, affiliate transactions,
insider loans, and tying the availability of products to obtaining other
products; (6) accounting rules and tax treatment; and (7) institution
policies.
1. Public Policy of the Early 1930s
First, differentiation in the regulation of depository institutions
arose from the federal public policy objectives in the early 1930s. A wave

74. EVANS CLARK, FINANCING THE CONSUMER 5–6 (1931); ROLF NUGENT, CONSUMER
CREDIT AND ECONOMIC STABILITY 59 (1939); LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN
DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT 283–84 (1999).
75. PRICE FISHBACK ET. AL., WELL WORTH SAVING: HOW THE NEW DEAL SAFEGUARDED
HOME OWNERSHIP 14–15 (2013); Jonathan D. Rose & Kenneth A. Snowden, The New Deal
and the Origins of the Modern Real Estate Loan Contract 2–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 18388, 2012).
76. ROY F. BERGENGREN, CREDIT UNION: A COOPERATIVE BANKING BOOK 3, 8, 11 (1923);
DONALD J. MELVIN & RAYMOND N. DAVIS, CREDIT UNIONS AND THE CREDIT UNION INDUSTRY
24, 28 (1977); see generally J. CARROLL MOODY & G ILBERT C. FITE, THE CREDIT UNION
MOVEMENT: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 1850-1970 (1971).
77. THE MORRIS PLAN OF INDUSTRIAL LOANS AND INVESTMENTS 7–9, 42 (Indus. Fin. Corp.,
2nd ed., 1915); PETER W. HERZOG, T HE MORRIS PLAN OF INDUSTRIAL BANKING 7, 19–21
(1928).
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of bank failures, home foreclosures, and unemployment followed the
stock market crash of 1929.78 Congress addressed the perceived reasons
for the crash79 with legislation that separated commercial banking from
investment banking, insured deposits, and encouraged and maintained
home ownership. When Congress enacted the Banking Act of 1933
(“1933 Act”) it included four sections that separated commercial banking
from investment banking, commonly known as the “Glass-Steagall
Act.”80 Congress also sought to restore confidence in the banking system
through federal government insurance of deposits.81 In addition,
Congress sought to encourage and maintain home ownership through
creation of the Federal Home Loan Bank System, authorization of federal

78. 1935 FRB ANN. REP. 134, 176 (stating that 2,113 banks placed in liquidation or
receivership in 1933, 14.55% of all banks operating the United States as of June 30, 1933);
Table DC1255-1270, Mortgage Foreclosures and Delinquencies: 1926-1979, in HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES (Susan B. Carter et al. ed., 2006) (252,400 foreclosures on
nonfarm real estate in 1933; 13% of mortgaged nonfarm real estate); 5 FHLBB ANN. REP. 4
(1938) (stating that urban foreclosures climbed to nearly 1,000 per day in 1933); Table Ba470477, Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment, 1890-1990, in HISTORICAL STATISTICS
OF THE UNITED STATES (Susan B. Carter et al. ed., 2006) (31.71% of civilian private nonfarm
labor force unemployed in 1932).
79. Congress believed that bank failures resulted from bank involvement in securities
underwriting and stock speculation. See e.g., 75 CONG. REC. 9906 (1932) (statement of Sen.
Walcott) (“The excessive use of bank credit in making loans for the purpose of stock
speculation . . . was generally admitted before the panic of 1929, and almost universally
accepted since that time, to have been one of the sources of major difficulty . . . .”); 77 CONG.
REC. 3835 (1933) (statement of Rep. Steagall) (“Bank deposits and credit resources were
funneled into the speculative centers of the country for investment in stocks operation and in
market speculation.”); 77 Cong. Rec. 3907 (1933) (statement of Rep. Kopplemann) (“One of
the chief causes of this depression has been the diversion of depositors’ money into the
speculative markets of Wall Street. Instead of keeping the money for the use of the legitimate
needs of commerce and agriculture, money has been lent to gamblers to use in buying stocks
on margin.”).
80. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. 162, 185, 188, 189,
194. The Banking Act of 1935 amended section 16 to permit a bank to purchase stocks for
the account of its customers; clarified that section 21 would not prevent a deposit taking
company from engaging in the securities underwriting and dealing activities permitted by
section 16; and amended section 32 to make it consistent with section 20 and to prevent a
securities company and bank from having any employee (not only any officer) in common.
Pub. L. No. 74-305, §§ 303–308, 49 Stat. 684, 707, 709 (1935).
81. Banking Act of 1933 § 8(d), (y), 48 Stat. at 168, 179 (adding § 12B to FR Act
temporarily establishing the FDIC and deposit insurance fund); 77 CONG. REC. 3837 (1933);
see also Banking Act of 1935 sec. 101, § 12B, 49 Stat. at 684 (amending § 12B to FR Act,
permanently establishing the FDIC and the FDIC deposit insurance fund); National Housing
Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 403(a), 48 Stat. 1246, 1257 (1934) (establishing the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation).
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charters for savings and loan associations, and provision for federal home
mortgage insurance. 82
2. Institution Powers
Second, differentiation in the regulation of depository institutions
arose from the powers available to the type of institution. Historically,
state-chartered banks were authorized to make loans secured by real
property.83 National banks lacked the legal authority to make loans
secured by real property. However, national banks obtained the authority
to make loans secured by farm land in 1913, and loans secured by first
lien upon improved real estate in 1927.84 Historically, savings
associations were limited to accepting time deposits, making residential
loans, and investing in government securities. 85 However, federal
savings associations had broader authority than banks to engage in certain
82. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, §§ 3, 10, 47 Stat. 725, 726, 731
(1932) (providing for formation of Federal Home Loan Bank System); Home Owners’ Loan
Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, § 5, 48 Stat. 128, 132 (providing for chartering of federal
savings and loan associations); National Housing Act of 1935 § 1, 48 Stat. 1246 (establishing
federal guarantee of home loan mortgages).
83. SAMUEL A. WELLDON, NATIONAL MONETARY COMMISSION, DIGEST OF STATE BANKING
STATUTES, S. Doc. No. 61-353, at 40–43 tbl. A (1910) (showing that only eleven states
restricted real estate lending by state-chartered banks).
84. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, §24, 38 Stat. 251, 273 (1913) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 371 (2018)) (improved and unencumbered farmland); McFadden Act,
Pub. L. No. 69-639, § 16, 44 Stat. 1224, 1232 (1927) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 371
(2018)) (improved real estate). Before enactment of these laws national banks were not
authorized to make loans initially secured by real estate. National Bank Act, ch. 106, § 8, 13
Stat. 99, 101 (1864) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24) (loan money on personal
security); 1878 OCC ANN. REP. 55 (“[N]ational banks may loan upon personal security
only—that is as original security for any loan . . . .”); 1893 OCC ANN. REP. 51 (“National
banking associations are by implication prohibited from taking mortgages on real estate as
security for contemporaneous loans.”).
85. Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, §§ 5–6, 48 Stat. at 132, 134 (authorized mutual thrift
institutions to encourage saving and home financing); Norman Strunk, The Improved
Investment Position of Savings and Loan Associations, J. FIN., Oct. 1947, at 1, 2, 16 (stating
that savings and loan associations offer savings accounts, not demand deposit accounts, invest
in first mortgage home loans, and invest in U.S. government securities). However, in the
1980s, federal savings associations obtained the authority to offer demand deposit accounts,
invest more broadly, and make additional types of loans. See, e.g., Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 401, 402, 94 Stat.
132, 151-156 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b), (c)); Thrift Institutions
Restructuring Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, §§ 312, 321–330, 96 Stat. 1469, 1496, 1499–
1502 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464); Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 301, 103 Stat. 183, 282-288 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464) (amending § 5 of HOLA).
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activities, such as insurance agency and real estate development.86 Still,
banks possessed authority not held by savings associations to accept
demand deposits, make commercial loans, invest in securities other than
government securities, and offer trust services. 87
3. Banking System Membership
Third, differentiation in the regulation of depository institutions
arose from banking system membership. In 1913, the Federal Reserve
Act (“FR Act”) required national banks to become members of the
Federal Reserve System (“FR System”) and permitted state banks to
become members. 88 Building and loan associations and mutual savings
banks were not eligible for membership in the FR System.89 Later,
amendments to the FR Act authorized ILCs and mutual savings banks to
become members of the FR System.90 In 1932, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Act (“FHLBA”) allowed all building and loan associations, savings
and loan associations, cooperative banks, homestead associations, and
savings banks to become members of the Federal Home Loan Bank
System (“FHLB System”).91 Later, the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933
(“HOLA”) required federal savings and loan associations chartered by
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (“FHLBB”) to become members of
the FHLB System.92 Membership allowed members to borrow from and
obtain services from their respective system.93
86. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., A Unified Federal Charter for Banks and Savings
Associations, 10 FDIC BANKING REV., No. 1, 1997, at 4.
87. National Bank Act § 8, 13 Stat. at 101 (authorizing national associations to receive
deposits, loan money on personal security); Federal Reserve Act § 11(k), 38 Stat. at 262
(authorizing the FRB to permit national banks to provide trust services); McFadden Act § 16,
44 Stat. at 1232 (authorizing national associations to make loans secured by first lien upon
improved real estate).
88. Federal Reserve Act §§ 2, 9, 38 Stat. at 252, 259.
89. Informal Rulings of the Board, 1 FED. RES. BULL. 211, 212 (1915) (stating that building
and loan associations were ineligible for system membership); Informal Rulings of the
Federal Reserve Board, 3 FED. RES. BULL. 949, 950 (1917) (stating that mutual savings banks
were ineligible for system membership).
90. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, sec. 5(a), (c), § 9, 48 Stat. 162, 164.
91. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, § 4, 47 Stat. 725, 726 (1932)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1424 (2018)).
92. Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-42, § 5(f), 48 Stat. 128, 133 (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464).
93. Federal Reserve Act § 13, 38 Stat. at 263 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 343);
Federal Home Loan Bank Act § 4(b), 47 Stat. at 726 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §
1424).
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4. Branching Rights
Fourth, differentiation in the regulation of depository institutions
arose from branching rights. At the beginning of the twentieth century,
the banking system consisted almost entirely of unit banks—independent
banks with one office that served a local community.94 The geographic
reach of individual state and national banks was very limited.95 State
laws generally prohibited a state-chartered bank from opening branch
offices. 96 However, states began to expand the authority of statechartered banks to branches, first within the city of a bank’s existing
office, then within an expanded geographic area, and then state-wide.97
The NB Act did not explicitly authorize national banks to establish
branch offices. 98 However, in 1927, the McFadden Act authorized a

94. FED. RESERVE COMM. ON BRANCH, GRP., AND CHAIN BANKING, BRANCH BANKING IN
THE UNITED STATES 1 (1931) (“Following the passage of the National Bank Act of 1863, . . .
public policy became committed to the unit banking system.”); JOHN M. CHAPMAN,
CONCENTRATION OF BANKING: THE CHANGING STRUCTURE AND CONTROL OF BANKING IN THE
UNITED STATES 6 (1934) (“The individual bank was a local affair devoted largely to the
interests of its immediate community.”); PALMER T. HOGENSON, THE ECONOMICS OF GROUP
BANKING 1 (1955) (“Independent unit banking is the more familiar pattern of banking in this

country in which an individual bank unit has but one office . . . .”).
95. FED. RESERVE COMM. ON BRANCH, GRP., AND CHAIN BANKING, supra note 94, at 1 (“In
1900, according to the best information available, there were only 119 branches in
existence.”).
96. Digest of State Laws Relating to Branch Banking, 16 FED. RES. BULL. 258, 258 (1930)
(22 states prohibited branch banking); Changes in State Laws Relating to Branch Banking, 18
FED. RES. BULL. 455, 455 (1932) (18 states prohibited branch banking).
97. Digest of State Laws Relating to Branch Banking, supra note 96, at 258 (10 states
permitted branch banking within a limited area and 9 states permitted state-wide branch
banking); Changes in State Laws Relating to Branch Banking, supra note 96, at 455 (14 states
permitted branch banking with a limited area and 9 states permitted state-wide branch
banking).
98. Because the NB Act did not authorize branch offices, national banks were generally
viewed as prohibited from opening branch offices. In 1911, the U.S. Attorney General found
that a national bank was restricted to carrying on general banking business to one office or
banking house in the place designated in its certificate of organization. Lowry National Bank
of Atlanta, GA—Establishment of Branch Office, 29 Op. Att’y Gen. 81, 98 (1911). In 1923,
the U.S. Attorney General found that a national bank had the power to open offices at places
other than its banking house to perform routine services, such as the collection of deposits
and cashing of checks, within the city or place designated in its organization certificate.
Power of National Banking Associations to Establish Offices, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 1, 5 (1923).
In 1924, the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a challenge to a national bank opening branches
in Missouri under a state statute. First National Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 657–60
(1924).
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national bank to establish branches in the city in which it was located if
permitted by state banks in the same state.99
During most of the twentieth century, the branching rights of
federal savings and loan associations were slightly more favorable than
the branching rights of banks. As enacted in 1933, HOLA provided the
FHLBB with exclusive authority to provide for the organization,
incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of federal savings
and loan associations.100 Therefore, the states did not have the authority
to limit branch locations of federal savings and loan associations.101 As
the twentieth century progressed, the FHLBB issued policy statements
expanding the ability of federal savings associations to establish
branches.102 In 1996, Congress authorized federal savings associations

99. Pub. L. No. 69-639, § 7(c), 44 Stat. 1224, 1228 (1927) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 36(f) (2018)). The McFadden Act defined a branch as any place of business at which
“deposits are received or checks paid, or money lent.” Id. § 7(f), 44 Stat. at 1229 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36(j)). The Banking Act of 1933 further expanded the authority of
national banks to branch within a state to the same extent state law permitted state banks to
branch within such state establish branches anywhere in the state in which the national bank
was situated to the extent the “law of the State in question by language specifically granting
such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition” authorized State
banks to establish branches, “subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of
the State on State banks.” Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 23, 48 Stat. 162, 189 (1933).
100. Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, § 5(a), 48 Stat. 128, 132
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464). In 1937, the FHLBB issued regulations that
allowed a federal savings and loan association to file an application with the FHLBB to
establish a branch office in any county within a state. Amendment to Rules and Regulations
for Federal Savings and Loan Associations, 2 Fed. Reg. 8244 (May 14, 1937).
101. The FHLBB’s authority was confirmed in later court cases. California v. Coast Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (“No provision is made for sharing
the Board's delegated authority with state regulatory or supervisory agencies.”) In 1982, the
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that “Congress gave the [FHLBB] plenary authority to issue
regulations governing federal savings and loans . . . .” Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de
la Cuesta, 450 U.S. 141, 160 (1982). The FHLBB promulgated regulations governing “the
powers and operations of every Federal savings and loan association from its cradle to its
corporate grave.” Id. at 145 (citing Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. at 316).
102. Branching by Federal Savings Associations, 12 C.F.R. § 556.5(b), (d) (1993)
(allowing federal savings associations to branch interstate, subject only to the limitations of
federal law); Establishment of Branch Offices, 12 C.F.R. § 556.5(a)(3) (1982) (permitting
interstate acquisition to prevent the failure of an institution or minimize risk or cost to the
insurance fund); Establishment of Federal Savings and Loan Associations and Branch Office
and Mobile Facilities of Such institutions, 12 C.F.R. § 556.5(b)(2)–(3) (1973) (stating the
general policy against establishing a branch other than in a federal association’s home state);
Establishment of Branch Offices, 12 C.F.R. § 556.5(a)(2) (1968) (limiting branches to
locations permitted by state law or practice); see also Conference of State Bank Supervisors
v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 792 F.2d 837 (D.D.C. 1992) (upholding OTS rule allowing
national savings association to branch interstate subject only to federal law); JULIE L.
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to branch across state lines if they qualified as a domestic building and
loan association or as a qualified thrift lender. 103
5. Restraints on Activities
Fifth, differentiation in the regulation of depository institutions
arose from the varying restraints on activities based on the type of
institution. For many years, thrifts were not subject to many of the
prohibitions, restrictions, and limitations on activities applicable to
banks. For instance, while the federal government regulated deposit
interest rates paid by banks from the 1930s to the 1980s,104 the federal
government did not regulate the rates paid by savings and loan
associations until 1966.105 Other examples of lighter regulation of thrifts
include affiliations with securities firms,106 restrictions on loans to
insiders,107 and limitations on transactions with affiliates.108

WILLIAMS, SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS: MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CONVERSIONS § 6.02[2][b]
(2020).
103. Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 2303, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–424 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(r)).
104. Member banks became subject to a prohibition against payment of interest on demand
deposits and an interest rate ceiling on other deposits in 1933. Banking Act of 1933 § 11(b),
148 Stat. at 181. State nonmember banks became subject to the same prohibition and ceiling
in 1935. Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, § 101, 49 Stat. 684, 702. The Board
implemented the prohibition and ceiling through promulgation of Regulation Q. Regulation
Q, Series 1933, Payment of Interest on Deposits, 19 FED. RES. BULL. 571 (1933). The FDIC
issued Regulation IV. 1935 FDIC ANN. REP. 95. In 1980, Congress mandated the elimination
of deposit interest rate ceilings by 1986. Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 202, 94 Stat. 132, 142. Congress eliminated the prohibition against
payment of interest on demand deposits in 2010. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 627, 124 Stat. 1376,
1640 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 371s, 1464, 1828). Regulation Q was
repealed effective July 21, 2011. 76 Fed. Reg. 42015 (July 18, 2011).
105. An Act of September 21, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-597, §§ 2(c), 3, 4, 80 Stat. 823, 824–
825. Until deposit interest rate ceilings were eliminated in 1986, savings associations could
pay a higher rate of interest on deposits than banks. Depository Institutions Deregulation Act
of 1980 § 202, 94 Stat. at 142. ILCs not subject to deposit interest rate limitations. James R.
Barth et al., Industrial Loan Companies: Where Banking and Commerce Meet, 21 FIN. MKT.,
INST. & INSTRUMENTS 1, 22 fn. 18 (2012).
106. Banking Act of 1933 §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. at 184, 188, 189, 194; Banking Act
of 1935 §§ 302, 303, 305, 307, 49 Stat. at 707–09.
107. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-630, §§ 104, 108, 92 Stat. 3641, 3644, 3664 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 375b(h),
1828(j)).
108. Banking Act of 1933 § 13, 48 Stat. at 183; Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485,
§ 12(c), 80 Stat. 236, 242.
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6. Accounting Rules and Tax Treatment
Sixth, differentiation in the regulation of depository institutions
arose from differences in accounting rules and tax treatment of banks and
thrifts. For most of the twentieth century, thrifts enjoyed more favorable
accounting rules and federal income tax treatment than banks.109 While
banks became subject to federal income tax in 1913, 110 thrifts were
exempt from federal income taxation until 1952.111 Even then, Congress
provided thrifts with preferential tax treatment of reserves for bad
debts.112 In addition, the FHLBB applied more lenient accounting
principles to thrifts related to capital, goodwill, and losses than applied to
banks during the 1980s.113
7. Institution Policy
Finally, differentiation in the regulation of depository institutions
arose from depository institution policy. In the first two decades of the
twentieth century, bank policy generally limited activities to the
acceptance of demand deposits from and extension of demand loans to
business customers.114 Banks did not usually accept deposits from lower

109. See generally Margaret E. Bedford, Federal Taxation of Financial Institutions, FED.
RES. BANK KAN. CITY ECON. REV., June 1976, at 3; Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 86, at
3.
110. Underwood Tariff Act, Pub. L. No. 63-16, Sec. II., A., 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913)
(imposing income tax on every citizen and business, trade, or profession carried on in the
United States, but providing exemptions for mutual savings banks, building and loan
associations, and cooperative banks).
111. Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 313(a)–(d), 65 Stat. 452, 490 (imposing
tax on mutual savings banks, building and loan associations, and cooperative banks).
112. Id. § 313(e), 65 Stat. at 490.
113. NAT’L COMM. ON FIN. INST. REFORM, RECOVERY, AND ENF’T, ORIGIN AND CAUSES OF
THE S&L DEBACLE: BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS OF
THE UNITED STATES 37–39 (1993); MARTIN E. L OWY, H IGH ROLLERS: INSIDE THE SAVINGS
AND LOAN DEBACLE 39–45 (1991); Alane Moysich, Chapter 4 The Savings and Loan Crisis
and its Relationship to Banking, in 1 HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES – LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE,
168, 173–75 (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. ed., 1997).
114. Demand deposits are deposits that may be withdrawn at any time without prior notice
of withdrawal to the depository institution. A demand deposit is “payable as a matter of legal
right on demand.” PAULINE B. HELLER, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY
LAW 5–6 (1976). A demand loan does not have a fixed repayment schedule or maturity date.
The borrower can make payments at any time without penalty. The lender may call for
repayment of the loan at any time. O. HOWARD WOLFE, PRACTICAL BANKING 102 (1918)
(“Call, demand, temporary, and overnight loans are loans which differ from other classes of
loans chiefly in the matter of maturity . . . . The time of their payment is optional, both with
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and working class persons.115 Furthermore, bank policy generally
precluded home mortgage and personal lending because such lending was
too risky, too troublesome for the returns, or too long-termed when
depositors could demand their money at any time. 116 On the other hand,
building and loan associations, credit unions, and ILCs were very willing
to do business with the working class during the early years of the
twentieth century. State-chartered building and loan associations made
loans to members tied to share accumulation contracts.117 Credit unions
encouraged saving and made small loans to “people of small means” on
reasonable terms.118 ILCs issued investment certificates and made
uncollateralized installment loans to low- and moderate-income
industrial workers.119
B.

Convergence

During the second half of the twentieth century, market
developments, legislative enactments, and institution policies and
practices decreased the variation in the regulation, supervision, and
activities of depository institutions and DIHCs. In financial markets,
rising interest rates and competitive pressure from money market funds
led to federal legislation and changes in financial institution policy and
the bank and the borrower, although ample warning is usually given by either party wishing
to terminate the obligation.”).
115. Federal Charter Legislation for Mutual Savings Banks: Hearings on H.R. 258 Before
the H. Subcomm. on Bank Supervision, 88th Cong. 295 (1963) (statement of Jerry Voorhis,
Executive Director, Cooperative League of the U.S.A.).
116. CLARK, supra note 74, at 5–6; NUGENT, supra note 74, at 59; CALDER, supra note
74, at 283–84.
117. Association members made monthly payments on shares typically over a period of
years, which accumulated in a sinking fund used to pay off the loan when the shares matured.
Rose & Snowden, supra note 75, at 5–6 (describing the movement of savings associations
from share accumulation loans to fully amortized residential mortgage loans in the 1930s);
see also FISHBACK ET AL., supra note 75, at 14–15. Other lenders typically required 50–60%
down payments for loans with five-year terms and large balloon payments at the end of the
term. While some of these loans provided for payment on principal, most loans were made
on an interest-only basis, which did not apply anything to the principal of the loan. FISHBACK
ET AL., supra note 75, at 12–13.
118. MOODY & FITE, supra note 76, at 35.
119. THE MORRIS PLAN OF INDUSTRIAL LOANS AND INVESTMENTS, supra note 77, at 9–10,
42; see also Control and Regulation of Bank Holding Companies: Hearings on H.R. 2674
Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong. 585 (1955) (statement of Arthur
J. Morris, Chairman, Morris Plan Corporation of America) (“I began the first Morris Plan
bank . . . for the sole purpose of making a start in the democratization of credit. . . . I was not
long in discovering that fact that more than 80 percent of the American public had no access
to credit of any kind except as they resorted to loan sharks or charitable institutions.”);
HERZOG, supra note 77, at 20–21.
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practice. Congress enacted legislation related to depository institutions:
(1) continuing to support housing finance; (2) extending and then
eliminating prohibitions on affiliation with securities firms;
(3) equalizing institution powers; (4) expanding eligibility for system
membership and access to services; (5) unifying deposit insurance funds
and extending coverage to industrial loan companies; (6) establishing
branching rights parity; (7) extending restraints of bank activities to
savings associations related to deposit interest rates, affiliations, affiliate
transactions, insider loans, and tying the availability of products to
obtaining other products; (8) mandating uniform accounting rules and tax
treatment; (9) repealing prohibitions on bank affiliation with securities
firms; and (10) imposing accountability measures for savings
associations similar to those for banks. Institutions changed policy to
engage in newly authorized activities and adopted names that blurred the
distinctions between different types of institutions.
1. Congressional Support of the Role of Thrifts in Home Mortgage
Lending
The first reason for convergence in the regulation of depository
institutions was continued Congressional support of the role of thrifts in
home mortgage lending. In the high interest rate environment of the
1970s and 1980s, depositors withdrew funds in banks and thrifts to invest
in higher yielding money market funds. 120 The impact on thrifts was
particularly acute because of the mismatch between low-yield mortgage
loans on their books and high cost of borrowing funds.121 Thrifts paid
more to borrow funds than they earned on their mortgage loans. Thrifts
suffered huge operating losses and depleted retained earnings.122
Congress responded to the difficulties faced by thrifts with legislation that

120. 1981 FHLBB ANN. REP., as reprinted in 15 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BD. J., Apr. 1982,
at 1, 26; SEN. REP. NO. 97-536, at 18 (1982) (“The statistical evidence of competitive
imbalance between regulated and unregulated depository institutions is measurable by the fact
that the asset size of the money market mutual funds grew from $60.9 billion in March, 1980,
to $203.3 billion in June, 1982, an increase of over 230 percent.”).
121. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., supra note 120, at 22.
122. Laura L. Mulcahy, Stock S&Ls Are Traveling a High Road Back, AM . BANKER, Mar.
2, 1983, at 3 (“After massive losses in the past few years, the nation’s largest stock saving
and loan associations are rebounding sharply to match or exceed record earnings per share.”);
Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., supra note 120, at 26 (“Profits deteriorated throughout 1981.
Rising market interest rates affected the cost of funds more than the return on investments.
Consequently, retained earnings declined for the first time since 1940.”).
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deregulated deposit interest rates,123 expanded the loans and investments
permissible for federal savings and loan associations and mutual savings
banks,124 and recapitalized the FSLIC.125 These actions allowed thrifts to
diversify their assets and compete more effectively in a high interest rate
environment.126 In doing so, Congress affirmed the continuing role of the
thrift industry in home mortgage lending.127
2. Repeal of Prohibitions on Affiliation with Securities Firms
The second reason for convergence in the regulation of
depository institutions was reversal of public policy barring the affiliation
123. Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 202, 94 Stat.
132, 142.
124. Qualified Thrift Lender Reform Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 441(a), 105 Stat.
2236, 2381 (amending HOLA to authorize unsecured consumer loans to up 35% of assets);
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73,
sec, 301, § 5(c)(D)(2), 103 Stat. 183, 287 (1989) (amending HOLA to authorize unsecured
consumer loans to up 30% of assets); Thrift Institutions Restructuring Act, Pub. L. No. 97320, § 325, 96 Stat. 1469, 1500 (1982) (amending HOLA to authorize commercial loans up
to 10% of assets); Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 401–402, 94 Stat. 132, 151–155 (authorizing unsecured consumer
loans to up 20% of assets, commercial real estate loans up to 20% of assets, residential
construction loans up to 5% of assets, education loans up to 5% of assets, and community
development loans up to 2% of assets).
125. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Recapitalization Act of 1987, Pub.
L. No. 100-86, §§ 301–308, 101 Stat. 552, 585–604.
126. 126 Cong. Rec. 6893–6900 (1980) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (“[T]he Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 . . . provides new lending powers
to thrift institutions in order to enhance their competitive viability, which means that savings
and loans can do many things banks can do, with trust powers, consumer loan powers, and so
on . . . . [T]itle IV augments the powers of thrift—institutions—savings and loan associations
and Federal mutual savings banks so that they may better serve the consumer and remain
viable in a market environment.”).
127. S. REP. NO. 96-368, at 12–13 (1979) (“Thrifts have historically functioned as
depositories and home mortgage lenders . . . . This legislation gives federal savings and loans
the ability to compete for the savings dollar while remaining housing oriented.”). Subsequent
legislation during the 1980s continued to support the thrift industry. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 97641, at 85 (1982) (Conf. Rep.) (The purpose of the Act was “to revitalize the housing industry
by strengthening the financial stability of home mortgage lending institutions and ensuring
the availability of home mortgage loans.”); H.R. REP. NO. 100-261, at 164 (1987) (Conf.
Rep.) (“The House Bill and the Senate amendment provide an approach for dealing with
troubled but well-managed and viable thrifts . . . . The overall objective of the two approaches
is to maximize the long-term viability of the thrift industry at the lowest cost to the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (SFLIC).”); S. REP. NO. 101-19, at 3 (1989) (“[T]he
Committee found most persuasive the testimony of those experts who concluded that good
reasons to maintain a separate thrift industry still exist. Essential to that conclusion, however,
is the assumption that the thrift industry will continue to pay a distinct economic role,
distinguishable from that fulfilled by the commercial banking industry, as the primary source
of residential housing finance.”).
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of banking organizations and securities firms. In 1999, Congress enacted
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), which repealed prohibitions on
the affiliation of banking organizations and securities firms. 128
3. Institution Powers Equalized
The third reason for convergence in the regulation of depository
institutions was the equalization of the powers of depository institutions.
In 1980, Congress authorized savings associations to offer interest
bearing checking accounts like banks,129 and required all insured
depository institutions to maintain reserves on deposits.130 In the lending
realm, Congress authorized savings associations to make commercial,
consumer, educational, credit card, and other types of loans offered by
banks.131 Congress also authorized the FHLBB to permit federal savings
128. Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999) (repealing sections 20 and
32 of the Banking Act of 1933). Congress extended the applicability of section 32 of the
Banking Act of 1933 to savings associations. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-86, §§ 103, 106, 101 Stat. 552, 566, 576. The GLBA also modified public
policy related to the regulation of insurance. In 1945, Congress passed the McCarranFerguson Act, granting states the power to regulate most aspects of the insurance business.
Pub. L. No. 79-15, § 2(b) 59 Stat. 33, 34 (1945) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2018)).
The McCarran-Ferguson Act states that “no act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any state for the purpose of regulating the business
of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance.” Id. Under the Act, a state law regulating the business
of insurance preempts a conflicting federal statute, unless the federal statute specifically
relates to the business of insurance. However, the GLBA specifically preempted any state
law preventing or restricting a depository institution from being affiliated with any insurer.
Still, reflecting Congressional deference to state law for the regulation of insurance activities,
GLBA included 13 safe harbors permitting state regulation, which cover advertising practices,
licensing requirements, various notices and disclaimers, tying, restrictions on paying fees to
non-licensed employees, and other potentially coercive sales practices. Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act ("GLBA”) § 104(d)(2)(B), 113 Stat. at 1353 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(B)).
129. Depository Institutions Deregulatory and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-221, § 303, 94 Stat. 132, 146 (1980) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 1832(a) (2018)).
130. Id. § 103., 94 Stat. at 133.
131. Id. §§ 401–402, 94 Stat. at 153–55 (unsecured consumer loans to up 20% of assets,
commercial real estate loans up to 20% of assets, residential construction loans up to 5% of
assets, education loans up to 5% of assets, and community development loans up to 2% of
assets); Garn-St German Depository Institutions Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 325, 96 Stat.
1469, 1500 (1982) (commercial loans up to 10% of assets); Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 301, 103 Stat. 183, 287 (1989)
(unsecured consumer loans to up 30% of assets); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 441(a), 105 Stat. 2236, 2381 (1991)
(unsecured consumer loans to up 35% of assets); Economic Growth and Regulatory
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2303, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-424
(1996) (commercial loans up to 20% of assets).
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associations to provide trust services, paralleling the authority available
to national banks.132 In 1982, Congress authorized insured savings
associations to offer demand deposits, which brought parity to deposit
taking activity.133
4. Banking System Membership and Access to Services Expanded
The fourth reason for convergence in the regulation of depository
institutions was the expansion of institutions eligible for FHLB System
membership and access to FR System services. In 1980, Congress
mandated that Federal Reserve Banks make their services and loans
equally available to all depository institutions.134 In 1989, Congress
expanded the scope of institutions eligible for FHLB System membership
by authorizing any depository institution with at least 10% of its total
assets in residential mortgage loans to become FHLB members.135 In
1999, the GLBA authorized FDIC-insured banks with average assets
under $500 million to become members of the FHLB System, regardless
of its percentage of assets in residential mortgages. 136
5. Deposit Insurance Extended and Unified
The fifth reason for convergence in the regulation of depository
institutions was the extension of deposit insurance to ILCs and merger of
deposit insurance funds. In the 1930s, Congress provided for separate
insurance funds with the FDIC insuring bank deposits and the FSLIC
insuring savings association deposits.137 In 1982, Congress required the
FDIC to insure the deposits of ILCs. 138 In 1989, Congress moved
132. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 § 403, 94
Stat. at 156.
133. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 § 312, 96 Stat. at 1496.
134. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 § 107, 94
Stat. at 141.
135. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, § 704, 103
Stat. at 415.
136. Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 602, 113 Stat. 1338, 1450 (1999).
137. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 11(b), 48 Stat. 162, 181 (1933); Banking
Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, § 101, 49 Stat. 684, 702 (1935).
138. Garn-St Germain Act of 1982 § 703, 96 Stat. at 1538. In 1933, the FDIC determined
that that industrial loan companies (“ILCs”) were not eligible for deposit insurance. Mindy
West, The FDIC’s Supervision of ILCs: A Historical Perspective 8 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.
SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, Summer 2004; see also GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-
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administration of the savings association deposit fund from the FLSIC to
the FDIC.139 In 2006, Congress merged the bank and savings association
funds into one fund administered by the FDIC.140 Currently, banks,
thrifts, and ILCs operate under the same laws and regulations applicable
to deposit accounts.
6. Branching Rights Parity
The sixth reason for convergence in the regulation of depository
institutions was that Congress and state legislatures slowly established
parity in the branching rights of depository institutions. Historically,
thrifts141 and ILCs142 enjoyed more expansive rights to establish branches
than banks. In the early 1980s, several states authorized interstate
branching by banks and BHCs. Some states allowed banks from any state
to enter the state.143 Other states provided for entry on a reciprocal

621, INDUSTRIAL LOAN CORPORATIONS: RECENT ASSET GROWTH AND COMMERCIAL INTEREST
HIGHLIGHT DIFFERENCES IN REGULATORY AUTHORITY 16 (2005). In 1934, the FDIC insured
the thrift certificates of twenty-nine ILCs. Barth et al., supra note 105, at 11. Thereafter, the
FDIC made deposit insurance determinations on a case-by-case basis.
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 138; West, supra note 138, at 8 fn. 9 (stating that fortyfive industrial banks became federally insured before 1982 where state law permitted the use
of “bank” in the name).
139. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, §§ 401–402,
103 Stat. at 354, 357.
140. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 2102, 120 Stat. 4, 9 (2006).
141. WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at § 6.02[1] (“Historically, federal thrift enjoyed a
significant advantage over national banks, in terms of their ability to branch, as the latter were
prohibited to branch interstate and were bound by state branching restrictions within the state
where they were located.”) In 1991, the OTS noted that Congress had given the FHLBB and
OTS "exceptionally broad authority to regulate from 'cradle to grave' the branching operations
and other activities of federal thrifts" and that "the courts have confirmed that the OTS's
authority in this respect is plenary and not bounded by any restrictions of state law." Policy
Statement on Branching by Federal Savings Associations, 56 Fed. Reg. 67236, 67237 (Dec.
30, 1991) (citations omitted). Therefore, the OTS stated that “federal savings associations
may be allowed to branch on an interstate basis." Id.
142. West, supra note 138, at 7; see also RAYMOND J. SAULNIER, INDUSTRIAL BANKING
COMPANIES AND THEIR CREDIT PRACTICES 48–50 (1940) (some states allowed industrial loan
company branches but imposed limitations).
143. EMMANUEL N. ROUSSAKIS, COMMERCIAL BANKING IN AN ERA OF DEREGULATION 45
(Praeger, 3d ed. 1997) (citing Alaska, Arizona, Texas, Oklahoma, and Maine). In 1978, the
state of Maine authorized interstate banking on a reciprocal nationwide basis. Phillip E.
Strahan, The Real Effects of U.S. Banking Deregulation, 85 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV.
July/Aug. 2003, 111, 112; see also Dean F. Amel, State Law Affecting the Geographic
Expansion
of
Commercial
Banks 18
(1993)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/state-laws-affecting-geographic-expansion-commercialbanks-4954 [https://perma.cc/EL7Z-3ZKT] (describing entry laws in Maine).
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basis,144 authorized entry for special-purpose facilities such as credit card
operations,145 or authorized the acquisition of a troubled or failing
institution.146 By 1992, all states but Hawaii had passed laws authorizing
regional or nationwide branching.147
The biggest step toward bank parity with savings association
regarding branches came through the enactment of the Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (“Riegle-Neal
Act”). 148 The Riegle-Neal Act authorized a bank in a state that satisfied
several conditions to acquire an existing bank in another state, unless the
state opted-out of interstate banking.149 Only two states opted out.150
Forty-seven states adopted legislation authorizing interstate branching
legislation.151 All but two of these states chose to bar de novo interstate
branching–opening a new in-state branch rather than acquiring an
existing branch.152 The Act largely eliminated the advantage federal
savings associations held over banks related to interstate branching. 153
144. ROUSSAKIS, supra note 143, at 45 (citing Kentucky, New York, Washington, and West
Virginia). The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionally of the regional bank compacts
in 1985. Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 472 U.S. 159
(1985); see also State Laws Gain Renewed Significance as Congress Stumbles, BANKING
POL’Y REP., Jan. 6, 1992, at 10.
145. ROUSSAKIS, supra note 143, at 45 (citing South Dakota and Delaware).
146. Id.
147. Jith Jayaratne & Phillip E. Strahan, Entry Restrictions, Industry Evolution, and
Dynamic Efficiency: Evidence from Commercial Banking, 41 J. L. & ECON. 239, 243, 245
tbl.1 (1998).
148. Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994).
149. Id. §§ 101, 102, 108 Stat. at 2339–2343; see also Riegle-Neal Amendments Act of
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-24, § 2, 111 Stat. 238 (1997) (establishing that laws of a state bank’s
host state apply only to the extent that they would apply to a branch of an out-of-state national
bank).
150. All But Few States Beat Trigger Date on Nationwide Branching, BANKING POL’Y REP.,
June 1992, at 11 (“Texas and Montana were the only states to opt-out but in both cases the
law includes a sunset provision that will automatically cancel the opt-out provision.”); Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 86, at 4 (“Only one state, Texas, had ‘opted-out.’”).
151. All But Few States Beat Trigger Date on Nationwide Branching, supra note 150 (“As
of May 23, 47 states plus the District of Columbia had acted on interstate branching under the
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.”).
152. Id. (“Most states chose to bar de novo interstate branching – that is, opening a brand
new in-state branch rather than having to acquire an in-state bank.”).
153. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 86, at 3 (“The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 reduced much of the historical branching advantage of
savings institutions.”). Still, federal savings associations maintained slight branching
advantages over banks. A federal savings association could establish an interstate de novo
branch, while a bank was not authorized to do so unless the state affirmatively opted-in to
such branching (and only one state did so). Id. at 4 (“Of the states that have ‘opted-in,’
however, only Indiana and Puerto Rico allow immediate interstate branching.”). However,
Congress eliminated the opt-in requirement for de novo branching in 2010, which allowed
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7. Restraints on Activities Extended
The seventh reason for convergence in the regulation of
depository institutions was the extension of many of the prohibitions,
restrictions, and limitations initially applicable to banks to savings
associations. In 1966, Congress authorized the FHLBB to limit the
deposit interest rates paid by savings associations,154 as the FRB and
FDIC exercised similar authority to limit the deposit interest rates paid
by banks beginning in the 1930s.155 In 1987, savings associations also
temporarily became subject to a prohibition on affiliations with securities
firms that applied banks.156 Congress repealed these prohibitions for all
institutions in 1999.157 Restrictions on loans to directors, officers, and
principal shareholders applicable to banks became applicable to savings
associations in 1989.158 Savings associations also became subject to
banks to establish branches nationwide on a de novo basis. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act"), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 613(a), 124 Stat.
1376, 1614 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 36(g)(1)(A) (pertaining to national banks); 12
U.S.C. § 1828(d)(4)(A)(i) (pertaining to state insured banks)).
154. An Act of Sept. 21, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-597, §§ 2(c), 3, 4, 80 Stat. 823, 824–825.
Even then, the FHLBB, the FRB, and FDIC established interest rate ceilings that gave savings
and loan associations an advantage over banks in attracting deposits. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON REGULATION Q:
DEPOSIT INTEREST RATE CEILINGS AND HOUSING CREDIT 40 (1979) (“Thus, the beginning of
the “differential” saw a 75 basis point advantage in passbook savings for savings and loan
associations over commercial banks, and a 25 basis point advantage for the former in small
CDs.”). Savings associations could pay a higher rate of interest on deposits than banks until
deposit interest rate ceilings were eliminated in 1986. Depository Institutions Deregulation
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 202, 94 Stat. 132, 142. ILCs were not subject to deposit
interest rate limitations. Barth et al., supra note 105, at 22 n. 18.
155. Member banks became subject to a prohibition against payment of interest on demand
deposits and an interest rate ceiling on other deposits in 1933. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L.
No. 73-66, § 11(b), 148 Stat. 162, 181. State nonmember banks became subject to the same
prohibition and ceiling in 1935. Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, § 101, 49 Stat.
684, 702. The Board implemented the prohibition and ceiling through promulgation of
Regulation Q. Regulation Q, Series 1933, Payment of Interest on Deposits, 19 FED. RES.
BULL. 571 (1933). The FDIC issued Regulation IV. 1935 FDIC ANN. REP. 95. In 1980,
Congress mandated the elimination of deposit interest rate ceilings by 1986. Depository
Institution Deregulation Act of 1980 § 202, 94 Stat. at 142. Congress eliminated the
prohibition against payment of interest on demand deposits in 2010. Dodd-Frank Act, § 627,
124 Stat. at 1640. Regulation Q was repealed effective July 21, 2011. Prohibition Against
Payment of Interest on Demand Deposits, 76 Fed. Reg. 42015 (July 18, 2011).
156. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 106(a)–(b), 101
Stat. 552, 576 (expired Mar. 1, 1988).
157. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338,
1341 (1999).
158. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, § 301, 103 Stat. 183, 342 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1468 (2018)).
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limitations that applied to bank loans and other covered transactions with
affiliates in 1989.159
8. Similar Accountability Measures Imposed
The eighth reason for convergence in the regulation of depository
institutions was the imposition of similar accountability measures for all
depository institutions. In 1989, Congress imposed cross-guarantee
liability on commonly controlled depository institutions.160 In 1991,
Congress required all of the federal banking agencies to take prompt
corrective action when a depository institution under its jurisdiction
failed to meet capital requirements.161 At the same time, Congress
imposed requirements on depository institution management,
accountants, and audit committees to enhance accountability for financial
statements, internal controls, and compliance with law and regulation. 162
Through laws enacted in 1966, 1978, and 1989, Congress strengthened
the authority of all of the federal banking agencies to take enforcement
action against depository institutions and institution-affiliated parties.163
159. Id. at § 301; see generally WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at § 13.01[1].
160. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, § 206, 103

Stat. at 201 (stating that, with certain exceptions, if the FDIC or FSLIC incurred a loss in
connection with the default of an insured bank or thrift or in connection with providing
assistance to a bank or thrift in danger of default, any other commonly controlled insured
depository institution may be required to reimburse the FDIC for such loss).
161. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102242, § 131, 105 Stat. 2236, 2253. Congress established mandatory and discretionary
restrictions on any depository institution that fails to remain at least adequately capitalized.
12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)–(i) (2018). The mandates become progressively more restrictive as
capital levels decrease: (i) restricting discount window borrowing, (ii) requiring a capital
restoration plan, (iii) prohibiting asset growth, acquisitions, new lines of business, (iv)
restricting interest rates paid, (v) requiring election of new directors or dismissal of senior
management, (vi) requiring divestitures, and (vii) prohibiting payments on subordinated debt.
Id. The agencies must issue a PCA directive to impose certain provisions on a significantly
or critically undercapitalized bank. Id. The agencies may also issue a PCA directive to
impose discretionary provisions on an undercapitalized bank. Id. at § 1831o(f)(2). Within 90
days of a depository institution’s becoming critically undercapitalized, the agency must
appoint a receiver, or take such other action that the agency, with the concurrence of the FDIC,
determines would better serve the purposes of a PCA. Id. § 1831o(h)(3).
162. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, § 112, 105 Stat. at
2242.
163. Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-695, §§ 102,201, 80
Stat. 1028, 1036, 1040, 1046, 1049 (authorizing federal banking regulators to issue cease and
desist orders, remove any bank officer or director for breach of fiduciary duty, and suspend
any officer or director charged with a felony involving dishonesty or breach of trust);
Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630,
§§ 103,107(b), 92 Stat. 3641, 3643, 3657 (authorizing assessment of civil money penalties
against depository institutions and issuance of temporary cease and desist orders); Financial
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9. Uniform Accounting Rules and Tax Treatment Mandated
The ninth reason for convergence in the regulation of depository
institutions was that Congress mandated that thrifts use the same
accounting rules that applied to banks and eliminated favorable tax
treatment of thrifts over banks. With regard to accounting, Congress
required thrifts to shift from Regulatory Accounting Principles to
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) to the same extent
required of banks,164 mandated the phase-out of the inclusion of
“supervisory goodwill” in the calculation of regulatory capital, 165 and
directed an end to the deferral of loan losses resulting from adverse
changes in interest rates.166 With regard to federal income tax, Congress
subjected thrifts to federal income tax in 1954.167 However, Congress
allowed mutual thrifts to calculate reserves for bad debts in ways more
favorable than the method required for banks.168 Congress gradually
diminished the favorable treatment mutual thrifts enjoyed related to
reserves for bad debts.169 The tax acts of 1969, 1976, and 1986 gradually
diminished the impact of this tax advantage.170 In 1996, Congress totally
eliminated the preferential tax treatment of thrifts.171
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 §§ 224, 902(a), 907, 913, 926,
103 Stat. at 450, 451, 462, 483, 488 (requiring FDIC approval for less than adequately
capitalized banks to accept brokered deposits, expanded authority to issue cease and desist
orders to cover specific banking activities, authorized issuance of temporary orders to restrict
an insured bank’s growth, authorized expedited termination of deposit insurance coverage,
established a three-tiered system for assessment of civil money penalties, and required federal
banking agencies to publicly disclose enforcement actions).
164. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 § 301, 103
Stat. at 280.
165. Id. This action caused many more savings associations to fall out of compliance with
capital standards and face closure. WILLIAMS, supra note 102 § 1.03[4].
166. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, § 301, 103
Stat. at 280. The FHLBB started to allow the deferral of loan losses in 1981. Treatment of
Gains and Losses on the Sale or Other Disposition of Mortgage Assets, Mortgage-Related
Securities; Republication of Reserve Requirements, 46 Fed. Reg. 50048 (Sept. 9, 1981)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. § 563c.14 (1981)).
167. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 11, 68A Stat. 3, 11.
168. Id. at § 593, 68A Stat. at 205.
169. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 6, 76 Stat. 960, 977–78 (1962) (amending
§ 593 of Internal Revenue Code of 1954); see also Ronald W. Masulis, Changes in Ownership
Structure; Conversions of Mutual Savings and Loans to Stock Charter, 18 J. OF FIN. ECON.
29, 30 (1987).
170. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 57, 83 Stat. 487, 581–82; Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 605, 90 Stat. 1520, 1575; Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-514, § 901, 100 Stat. 2085, 2375.
171. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1616, 110 Stat.
1755, 1854 (codified at 26 U.S.C. 593 (2018)). Before this Act, thrifts could claim deductions
for addition to a bad-debt reserve, using either the percentage of income method (deduct
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10. Ambiguous Institution Names Permitted
The tenth reason for convergence in the regulation of depository
institutions is the use of names by depository institutions that blur the
distinctions between different types of depository institutions.
Ambiguity arises from use of trade names, names of acquired institutions,
and legal names that reflect an institution’s charter prior to conversion to
another type of charter (e.g., use of the word “bank” for the name of a
branch of a savings association).172 Additional ambiguity about the type
of institution represented by a name arises from the use of the word
“bank” in the legal name of thrift institutions (e.g., federal savings bank
and state savings bank).173 Furthermore, the use of the word “bank” by
ILCs dilutes the meaning of the word in the name of a depository
institution (e.g., “industrial bank”).174
11. Institution Policy Changed
Finally, the regulation of depository institutions has converged
because expanded powers and revised assessments of risk and
profitability by depository institutions have prompted changes in policies
and entry into lines of business occupied by other depository institutions.
In simplistic terms, national banks entered the market for residential
against taxable income additions to bad-debt reserve equal to 8% of taxable income) or
experience method (based on institution’s bad-debt experience over previous 6 years). Prior
to January 1, 1987, the percentage of taxable income limitation was 40%. Banks with total
assets over $500 million required to deduct bad-debts as they occurred using the specific
charged-off method, while smaller banks allowed to use the experience method or the specific
charge-off method. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 86, at 3.
172. FED. RESERVE BD. ET AL., SR-98-14, INTERAGENCY POLICY STATEMENT ON BRANCH
NAMES (1998), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/1998/SR9814.HTM
[https://perma.cc/X8SP-RRWC] (permitting depository institution use of a different trade
name for branches acquired from another institution so long as the institution takes steps to
avoid customer confusion with respect to the extent of deposit insurance coverage). Cf. FED.
FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, FFEIC 041, CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF CONDITION AND
INCOME
FOR
A
BANK
WITH
DOMESTIC
OFFICES
ONLY
44
(2020),
https://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/FFIEC_forms/FFIEC041_202012_f.pdf [https://perma.cc/CKN2ZUBJ] (“trade names other than the reporting institution’s legal title used to identify one or
more of the institution’s physical offices at which deposits are accepted or solicited form the
public, if any”).
173. Donald I. Hovde, Eight Trends Shaping the Industry, 19 FED. HOME LOAN BANK J.,
May 1989, at 14.
174. BARTH ET AL., ILCS: SUPPORTING AMERICA’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM 28, 77 app. 3 (2012);
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 138, at 25.
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mortgage loans175 and consumer loans176 in the late 1920s and thrifts
entered the market for commercial and consumer loans in the early
1980s.177
175. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, §24, 38 Stat. 251, 273 (1913) (improved and
unencumbered farmland); McFadden Act, Pub. L. No. 69-639, § 16, 44 Stat. 1224, 1232
(1927) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 371) (improved real estate). In 1900, non-institutional lenders
held almost 50% of the nonfarm residential mortgage debt, followed by mutual savings banks
with approximately 22%, savings and loan associations with 13%, commercial banks with
6%, and life insurance companies with 5%. LEO GREBLER ET AL., CAPITAL FORMATION IN
RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE 197 tbl. 54, 200 chart 23 (1956) (non-farm residential mortgage
debt); see also CARL F. BEHRENS, COMMERCIAL BANK ACTIVITIES IN URBAN MORTGAGE
FINANCING 33, tbl. 4 (1952) (commercial banks held 18.2% of nonfarm mortgage debt in
1949). In 1913, state banks accounted for more than 95% of residential real estate loans held
by all commercial banks, and such loans accounted for 16% of the total assets of state banks.
After national banks obtained the authority to make loans secured by a first lien on improved
real estate in 1927, national banks began to hold a larger portion of residential real estate loans
relative to state banks.
176. At the beginning of the twentieth century, banks rarely made consumer loans. See
supra section III.A.8. Working people relied on industrial loan banks, finance companies,
credit unions, pawn shops, loan sharks, and others for small loans to purchase goods or meet
unexpected expenses. CLARK, supra note 74, at 27–29. However, banks saw profit
opportunities in lending to consumers as the century progressed. In 1928, the National City
Bank of New York (predecessor of Citibank) opened a personal loan department to make
loans unsecured by tangible property. Id. at 9, 75. More than 100 banks quickly opened
similar departments. Id. By 1936, 685 banks operated personal loan departments. NUGENT,
supra note 74, at 342. The consumer debt held by the personal loan departments grew from
$17 million in 1928 to $131 million in 1936. Id. at 343.
177. In the 1980s, thrifts began to offer new deposit and loan products enabled by broader
authorities granted by Congress. Thrifts were authorized to extend their lending beyond
financing residential real estate to lending for consumer, commercial, educational, and other
purposes. See, e.g., Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 401,402, 94 Stat. 132, 153–155 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1461)
(authorizing unsecured consumer loans to up 20% of assets, commercial real estate loans up
to 20% of assets, residential construction loans up to 5% of assets, education loans up to 5%
of assets, and community development loans up to 2% of assets); Garn-St Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 325, 96 Stat. 1469, 1500 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1464) (authorizing commercial loans up to 10% of assets); Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 301, 103
Stat. 183, 287 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464) (authorizing unsecured consumer loans to up
30% of assets); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-242, § 441(a), 105 Stat. 2236, 2381 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464) (unsecured
consumer loans to up 35% of assets); Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2303, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-424 (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1464) (authorizing commercial loans up to 20% of assets). Congress also
authorized thrifts to offer the interest-bearing checking accounts and demand deposit
accounts. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, § 303, 94
Stat. at 146; Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, § 312, 96 Stat. at 1496.
Unfortunately, the inexperience of thrifts with these new lines of business became a
significant contributor to the failure of many institutions. NAT’L COMM’N ON FIN. INST.
REFORM, RECOVERY, AND ENF’T, supra note 113, at 2, 42 (“The S&L’s asset and liability
powers were expanded sharply, and they were allowed to move rapidly into risky new areas
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Remaining Differences

Small differences remain in the regulation of banks and thrifts
related to banking system membership, intrastate branching, types of
lending, and permissible activities.
1. FHLB System Membership Eligibility
First, some differences in eligibility for bank system membership
remain in place. Savings associations are not eligible for membership in
the FR System,178 but savings associations are eligible for membership
FHLB System.179 However, savings associations are subject to stricter
eligibility requirements than banks for membership in the FHLB System.
A savings association must meet the QTL test to be eligible for and
maintain membership in the FHLB System. 180 More dramatically, an
insured bank with average assets under $500 million may become a
member of the FHLB System, regardless of its percent of assets in
residential mortgages.181
2. Intrastate Branching Rights
Second, there are differences in federal law applicable to
branching by banks and thrifts. Thrifts are permitted to establish

of business in which they lacked expertise . . . . [The FHLBB] allowed members . . . to enter
risky areas in which they had little or no experience, and in which there was an unusual
potential for abuse and fraud.”); LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY
LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION 115, 117 (1991) (“The hundreds of rapidly
growing thrifts of the 1982-1985 period did not use their new powers for prudent
diversification. Rather, these thrifts plunged into new assets and investments in ways that
increased their risks, not decreased them . . . . [Insolvent thrifts] largely failed because of an
amalgam of deliberately high-risk strategies, poor business judgments, foolish strategies,
excessive optimism, and sloppy and careless underwriting, compounded by deteriorating real
estate markets.” (emphasis in original)).
178. 1 FED. RES. BULL. 212 (1915).
179. Federal Home Loan Bank Act § 4(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1424.
180. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(a)(1)(D)(ii)(I), (b). The QTL test requires a savings association to
have at least 65% of its total assets in residential real estate loans or investments. However,
an insured bank with $500 million or more in total assets must only hold 10% of its total assets
in residential real estate loans and investments to continue to maintain its FHLB System
membership. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(m)(1), (3)(C).
181. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) §§ 602, 605, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1422(10), 1424(a)(1).
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interstate and intrastate branches regardless of state law. 182 While
national and state banks may establish interstate branches, they are still
limited to locations within a state where a locally chartered state bank
would be permitted to establish a branch.183
3. Lending and Investment Limitations
Third, there are differences in federal law related to lending. To
remain regulated as a federal savings association, the association must
meet the QTL test or qualify as a domestic building and loan association
under the Internal Revenue Code.184 While federal savings associations
can engage in almost all of the types of lending authorized for national
banks, they are subject to a percentage of total asset limitations. For
example, a bank may concentrate its overall lending in commercial real
estate loans subject only to the management of risk consistent with safe
and sound banking practices,185 but the commercial real estate loans made
by a federal savings association are limited to 20% of its total assets.186
4. Permissible Activities
Finally, there are minor differences in the permissible activities
of banks and thrifts under federal law. For instance, federal savings
associations are authorized to engage in real estate brokerage,
management, and development activities through service corporations.187
National banks and their subsidiaries, however, are not authorized to
182. WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at § 6.02[2] (“Federal savings institutions have the
statutory authority to branch nationwide, subject to few constraints. The authority of the . . .
OTS to permit interstate expansion by federal institutions derives from the agency’s ‘plenary
authority’ with respect to federal institutions.”). id. (“[I]ntrastate restrictions on branching
continue to apply to national banks, to the same extent as their state counterparts, and federal
thrifts are not similarly constrained.”)
183. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”),
§ 613(a), 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(g)(1)(A), 1828(d)(4)(A)(i) (pertaining to national banks and state
insured banks respectively); see also 12 U.S.C. § 321 (pertaining to state member banks).
184. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(m)(1), (m)(3)(C).
185. FED. RESERVE BD. ET AL., SR 15-15, INTERAGENCY STATEMENT ON PRUDENT RISK
MANAGEMENT FOR COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LENDING (2015).
186. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(2)(A) (2018). Similarly, a federal savings association’s
consumer lending is limited to 35% of its total assets, construction lending is limited to 5%
of total assets, and community development lending is limited to 2% of total assets. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(c)(2)(D), (c)(3)(A), (c)(3)(C) (2018).
187. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(4)(B) (2018); 12 C.F.R. § 5.59 (2019).
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engage in these activities.188 On the other hand, national banks and state
banks may engage in certain financial activities through a financial
subsidiary, while savings associations are not permitted to form financial
subsidiaries.189
D.

Proposals to Eliminate the Thrift Charter

The convergence in the regulation and activities of banks and
thrifts prompted proposals for the elimination of the thrift charter. In the
late 1990s, Congress considered legislation to eliminate the federal
savings association charter, but support for a separate thrift industry led
to the preservation of the charter.190 In 2018, Congress granted the OCC
the authority to permit certain federal savings associations to operate
subject to the same investment and lending powers as a national bank
without converting to a national bank.191 The authority results in a
functional elimination of the thrift charter without requiring thrifts to
change their form of organization. Going further, at least two states have
eliminated their thrift charters while adopting a universal charter for
banks.192
188. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 624, 123 Stat. 524, 678
(2009) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 1843 nt.); see also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), Pub.
L. No. 106-102, § 121(a), 113 Stat. 1338, 1373 (1999) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(2)(B)(ii)
(2018)).
189. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) § 121(a), (d), 113 Stat. at 1373, 1380
(authorizing a national bank or state bank to form a financial subsidiary). Neither a national
bank nor a state bank may engage in securities underwriting, insurance underwriting, or
merchant banking through financial subsidiary.
190. See, e.g., H.R. 2363, 104th Cong. § 201 (1995); H.R. 268, 105th Cong. § 502 (1997);
see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra Note 86, at 1; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ELIMINATING
THE THRIFT CHARTER (1997). These discussions followed the thrift crisis of the 1980s and
the transfer of responsibility for supervision of thrifts from the FHLBB to the OTS by
FIRREA. Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 301, 401, 103 Stat. 183, 278, 354 (1989) (codified at 12
U.S.C. 1462a, 1437 nt.). At the time of enactment of FIRREA, there was still congressional
support for a separate thrift industry. S. REP. NO. 101-19, at 3 (1989) (“[T]he Committee
found most persuasive the testimony of those experts who concluded that good reasons to
maintain a separate thrift industry still exist. Essential to that conclusion, however, is the
assumption that the thrift industry will continue to pay a distinct economic role,
distinguishable from that fulfilled by the commercial banking industry, as the primary source
of residential housing finance.”).
191. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115174, § 206, 132 Stat. 1296, 1310 (2018) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 1464a); see also Covered
Savings Associations, 84 Fed. Reg. 23991 (May 24, 2019) (final regulation).
192. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1101.01(B) (2019); WIS. STAT. § 222.0102 (2019);
see also Kevin Allard, State Focus: Ohio, CSBS (Jan. 22, 2019),
https://www.csbs.org/newsroom/state-focus-ohio [https://perma.cc/TQ3B-NBKE] (“[T]he
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The advantages and disadvantages of proposals to eliminate the
thrift charter are beyond the scope of this article. However, the related
issue of a unified statutory scheme for the regulation and supervision of
DIHCs is taken up in the conclusion of this article. The following review
of differentiation and convergence in the regulation and supervision of
DIHCs provides the foundation for the recommendation made in the
conclusion that Congress unify regulation of all companies controlling an
FDIC-insured depository institution in one statute of uniform application.
IV. DIFFERENTIATION AND CONVERGENCE IN THE REGULATION OF
DIHCS
Generally, a company owning or controlling a bank is a BHC,193
while a company owning or controlling a saving association is an
SLHC.194 If a company owns or controls both a bank and a savings
association, it is a BHC.195 A company owning or controlling a state
savings bank is a BHC unless its subsidiary state savings bank files an
election with the FDIC to be treated as a savings association.196 Then,
the holding company is regulated as an SLHC rather than a BHC unless
the company also controls another entity that is a “bank” under the
BHCA.197 Companies owning or controlling a credit card bank, a nondepository trust company, or an ILC are not subject to regulation as BHCs
or SLHCs198 unless they also own or control a bank or thrift.199
The activities permissible for a DIHC depend upon the type of
holding company. BHCs are prohibited from owning or controlling any
company other than a bank or engaging in any business other than
managing or controlling banks unless the activity fits within the
exemptions specified in the BHCA, such as an activity “so closely related

creation of a “universal” bank charter in the state . . . consolidate[es] the three existing charter
types into one universal charter. On Jan. 1, 2018, this new universal “state bank” charter
became effective, encompassing Ohio-chartered banks, savings and loan associations (S&Ls)
and savings banks.”).
193. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2018).
194. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(a)(1)(D).
195. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1).
196. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(l).
197. Id. § 1841(a)(1).
198. Id. § 1841(c)(2)(D), (F), (H).
199. Id. §§ 1467a(a)(1)(D), 1841(a)(1).
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to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident
thereto.”200
SLHCs that own or control more than one savings association are
prohibited from engaging in any business activity other than exempt
activities specified in the Home Owners’ Loan Act (“HOLA”). 201 Certain
SLHCs that own or control only one savings association not subject to
the activities restrictions of HOLA if their subsidiary savings associations
satisfy the requirements for a QTL. 202 These SLHCs are called
grandfathered unitary savings and loan holding companies
(“GUSLHCs”).
BHCs and SLHCs that become financial holding companies
(“FHCs”) may engage in certain financial activities, as well as activities
incidental or complementary to a financial activity.203 Financial activities
include securities underwriting and dealing, insurance underwriting and
agency, merchant banking activities, activities previously determined by
the FRB to be closely related to banking, and activities routine in
connection with the transaction of banking abroad.204 The FRB may also
determine that an activity is “complementary to a financial activity and
does not pose a substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depository
institutions or the financial system generally."205
The activities of a parent company of an industrial loan company
are not limited by banking law or regulation because they are not BHCs
or SLHCs under the BHCA or HOLA, respectively.206 Parent companies
of ILCs are free to engage in commercial activities without the
restrictions of the BHCA an HOLA applicable to BHCs and SLHCs,
respectively. ILCs have engaged in a variety of commercial activities,
including automobile manufacturing, retail consumer sales,
transportation, and energy production.207 The FDIC’s recent proposal

200. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, § 4(a), (c)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 1843.
201. Home Owners’ Loan Act § 2, 12 U.S.C. § 1730a.
202. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)((3)(A).
203. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) § 103(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k); Dodd-Frank

Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) § 606(b), 12 U.S.C. §
1467a(c).
204. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4).
205. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B).
206. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1462(2), 1813(b)(1), 1841(c)(2)(H).
207. BARTH ET AL., supra note 174, at 16–17; GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note
138, at 66.
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regarding the supervision of the parent companies of ILCs would not
limit them to financial or any other activities.208
A.

Growth in the Number of Holding Companies

During the latter half of the twentieth century, banks and thrifts
generally found it advantageous to form DIHCs. The commonly cited
reasons for the formation of holding companies include providing access
to capital markets, facilitating acquisitions, expanding activities, and
avoiding state franchise taxes.209 The following chart shows the growth
in the number of BHCs.

Figure 1
Source: FRB Annual Reports, FFIEC, National Information Center

Figure 1 shows the number of BHCs grew from 69 in 1956 to a
high of 6,474 in 1988.210 In 1988, BHCs controlled 9,025 banks, which
held 91% of the assets of all insured commercial banks. 211 At the end of
2019, there were 3,725 top-tier BHCs that controlled 3,827 banks, which
208. See Parent Companies of Industrial Banks and Industrial Loan Companies, 85 Fed.
Reg. 17771 (Mar. 31, 2020). This proposal differs from the FDIC’s 2007 proposal, which
limited the control of ILCs to financial companies and required a commitment from the parent
company that it would only engage, directly or indirectly in financial activities. Industrial
Bank Subsidiaries of Financial Companies, 72 Fed. Reg. 5217, 5224 (Feb. 5, 2007).
209. See, e.g., L. GARRETT DUTTON, JR. & WILLIAM R. COLMERY, FORMATION OF A BANK
HOLDING COMPANY IN PENNSYLVANIA 2–12 (Packard Press, 1982).
210. MARK B. GREENLEE, GROWTH OF BHCS (1957–2019), [https://perma.cc/8SH4-JKYB]
(calculating the change in the number of BHCs based on information obtained from FRB
annual reports, available at provided link); 1957 FRB ANN. REP. 71; 1988 FRB ANN. REP.
169.
211. 1988 FRB ANN. REP. 169.
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held $23.1 trillion in total assets, which represented 94% of the assets of
all insured commercial banks.212

Figure 2
Source: FFIEC, National Information Center

Figure 2 shows the growth in the number of SLHCs from two in
1968 to a high of 893 in 2008.213 In 2008, SLHCs controlled 479 savings
associations with total assets of $767 billion, which represented 62% of
all assets of savings associations.214 At the end of 2019, there were 187
top-tier SLHCs that controlled 195 depository institutions, which held
$1.86 trillion in total assets.215 Approximately 92% of SLHCs engaged
primarily in depository activities.216 The other SLHCs engaged primarily

212. 2019 FRB ANN. REP., 41, 44. Any company with direct or indirect control of a bank
is a BHC. Many banking organizations use a tiered ownership structure. A “top-tier” BHC
is the ultimate parent of a banking organization.
213. National Information Center, FED. FIN. INSTITUTIONS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL,
[https://perma.cc/SRS3-FPQ4] (providing a copy of calculations based on data download
accessible through link); see also S. REP. NO. 86-810, at 4 (1959) (“At the time of the hearings
on the Financial Institutions Act of 1957, only two of these companies were known -one
controlling four associations in California, the other controlling two associations in Utah and
Idaho.”).
214. National Information Center, supra note 213.
215. 2019 FRB ANN. REP. 41, 45. There were 358 SLHCs at this time, 171 of which were
subsidiaries of top-tier SLHCs. Id. Any company with direct or indirect control of a savings
association is an SLHC. Many thrift organizations use a tiered ownership structure. A “toptier” SLHC is the ultimate parent of a banking organization.
216. Id. at 41.
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in nonbanking activities, such as insurance underwriting, securities
brokerage, and commercial activities.217
Many commercial companies formed or acquired an ILC during
the latter half of the twentieth century. The following figure shows the
number of ILCs from 1910 to 2010.

Figure 3
Source: James R. Barth, Tong Li, Apanard Angkinand, Yuan-Hsin Chiang, and Li Li, ILCs:
Supporting America’s Financial System (Milliken Institute, 2012), Appendix 4.

Figure 3 shows the growth of ILCs from one institution in 1910
to a high of 254 institutions in 1966. The total assets held by all ILCs
was $408 million in 1966. The number of ILCs declined to 130 by 1977,
before increasing to 155 in 1983. The total assets of ILCs reached an alltime high of $270 billion in 2007, which were held by 94 ILCs. In 2010,
the number of ILCs declined to 78, which held $122 billion in total assets.
At the end of 2019, there were 34 ILCs with $102.4 billion in total
assets.218
For most of the twentieth century, the regulation of BHCs,
SLHCs, and parent companies of ILCs differed significantly. As the
twentieth century progressed, changes in public policy, market
developments, and changes in law made the regulation of BHCs and
SLHCs more and more similar. The following sections of this article

217. See id.
218. INDEP. COMTY. BANKS OF AMERICA, INDUSTRIAL LOAN COMPANIES: CLOSING THE

LOOPHOLE
TO
AVERT
CONSUMER
AND
SYSTEMIC
HARM
13
(2019),
https://www.icba.org/docs/default-source/icba/advocacy-documents/reports/ilc-whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF4J-GQ5P].
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summarize the areas of differentiation and convergence in the regulation
of DIHCs.
B.

Differentiation

Differentiation in the regulation of DIHCs arose from variations
in: (1) Congressional public policy objectives related to holding
company affiliations with other companies; (2) limitations on
transactions with affiliates; (3) reporting, examination, and voting permit
requirements; (4) permissible activities for holding companies; and
(5) Congressional concern about the separation of banking and
commerce.
1. Prohibitions on Affiliation with Securities Firms
Differentiation in the regulation of BHCs, SLHCs, and parent
companies of ILCs arose partially due to variations in federal law related
to bank affiliations with other companies. In the early 1930s, Congress
became concerned about the role of banks, their affiliates, and holding
companies in stock speculation that contributed to the stock market crash
of 1929.219 This concern led to provisions in the 1933 Act that prohibited
affiliations between a member bank and affiliates of a member bank with
securities firms,220 limited member bank transactions with affiliates,221
required member banks to obtain reports from affiliates, 222 and
conditioned voting of member bank stock by a holding company on
obtaining a permit from the FRB.223

219. The Senate report in support of the 1933 Act identified “excessive use of bank credit
in making loans for the purpose of stock speculation” as a source of the “panic of 1929.” S.
REP. NO. 73-77, at 9 (1933); S. REP. NO. 72-584, at 9 (1932). The same Senate report viewed
bank affiliates devoted to “perilous underwriting operations, stock speculation, and
maintaining a market for the banks’ own stock” as a large factor contributing to the panic of
1929. S. REP. NO. 73-77, at 10. Similarly, the House Report supported legislation to “prevent
the undue diversion of funds into speculative operations” and recommended provisions
“strengthening restrictions upon banks . . . making loans for speculative purposes.” H. REP.
NO. 73-150, at 1 (1933).
220. Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. 162, 184, 188, 189, 194 (1933).
221. Id. § 13, 48 Stat. at 183 (adding section 23A to the FR Act).
222. Id. § 5(c), 48 Stat. at 165.
223. Id. § 19, 48 Stat. at 186. The FRB issued Regulation P to implement the voting permit
provisions of the Banking Act of 1933. See Fed. Reserve Bd., Regulation P, Series of 1933,
Holding Company Affiliates –Voting Permits, 19 FED. RES. BULL. 505 (1933).
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The Glass-Steagall Act prohibited the affiliation of banking
organizations and securities firms. Section 20 of the 1933 Act prohibited
affiliations between a member bank 224 and any firm engaged principally
in the underwriting of securities, as well as affiliations between such
securities firms and shareholders of a member bank that owned or
controlled a majority of the shares of such a bank or owned or controlled
more than 50% of the number of shares voted for election of such bank’s
directors.225 This brought many companies that owned or controlled a
member bank within the scope of the prohibition. However, Section 20
did not apply to nonmember banks, savings associations, or the
companies controlling them.226 Section 21 prohibited any person
engaged in the underwriting of securities from receiving deposits.227
Section 32 prohibited interlocking directors and management between a
member bank and a securities firm.228
2. Limitations on Transactions with Affiliates
Differentiation in the regulation of BHCs, SLHCs, and parent
companies of ILCs also arose due to variations in the limitations on
affiliate transactions. The 1933 Act added Section 23A to the FR Act,
which limited (1) the aggregate amount of member bank transactions,
such as loans and investments, with any one affiliate to 10% of the
member bank’s capital and surplus; and (2) member bank transactions
with all affiliates to 20% of the member bank’s capital and surplus.229
224. All national banks were automatically member banks and state-chartered banks could
elect to become member banks. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251
(1913).
225. See Banking Act of 1933, § 2(c), 48 Stat. at 163.
226. WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at § 11.01[1] (The G-S Act “did not and does not apply to
thrifts for two reasons. First, at the time it was enacted, thrifts were small, locally oriented
institutions with a narrow focus on residential lending. . . . Second, thrifts were entirely statechartered and supervised . . . . And even though the subsequent enactment of HOLA provided
for federal chartering of thrifts, they still were not thought of as ‘banks’ because of their
limited powers and functions.”). Sections 20 and 32 of the G-S Act applied to savings
associations from August 10, 1987 to March 1, 1988. Competitive Equality Amendments of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 106, 101 Stat. 552, 576. Even then, the statute set forth a number
of exceptions to the prohibition related to specifically named entities and activities. Id.
227. Banking Act of 1933 § 21., 48 Stat. at 166, 189. As originally enacted, only section
21 of the G-S Act applied to nonmember banks and savings associations. Section 21 did not
apply to an ILC unless it received deposits rather than issued thrift certificates.
228. Id. § 32, 48 Stat. at 194.
229. Id. § 13, 48 Stat. at 183 (adding section 23A to the FR Act).
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These limitations applied to member bank transactions with a holding
company that owned or controlled a majority of the shares of the bank or
owned or controlled more than 50% of the number of shares voted for
election of the bank’s directors. 230 These limitations did not apply to
transactions between a nonmember state bank, SLHC, or parent company
of an ILC.231
For most of the twentieth century, the regulation of savings
association transactions with affiliates differed significantly from the
regulation of bank transactions with affiliates, because the 1933 Act did
not govern savings association transactions with affiliates. However, in
1968, the SLHCA prohibited certain transactions between a savings
association subsidiary of an SLHC and its affiliates, such as a parent
SLHC and its other subsidiaries.232 The SLHCA also required regulatory
approval for certain other transactions between a savings association
subsidiary of an SLHC and its affiliates. 233
3. Affiliate Reports, Examinations, and Voting Permits
Differentiation in the regulation of BHCs, SLHCs, and parent
companies of ILCs also arose from variation in the applicability of
reporting, examination, and voting permit requirements. The 1933 Act
enabled bank regulators to determine the relationships between member
banks and their affiliates. Member banks were required to provide the
FRB with reports obtained from affiliates to fully disclose the relations
between affiliates and the bank to enable the FRB to determine the effect
of the relations upon the affairs of the bank.234 In addition, holding

230. Id.
231. As discussed in Section IV.C.3, section 23A became applicable to state nonmember

banks, savings associations, and their affiliates. Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, §
12(c), 80 Stat. 236, 242 (applicable to state nonmember banks); Competitive Equality
Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 104(d), 101 Stat. 552, 573 (applicable to savings
association transactions with affiliates engaged in activities permissible for a BHC); Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 301, 103
Stat. 183, 342 (applicable to savings association transactions with all affiliates).
232. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, § 2,
82 Stat. 5, 8 (1968) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(e) (2018)) (amending section 408(d) of
the National Housing Act).
233. Id. The FHLBB also adopted implementing regulations. 54 Fed. Reg. 49552 (Nov.
20, 1989). In 1976, the FHLBB also promulgated conflict rules applicable to transactions
with “affiliated persons.” 41 Fed. Reg. 35811 (Feb. 24, 1976).
234. Banking Act of 1933 §§ 5; 27, 48 Stat. at 165, 191.
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company affiliates were required to obtain a permit from the FRB before
voting any stock of a member bank that it owned or controlled.235 In
applications for a voting permit, the FRB required the holding company
affiliate to agree to certain conditions, such as submission of reports and
consent to examination.236
4. Permissible Activities
Differentiation in the regulation of BHCs, SLHCs, and parent
companies of ILCs arose from variation in permissible activities.
Currently, the BHCA and HOLA restrict the activities of BHCs, SLHCs
and their non-depository subsidiaries, 237 but not the activities of
GUSLHCs238 or the parent companies of ILCs.239 BHCs and SLHCs may
not engage in any business or activity that is not authorized by statute,
regulation, or order. While there are substantial similarities in the
activities permissible under the BHCA and SLHCA, there also are
significant differences.240
i. Bank Holding Companies
In 1956, the BHCA required registration of companies owning or
controlling two or more banks as BHCs, prohibited a company from
acquiring two or more banks without the prior approval of the FRB, and
authorized the FRB to issue regulations, approve certain nonbanking
activities, require reports, conduct examinations, and enforce law and
regulation.241 With regard to activities, the BHCA prohibited a BHC
from engaging in any business other than managing or controlling banks,

235. Id. § 19, 48 Stat. at 186. The FRB issued Regulation P to implement the voting permit
provisions of the Banking Act of 1933. Fed. Reserve Bd., Regulation P, Series of 1933,
Holding Company Affiliates –Voting Permits, 19 FED. RES. BULL. 505 (1933).
236. Banking Act of 1933 § 19, 48 Stat. at 186.
237. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a(c), 1843(a).
238. Id. § 1467a(c)(3), (9)(C).
239. Id. § 1841(c)(2)(H).
240. The similarities and differences changed over time. In the following subsections a.
and b., a similarity is the authority to originate loans secured by real estate, and a difference
is SLHC authority to develop and manage real estate, which is not authorized by BHCs. See
Section IV.C.4. for current similarities and Section IV.D. for current differences in
permissible activities.
241. Pub. L. No. 84-511, §§ 3(a), 4(c)(6), 5(a)-(c), 70 Stat. 133, 134, 137 (1956).
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unless it fit within an exemption.242 The exemptions included holding
property used substantially in bank operations, acquiring shares of a
company in good faith in a fiduciary capacity, acquiring up to 5% of the
voting securities of any company, and engaging in activities approved by
the FRB as “so closely related to banking as to be a proper incident
thereto.”243 In the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970
(“1970 BHCA Amendments”), Congress brought one-bank holding
companies within the scope of the BHCA’s registration, activity,
approval, report, examination, and enforcement authority.244
The activities permissible for BHCs expanded most significantly
as the FRB interpreted its ability to authorize activities closely related to
banking. The FRB determined whether activities were “closely relatedactivities" by order on a case-by-case basis after notice and hearing. 245 In
1971, the FRB began to set forth permissible closely-related activities in
its Regulation Y.246 The activities listed in Regulation Y came to be
242. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 4(a), 70 Stat. at 135 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1843(a)). The 1970 amendments to the BHCA simplified the closely related to banking
exception to the BHCA’s generally prohibition on engaging in activities other than managing
or controlling banks by eliminating the requirement that the FRB determine it was
unnecessary to apply the nonbanking prohibitions of the BHCA in order to carry out the
purposes of the act. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607,
§ 103, 84 Stat. 1760, 1765 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)) (replacing section 4(c)(6) of
the BHCA with section 4(c)(8) of BHCA).
243. In connection with these activities, the FRB was also required to determine the activity
was so closely related to banking “as to make it unnecessary for the [nonbanking prohibitions
of the BHCA] to apply in order to carry out the purposes of [the BHCA].” Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 § 4(b)(6), 70 Stat. at 137. This requirement was eliminated in 1970.
244. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 §§ 101, 103, 84 Stat. at 1760,
1762–63.
245. See, e.g., First Wisconsin Bancshares, Corp., 45 FED. RES. BULL. 1136 (1959)
(approved operation of credit life insurance program in connection with bank loans); Otto
Bremer Co., 45 FED. RES. BULL. 892 (1959) (approved insurance agency activities provided
the company ceased real estate activities); Otto Bremer Co., 47 FED. RES. BULL. 23 (1961)
(approved making and discounting agricultural loans); Virginia Commonwealth Corp., 49
FED. RES. BULL. 934 (1963) (approved insurance agency activities related to automobile
insurance on collateral for bank loans and credit life insurance on bank borrowers); Citicorp,
63 FED. RES. BULL. 416 (1977) (money orders and travelers checks).
246. After a notice, comment, and hearing process, the FRB amended its Regulation Y to
include a list of closely-related-activities. 36 Fed. Reg. 10777 (Jun. 3, 1971) (codified at 12
C.F.R. § 222.4(a) (1971)) (permitting activities including making loans, operating an
industrial bank, servicing loans, trust company functions, investment and financial advisory
services, leasing personal property, and community welfare investments). The FRB
continued to add to the list through further amendments to its Regulation Y. See, e.g., 36 Fed.
Reg. 11805, 11806 (Jun. 19, 1971) (permitting bookkeeping and data processing services for
internal operations and performing payroll, accounts payable, or billing services); 37 Fed.
Reg. 18520 (Sept. 13, 1972) (permitting underwriting insurance directly related to extension

46

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 25

known as the “laundry list” of permissible activities.247 By 1986, the FRB
determined by regulation that twenty-four activities were closely related
to banking248 and determined by order that additional activities were
closely related to banking.249 During the 1980s, the FRB also issued
many orders approving securities broker, advisory, private placement,
and underwriting activities as closely related to banking. 250
of credit); 37 Fed. Reg. 26534 (Dec. 13, 1972) (permitting leasing real and personal property);
38 Fed. Reg. 32126 (Nov. 21, 1973) (permitting courier services); 44 Fed. Reg. 12019 (1977)
(permitting selling money orders, traveler’s checks, and savings bonds).
247. During debate leading up to the enactment of the 1970 BHCA Amendments, the
phrase “laundry list” referred to a proposed statutory list of prohibited activities, which
ultimately did not become part of the BHCA. See, e.g., One-Bank Holding Company
Legislation of 1970: Hearings on S. 1052, S. 1211, S. 1664, S. 3823, and H.R. 6778 Before
the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. 186–87 (statement of William B. Camp,
Comptroller of the Currency). Later, the phrase was used to refer to the regulatory list of
permissible activities set forth in the FRB’s Regulation Y. See, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9302
(Feb. 28, 1997) (“The list of nonbanking activities contained in Regulation Y (the “laundry
list”) is intended to serve the purpose of providing a convenient and detailed list of most of
the activities that the FRB has found to be closely related to banking and therefore permissible
for bank holding companies.”).
248. 51 Fed. Reg. 39994, 40000 (Nov. 4, 1986) (24 activities); see also 51 Fed. Reg. 36211
(Oct. 9, 1986); 54 Fed. Reg. 37301 (Sept. 8, 1989); 57 Fed. Reg. 20961 (May 18, 1992); 57
Fed. Reg. 41387 (Sept. 10, 1992); 62 Fed. Reg. 9290 (Feb. 28, 1997).
249. See, e.g., Citizens & Southern Holding Co., 57 FED. RES. BULL. 1037 (1971)
(operating a pool reserve plan for loss reserves of banks for loans to small businesses);
Northwest Bancorporation, 67 FED. RES. BULL. 804 (1981) (provide audit services for
unaffiliated banks); Barnett Banks of Florida, 65 FED. RES. BULL. 263 (1979) (providing
retail check authorization and guarantee); Hong Kong & Shanghai, 69 FED. RES. BULL. 221
(1983) (offering informational, advisory, and transactional foreign exchange); Citicorp, 72
FED. RES. BULL. 497 (1986) (develop, produce, and sell software that allows customers to
conduct banking transactions).
250. See, e.g., Bank of America Corp., 69 FED. RES. BULL. 105 (1983) (discount securities
brokerage services); NatWest Holdings, Inc., 72 FED. RES. BULL. 584 (1986) (adding
investment advice in combination with brokerage services through a nonbank subsidiary);
Bankers Trust New York Corp., 73 FED. RES. BULL. 138 (1987) (adding private placements of
commercial paper through a nonbank affiliate); The Chase Manhattan Corp., 73 FED. RES.
BULL. 367 (1987) (adding underwriting and dealing in securities that a member bank may not
underwrite or deal in directly); Citicorp, 73 FED. RES. BULL. 473 (1987) (adding underwrite
and dealing in commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds, and mortgage back-securities);
Chemical New York Corp., 87 FED. RES. BULL. 731 (1987) (adding underwrite and dealing in
consumer receivables); Bankers Trust New York Corp., 75 FED. RES. BULL. 829 (1989)
(adding private placement of commercial paper). Many of these determinations were
challenged in court. See, e.g., Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
468 U.S. 207, 216–21 (1984) (holding that affiliation between a BHC and discount broker
does not violate the G-S Act); Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 821 F.2d 810, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1005 (1988) (holding that
BHC subsidiary providing brokerage services and investment advice did not violate the G-S
Act); Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 807 F.2d 1052, 1055, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied 107 S.Ct. 3328 (1987) (holding that BHC subsidiary placement of commercial
paper did not violate the G-S Act); Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 839 F.2d 47 (2d
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In 1997, the FRB reorganized its laundry list of permissible
activities, dividing them into the following fourteen groups of
functionally related activities:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
x.
xi.
xii.
xiii.
xiv.

Extending credit and servicing loans;
Activities related to extending credit;
Leasing personal or real property;
Operating non-bank depository institutions;
Trust company functions;
Financial and investment advisory activities;
Agency transactional services for customers;
Securities investment transactions as principal;
Management consulting and counseling
activities
for
unaffiliated
depository
institutions;
Support services, such as check courier,
printing, and encoding;
Insurance agency,
underwriting credit
insurance, and sale of insurance in small towns;
Community development activities;
Issuance and retail sale of money orders,
savings bonds, and traveler’s checks; and
Data processing, storage, transmission, and
facilities for financial, banking, or economic
data.251

The FRB continued to approve by order other activities as closely related
to banking.252

Cir. 1987) (holding that BHC subsidiary underwriting and dealing in municipal revenue
bonds, mortgage-related securities, and commercial paper did not violate the G-S Act).
251. 12 C.F.R. § 225.28 (1998).
252. See, e.g., Popular, Inc., 84 FED. RES. BULL. 481 (1998) (adding government
services, including postage stamps, public transportation tickets, vehicle registration, and
notary public services, and incidental services, such as mailboxes, photocopying, and
facsimiles); Dresdner Bank AG, 84 FED. RES. BULL. 361 (1998) (acting as commodity pool
operator for private investment vehicles acting as commodity pool operator for private
investment vehicles); Compagnie Financiére de Paribas, 82 FED. RES. BULL. 348 (1996)
(providing fraud detection services in connection with billing services).
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ii. Savings and Loan Holding Companies
In 1968, the SHLCA prohibited a company that owned or
controlled two or more savings associations from commencing or
continuing any business activity other than those permitted by specific
exemptions.
Permissible actions include furnishing management
services for a subsidiary, conducting insurance agency business, acting
as a trustee under a deed of trust, and engaging in activities approved or
prescribed by FSLIC regulation “as being a proper incident to the
operations of insured institutions and not detrimental to the interests of
savings account holders.”253 The FSLIC, and subsequently the FHLBB,
interpreted its authority to approve activities related to the operations of
insured institutions through the issuance of regulations. By March 5,
1987, the list of related activities prescribed by regulations included the
following:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
x.
xi.
xii.

Originating, selling, and servicing real estate,
educational, and consumer loans;
Clerical accounting and internal services
primarily for affiliates;
Services primarily for affiliates and other
SLHCs;
Acquisition of unimproved real estate;
Development of unimproved real estate;
Acquisition of improved real estate;
Development of improved real estate;
Real estate management;
Insurance underwriting;
Tax preparation;
Coin purchases and sales; and
Any services or activities approved by order of
the FSLIC.254

253. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, § 2,
82 Stat. 5, 8 (1968).
254. 12 C.F.R. § 584.2-1(b) (1987).
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At that point in time, the most significant activities permissible
for an SLHC but not a BHC were (1) real estate acquisition, development,
and management activities;255 (2) insurance agency activities;256 (3)
insurance underwriting;257 and (4) travel agency activities.258
5. Separation of Banking and Commerce
Differentiation in the regulation of BHCs, SLHCs, and the parent
companies of ILCs arose from varying degrees of Congressional concern
about the separation of banking and commerce. Congress imposed more
restrictions on BHCs participating in commercial activities than it
imposed on SLHCs and left the parent companies of ILCs free to engage
in commercial activities.
i. Bank Holding Companies
In 1956, the BHCA separated banking from commerce by
prohibiting a company controlling multiple banks from engaging in any
activity other managing or controlling banks unless it fit within an
exemption, such as an activity closely related to banking.259 The BHCA

255. See, e.g., 52 Fed. Reg. 543 (Jan 7, 1987) (real estate investment); UB Financial Corp.,
58 FED. RES. BULL. 428, 429 (1972), First Security Corp., 61 FED. RES. BULL. 325 (1975);
Boatmen’s Bancshares, Inc., 58 FED. RES. BULL. 427, 428 (1972) (real estate brokerage);
Regulation Y Interpretation, 58 FED. RES. BULL. 571 (1972), Bank Holding Companies:
Property Management Services, 58 FED. RES. BULL. 652 (1972); Activities Not Closely
Related to Banking, 58 FED. RES. BULL. 905 (1972); Regulation Y Interpretation, 58 FED.
RES. BULL. 652, Activities Not Closely Related to Banking, 58 FED. RES. BULL. 905 (1972);
United Missouri Bancshares, Inc., 64 FED. RES. BULL. 415, fn. 1 (1978) (property
management).
256. United Carolina Bancshares, 60 FED. RES. BULL. 678 (1974); Fidelity Corp. of
Pennsylvania, 59 FED. RES. BULL. 472 (1973) (denying sale of term credit life insurance).
257. Activities Not Closely Related to Banking, 58 FED. RES. BULL. 905 (1972) (FRB
denied underwriting general life insurance not related to an extension of credit); Bank
Holding Companies Activities Decision, 60 FED. RES. BULL. 681 (1974); Bank Holding
Companies, Nonbanking Activities of Bank Holding Companies, 60 FED. RES. BULL. 727
(1974) (FRB denied underwriting mortgage guaranty insurance); Bank of America, 66 FED.
RES. BULL. 660 (1980) (FRB denied underwriting home loan life mortgage insurance); NCNB
Corporation, 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 506 (1878) (FRB denied underwriting property and casualty
insurance).
258. Nonbanking Activities of Bank Holding Companies; Operation of a Travel Agency,
62 FED. RES. BULL. 148 (1976) (impermissible for a BHC).
259. Pub. L. No. 84-511, §§ 2, 4, 70 Stat. 133, 133, 135 (1956).
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required divestiture of nonbanking activities within two years.260
Congress reaffirmed its support for the separation of banks and commerce
in the 1970 BHCA Amendments, which brought one-bank holding
companies within the scope of regulation as a BHC.261 This required a
company controlling one bank to divest of impermissible commercial
activities or the bank by December 31, 1980.262
ii. Savings and Loan Holding Companies
Congressional concern with the separation of banking and
commerce with respect to SLHCs has lagged behind congressional
concern with respect to BHCs. While Congress passed the Spence Act
in 1959 to temporarily halt the acquisition of two or more savings
associations by any company, the Spence Act did not limit the activities
of the parent companies of savings associations, nor did it require any
divestiture.263 In 1968, Congress took action to comprehensively regulate
companies controlling multiple savings associations in the SLHCA,
which required divestiture of unrelated activities within two years.264
Still, the SLHCA allowed for greater blending of banking and commerce
than the BHCA because the SLHCA did not prohibit unitary SLHCs—
those controlling only one insured institution—from engaging in
unrelated activities, including commercial activities. The lack of concern
with maintaining the separation of SLHCs from commerce may arise
from the fact that subsidiary savings associations did not take demand
deposits or make commercial loans.265

260. Id. § 4(a)(2), 70 Stat. at 135 (requiring divestiture within two years or as of the date
of becoming a BHC).
261. Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 101, 84 Stat. 1760, 1762 (1970).
262. One-bank holding companies had until December 31, 1980 to conform their activities
to the BHCA. Id. § 103, 84 Stat. at 1762–63; see generally HELLER, supra note 114, at 182–
203 (describing “Grandfather” exemptions for one-bank holding companies).
263. Pub. L. No. 86-374, 73 Stat. 691 (1959); S. REP. NO. 86-810, at 1 (1959) (“The bill .
. . would not require an existing holding company to divest itself of an insured association it
now controls. But the company could not acquire control of any additional insured
association.”).
264. Pub. L. No. 90-255, § 2, 82 Stat. 5, 8 (1968) (requiring divestiture within two years
or 180 days after becoming an SLHC).
265. See WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at § 11.01[1] (The G-S Act “did not and does not apply
to thrifts for two reasons. First, at the time it was enacted, thrifts were small, locally oriented
institutions with a narrow focus on residential lending . . . . Second, thrifts were entirely statechartered and supervised . . . . And even though the subsequent enactment of HOLA provided
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iii. Parent Companies of ILCs
Generally, the regulation of the commercial activities of parent
companies of ILCs has remained outside the scope of the activity
restrictions applicable to BHCs and SLHCs. As originally enacted, and
amended by the 1970 BHCA Amendments, ILCs did not fit the definition
of a bank and the parent companies of ILCs were not BHCs subject to the
activity restrictions of the BHCA.266 The Competitive Equality Banking
Act of 1987 (“CEBA”) amended the BHCA’s definition of a “bank” to
include an insured bank as defined by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
(“FDIA”). This action brought ILCs within the definition of a bank
unless they satisfy at least one of the following conditions: (1) the
institution does not accept deposits, (2) the institution’s total assets are
less than $100 million, or (3) control of the institution has not been
acquired by any company after August 10, 1987. This left qualifying
parent holding companies of ILCs free to engage in commercial
activities.267 In 1999, GLBA did not alter the exclusion of the parent
companies of ILCs from regulation as BHCs.268
In 2005, Walmart and Home Depot filed applications with the
Utah Department of Financial Institutions (“UDFI”) and FDIC to acquire
ILCs.269 These filings ignited a storm of controversy. The FDIC imposed
a moratorium on the acceptance of new applications for deposit insurance
and solicited public comment on commercial ownership and regulation
of ILCs.270 Walmart and Home Depot eventually withdrew their
applications because of overwhelming opposition from lawmakers,

for federal chartering of thrifts, they . . . were not thought of as ‘banks’ because of their limited
powers and functions.”).
266. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 2, 70 Stat. 133; Bank
Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 101, 84 Stat. 1760, 1762.
267. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 101, 101 Stat. 552,
554 (amending § 2(c)(2)(H) of the BHCA).
268. N. ERIC WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32767, INDUSTRIAL LOAN
COMPANIES/BANKS AND THE SEPARATION OF BANKING AND COMMERCE: LEGISLATIVE AND
REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES 6 (2008) (“GLBA did not disturb the exemption of ILCs and their
owners from Fed supervision.”).
269. Michelle Clark Neely, Industrial Loan Companies Come Out of the Shadows,
REGIONAL ECONOMIST, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, July 2007, at 6.
270. Moratorium on Certain Industrial Loan Company Applications and Notices, 71 Fed.
Reg. 43482 (Aug. 1, 2006); 72 Fed. Reg. 5290 (Feb. 5, 2007); 72 Fed. Reg. 5217 (Feb. 5,
2007).
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banking industry officials, and watchdog groups.271 In 2010, the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“DoddFrank Act”) imposed a three-year moratorium on approving FDIC
deposit insurance for new ILCs that would be owned or controlled by a
commercial firm and on the transfer of ownership of an ILC to a
commercial firm.272
Between 2011 and 2016, the FDIC received no new applications
to insure industrial loan companies.273 In 2017, Square, Inc. (“Square”),
a provider of payment services to small businesses, submitted
applications to the FDIC and UDFI.274 Square subsequently withdrew its
FDIC application, before re-filed in 2018.275 Nelnet, Inc. (“Nelnet”), a
student loan processor, also filed applications with the FDIC and UDFI
in 2018276 and plans to begin originating educational and consumer loans.
In 2020, the UDFI and FDIC approved ILC applications from Square and
Nelnet.277
At the same time, the FDIC published notice of a proposed
rulemaking regarding its supervision of the parent companies of ILCs.278
Historically, the FDIC has exercised authority over the parent companies
of ILCs through written agreements entered into as a condition of FDIC
271. Eric Dash, Wal-Mart Abandons Bank Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2007, at C1; Joe
Adler, ILC Debate’s New Twist: Home Depot Drops its Bid, 173 AM. BANKER, Jan. 25, 2008,
at 1.
272. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”),
§ 603, 124 Stat. 1376, 1597 (2010). The moratorium expired on July 21, 2013.
273. Oversight of the FDIC Application Process: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 140th Cong. 12 (2016) (statement of Martin J. Gruenberg,
Chairman, FDIC).
274. Lauren Sullivan, FDIC Approves 2 Industrial Bank Applications, S&P GLOBAL (Mar.
18, 2020), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-newsheadlines/fdic-approves-2-industrial-bank-applications-57654125 [https://perma.cc/N6MLUVVT].
275.See
Application
Status,
UTAH
DEP’T
OF
FIN.
INSTITUTIONS,
https://dfi.utah.gov/general-information/application-status/ [https://perma.cc/V2GA-X93W]
(last updated Dec. 14, 2020); Christine A. Edwards & Julius L. Loeser, Winston & Strawn
LLP, Public Comments on ILC Application by Square Financial, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 1, 2019),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=508a6bd9-3c2f-49ef-a061-9fc36a60dc90
[https://perma.cc/2DMQ-9VYG].
276. Sullivan, supra note 274.
277. Id.
278. Parent Companies of Industrial Banks and Industrial Loan Companies, 85 Fed. Reg.
17771 (Mar. 31, 2020); see also Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Release No. 1372020, FDIC Approves Rule to Ensure Safety and Soundness of Industrial Banks (Dec. 15,
2020)
(final
rule),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/2020/pr20137.html
[https://perma.cc/3AT2-2BW7].
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approval. The proposed rule would formalize past FDIC practice,
requiring parent companies of ILC applicants to agree to commitments
related to: (1) subsidiary information; (2) consent to examination; (3)
annual reports; (4) maintenance of records; (5) independent audit; (6)
limitation on BODs representation; (7) maintenance of capital and
liquidity; and (8) execution of a tax allocation agreement. It would also
require ILCs controlled by a parent company to obtain prior written
approval for material changes in business plan, changes in directors and
senior officers, and entering into service contracts with specified entities.
In 2016, the FRB recommended Congress place the parent
companies of ILCs under its supervision.279 The reasons cited by the FRB
included maintaining the separation of banking and commerce, leveling
the competitive and regulatory playing field for entities controlling an
insured depository institution, and mitigating the risks to the federal
safety net by imposing consolidated supervision on the parent companies
of ILCs.280
ILCs remain the subject of debate because they continue to offer
commercial firms the ability to own or control an FDIC-insured
institution without regulation as a BHC or SLHC.281 Proponents of these
exemptions point to lack of ILC failures and diversification of risk in
support of continuing exemption of ILCs from regulation as BHCs or
SLHCs.282 Opponents point to unfair competitive advantage and
systemic risks that could result from the formation of additional ILCs.283

279. FED. RESERVE BD. ET AL., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND THE FINANCIAL STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL PURSUANT TO SECTION 620 OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 28 (2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20160908a1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6CJU-TNPH].
280. Id. at 32–35.
281. 12 U.S.C §§ 1467a(a)(1)(A), 1842(c) (2018) (ILCs outside the definitions of savings
association in HOLA and bank in BHCA).
282. See Peter J. Wallison, Why Are We Still Separating Banking and Commerce? 182 AM.
BANKER, July 27, 2017, at 1 (“Gramm-Leach-Bliley allowed BHCs to enter various
nonbanking fields . . . .); see also Keith A. Noreika, Acting Comptroller of the Currency,
Innovation and Financial Technology: Rethinking the Banking & Commerce Split, Remarks
to the Utah Association of Financial Services and the National Association of Industrial
Bankers 7–8 (Aug. 17, 2018) (“Arguments that this separation makes banks safer ignore the
benefits that banking institutions gain from diversification . . . .”).
283. INDEP. COMTY. BANKS OF AMERICA, supra note 218, at 3–4; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.,
Beware of the Return of the ILC, 182 AM. BANKER, Aug. 2, 2017, at 1.
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Convergence

Convergence in the regulation of DIHCs arose from the common
objectives of the BHCA and SLHCA to: (1) preserve competition and
prevent concentration, as well as subsequent laws; (2) equalize and then
eliminate the prohibitions on affiliations with securities firms; (3) extend
limitations on transactions with affiliates to savings associations
transactions with SLHCs and their affiliates; (4) establish substantial
parity regarding permissible activities for BHCs and SLHCs; (5) increase
consistency related to the separation of banking and commerce; and (6)
require SLHCs to maintain capital on a consolidated basis not lower than
requirements in effect for insured depository institutions.
1. Competition Preserved and Concentration Prevented
First, Congress sought to preserve competition and prevent
concentration of banking control. In the 1950s, Congressional reports
connected with legislation to regulate bank holding companies cited
concern with preserving bank competition and minimizing concentration
of economic power among the reasons for further regulation of BHCs.284
In 1956, Congress enacted the BHCA, which regulated companies
controlling two or more banks.285 The FRB was required to consider
whether a proposed merger or acquisition would be consistent with the
“preservation of competition in the field of banking.”286 The House
report supporting the legislation expressed concern with further

284. The proposed Bank Holding Company Act of 1947 declared it to be the express policy
of Congress to “control the creation and expansion of bank holding companies; to separate
their business of managing and controlling banks from unrelated businesses, and generally
maintain competition among banks and to minimize the danger inherit in concentration of
economic power through centralized control of banks.” S. 829, 80th Cong. § 2 (1947)
(emphasis added). The Senate Report in support of the act noted that “loopholes and
deficiencies” in the Banking Act of 1933 had “nullified” its basic purpose and called for new
legislation to guard against the use of holding companies to “evade traditional limitations
upon bank expansion” and “gather under one management many different and varied
enterprises wholly unrelated to the conduct of the banking business.” S. REP. NO. 80-300, at
1–2 (1947). The Senate Report also noted that “the administrative agencies must take into
account the national policy against restraints of trade and commerce and the undue
concentration of economic power and in favor of the maintenance of competition in the field
of banking” when approving or disapproving the creation or expansion of bank holding
companies. Id. at 6.
285. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, §§ 2, 3(a), 70 Stat. 133,
133–34.
286. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 3(c), 70 Stat. at 135.
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“concentration of credit,” “monopolistic control of credit,” and
“concentration of banking control in fewer and fewer hands.”287 The
Senate report supporting the legislation noted the need for “adequate
safeguards against undue concentration of control of banking activities”
and avoidance of “dangers accompanying monopoly in this field.”288
In 1966, Congress required the FRB to apply a balancing test in
assessing the competitive impact of a proposed acquisition. The BHCA
was amended to prohibit the FRB from approving any acquisition that
would result in a monopoly, or which may substantially lessen
competition, unless the anticompetitive effects of the proposed
acquisition are clearly outweighed by the convenience and needs of the
community.289
Congress took a similar approach to the regulation of SLHCs. In
1959, the House report in support of legislation temporarily halting the
acquisition of saving and loan associations by companies cited desires to
“preserve the traditional pattern of independent, locally managed savings
and loan associations” and to “prevent undue concentration of economic
control through the holding company device” among the reasons for the
legislation.290 In 1968, Congress enacted the SLHCA, which established
a comprehensive framework for the regulation of companies controlling
one or more savings associations.291 The SLHCA required the FSLIC to
consider factors identical to the factors contained in the amended
standards embodied in the BHCA and Bank Merger Act (“BMA”) for

287. H. REP. NO. 84-609, at 2 (1955). The report also noted the “threat” to the “democratic
ideal” of “the independent unit bank as an institution having its ownership and origin in the
local community.” Id.
288. S. REP. NO. 84-1095, pt. 1, at 1 (1955); see also S. REP. NO. 84-1095, pt. 2, at 1 (1956).
289. Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 7(c), 80 Stat. 236, 237-38. The amendment
prohibited the FRB from approving any acquisition, merger, or consolidation that “would
result in a monopoly, or which would be in furtherance of any combination or conspiracy to
monopolize or to attempt to monopolize the business of banking.” Id. In addition, the FRB
was prohibited from approving a proposed transaction whose effect may be “substantially to
lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly, or which in any manner would be in restraint
of trade, unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly
outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the
convenience and needs of the community to be served.” Id.
290. H. REP. NO. 86-679, at 2–3 (1959).
291. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, 82
Stat. 5 (1968); H. REP. NO. 90-997, at 2 (1967) (“The purpose of H.R. 8696 . . . is to provide
a comprehensive statutory framework for the registration, examination, and regulation of
holding companies controlling one or more savings and loan associations. . . .”).
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approval of mergers and acquisitions.292 The SLHCA similarly
prohibited the FSLIC from approving any acquisitions which would
result in a monopoly or which may substantially lessen competition,
unless the anticompetitive effects of the proposed acquisition are clearly
outweighed by the convenience and needs of the community.293
2. Affiliation Prohibitions Equalized and then Eliminated
Second, Congress equalized and then eliminated the prohibitions
on bank affiliations with securities firms. In 1987, Congress temporarily
extended the applicability of the prohibition to member bank affiliations
with securities firms engaged principally in underwriting securities and
also the prohibition on director and management interlocks between a
member bank and a securities firm extended the prohibition to
nonmember banks and savings associations. 294 These prohibitions also
restricted the affiliation and interlocks of BHCs and SLHCs with
securities firms.295 The extension of these prohibitions to savings
associations expired in 1988. In 1999, the GLBA repealed the
prohibitions on affiliation and interlocks between banks and securities
firms.296 With the transfer of responsibility for the regulation of SLHCs
292. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967 § 2, 82 Stat. at 10–11
(amending section 408(e)(2) of the National Housing Act); S. REP. NO. 90-354, at 8 (1967)
(“In providing standards for approving mergers and acquisitions, the committee has inserted
language identical to the comparable standards contained in the Bank Holding Company Act
and Bank Merger Act.”).
293. Id. (amending section 408(e)(2) of the National Housing Act). “No acquisition shall
be approved . . . which will . . . substantially lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly,
or which in any manner would be in restraint of trade, unless it found that the anticompetitive
effects of the proposed acquisition are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the
probable effect of the acquisition in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to
be served.” Id.
294. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, §§ 103, 106, 101
Stat. 552, 566, 576. An exemption provided for affiliations between savings associations and
firms principally engaged in the sale or underwriting of mortgage-backed securities, real
estate partnerships, insurance products deemed to be securities, mutual funds, and securities
whose sale or underwriting was permitted for national banks. Id.
295. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 § 106, 101 Stat. at 576–77. CEBA
temporarily applied sections 20 and 32 of the 1933 Act to insured savings associations until
March 1, 1988.
296. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338,
1341 (1999) (repealing sections 20 and 32 of the 1933 Act). A FDIC policy statement
expressed the opinion that Glass-Steagall Act does not prohibit a nonmember bank from
establishing an affiliate relationship with a bona fide subsidiary engaged in securities
activities. The statement also stated that section 21 applied to nonmember banks, prohibiting
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from the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) to the FRB in 2011, banks,
savings associations, and their affiliates are on equal footing regarding
affiliations with securities firms.297
3. Limitations on Transactions with Affiliates Extended
Third, Congress extended the limitations on bank transactions
with affiliates to savings association transactions with affiliates. In 1987,
CEBA made Section 23A, and the newly enacted Section 23B, applicable
to transactions between a savings association subsidiary of an SLHC and
its parent holding company or other affiliates solely engaged in activities
permissible for a BHC.298 Other transactions between a saving
association subsidiary of an SLHC and affiliates remained subject to
affiliate transaction rules specified by the SLHCA.299 The Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
(“FIRREA”) repealed the CEBA approach to affiliate transactions. 300
FIRREA fully subjected all savings association transactions with
affiliates to the same limitations on transactions with affiliates as were
applicable to banks.301 The OTS issued implementing regulations in
1991.302 At the time, the FRB had not exercised its authority to issue
regulations implementing Sections 23A and 23B. In 2002, the FRB
issued Regulation W implementing Sections 23A and 23B for member
banks.303 In 2002, the OTS revised its rules on savings association
transactions with affiliates to conform to Regulation W. 304
affiliations between securities underwriting firms and entities engaged to any extent in
business of receiving deposits, but did not apply to nonmember bank subsidiaries or affiliates.
Statement of Policy on Applicability of Glass-Steagall Act to Securities Activities of
Subsidiaries of Insured Nonmember Banks, 47 Fed. Reg. 38984 (Sept. 3, 1982).
297. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank
Act”), § 603, 124 Stat. 1376, 1521 (Jul. 21, 2010); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at §
11.01[3] (“With the transfer of SLHC regulation to the Federal Reserve, it may be expected
that securities firms seeking to own thrifts will be treated substantially like bank holding
companies.”).
298. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 §§ 102(a), 104(d), 101 Stat. at 564, 573.
299. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, § 2,
82 Stat. 5, 8 (1968) (adding § 408(d) to National Housing Act).
300. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, § 407, 103 Stat. 183, 363.
301. Id. § 301, 103 Stat. at 342; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at § 13.01[1]
(discussing the addition of subsections 408(p) and (t) to the National Housing Act).
302. 56 Fed. Reg. 34005 (Jul. 25, 1991).
303. 67 Fed. Reg. 76560 (Dec. 12, 2002).
304. 68 Fed. Reg. 57790 (Oct. 7, 2003); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at § 13.01[2].
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4. Substantial Parity Regarding Permissible Activities
Fourth, Congress established substantial parity regarding the
activities permissible for BHCs and SLHCs. In 1987, CEBA authorized
an SLHC to engage in any activity that the FRB determined by regulation
to be permissible for BHCs under Section 4(c) of the BHCA.305 In 1999,
the GLBA authorized BHCs and SLHCs that become FHCs to engage in
certain financial activities, as well as activities incidental or
complementary to a financial activity.306 Financial activities include
securities underwriting and dealing, insurance underwriting and agency,
merchant banking activities, activities previously determined by the FRB
to be closely related to banking, and activities usual in connection with
the transaction of banking abroad.307 The FRB may also determine that
an activity is “complementary to a financial activity and does not pose a
305. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 104(b), 101 Stat.
552, 568. The FHLBB limited activities permissible pursuant to this authority to activities
permitted for BHCs under regulations implementing section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA. 53 Fed.
Reg. 312, 319 (Jan. 6, 1988); see also 72 Fed. Reg. 14246, 12247, fn. 9 (Mar. 27, 2007). In
2007, the OTS expanded the permissible activities of SLHCs to all section 4(c) activities. 72
Fed. Reg. 72235 (Dec. 20, 2007).
306. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 103(a), 113 Stat. 1338,
1342 (1999); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 103(a), 606(b) (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§
1467a(c), 1843(k)). The GLBA also added section 10(c)(9) to HOLA, which limited the
activities of a new or existing company acquiring control of a savings association after May
4, 1999 to activities permitted for a financial holding company under section 4(k) of the
BHCA. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) § 401(a), 113 Stat. at 1435. The OTS read
section 10(c)(9) as an affirmative grant of authority for SLHCs to engage in 4(k) activities
without satisfying qualification requirements applicable to BHCs to become FHCs or
providing any notice to the OTS. 76 Fed. Reg. 56508, 56510 (Sept. 11, 2011). Section 606(b)
of the Dodd-Frank Act added section 10(c)(2)(H) to the HOLA, which authorized an SLHC
to engage in section 4(k) activities if it meets the criteria and complies with the requirements
applicable to a BHC electing FHC status under the BHCA. Dodd-Frank Act § 606(b), 124
Stat. at 1607. The FRB interpreted this authority as requiring an SLHC to file a declaration
with the FRB to elect to be treated as an FHC and certify that it satisfies the criteria for a BHC
to engage in 4(k) activities. 76 Fed. Reg. 56508, 56510 (Sept. 11, 2011). Therefore, BHCs
and SLHCs must file an effective declaration to become FHCs authorized to engage in
financial in nature activities, as well as activities incidental or complementary to a financial
activity. 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.82, 238.64 (2019).
307. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) § 103(a), 113 Stat. at 1342. Regulation Y listed
the banking aboard activities as providing management consulting services; operating a travel
agency; and organizing, sponsoring, and managing a mutual fund. 66 Fed. Reg. 400, 418
(Jan. 3, 2001) (final rule) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(b) (2019)). The FRB also
determined by rule that acting as a finder in bring together one or more buyers and sellers of
any product or service for transactions that the parties themselves will negotiate and
consummate is incidental to a financial activity. 65 Fed. Reg. 80735 (Dec. 22, 2000) (codified
at 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(d)).
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substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depository institutions or the
financial system generally."308
5. Increased Consistency Related to the Separation of Banking and
Commerce
Fifth, changes in federal law have brought increased consistency
regarding separation of banking and commerce to the regulation of BHCs
and SLHCs. The legislative history of the BHCA establishes that
separating banking from commerce was one of its primary policy
objectives. The separation of banking from commerce was embedded in
the BHCA through its prohibition on a BHC’s engaging in activities other
than banking or managing and controlling banks. 309 The Senate Report
in support of the BHCA noted that “the philosophy of this bill is that bank
holding companies ought to confine their activities to the management
and control of banks.”310 The separation of banking and commerce was

308. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B); see also 12 C.F.R. § 225.89 (2019) (defining the
procedure to request approval to engage in an activity that is complementary to a financial
activity). JP Morgan Chase & Co., 92 FED. RES. BULL. C57 (2005) (defining a
complementary activity as an activity that appears to be “commercial rather than financial in
nature but that is meaningfully connected to a financial activity such that it complements the
financial activity.”). 145 CONG. REC. H11529 (Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Rep. Leach) (“It
is expected that complementary activities would not be significant relative to the overall
financial activities of the organization.”). The FRB determined by order that certain physical
commodities activities are complementary to the financial activity of commodity derivatives
activities. Citigroup, Inc., 89 FED. RES. BULL. 508 (2003). The FRB also determined that
energy management services are complementary to the financial activities of commodity
derivatives activities and derivatives advisory services and that energy tolling activities are
complementary to the financial activity of commodity derivatives activities. Fortis, S.A./N.V.,
94 FED. RES. BULL. C20 (2008); Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC, 94 FED. RES. BULL.
C60 (2008). In response to a request from the FDIC, the FRB also determined that disease
management and mail-order pharmacy activities are complementary to the financial activities
of underwriting and selling health insurance. Wellpoint, Inc., 93 FED. RES. BULL. C133
(2007).
309. Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 4(a), 70 Stat. 133, 135 (1956).
310. S. REP. NO. 84-1095, pt. 1, at 1 (1955). The Senate Report continued: “The
combination under single control of both banking and nonbanking enterprises . . . [permits]
departure from the principle that banking institutions should not engage in business wholly
unrelated to banking.” Id. at 2; see also H.R. REP. NO. 84-609, at 1 (1955) (“The need for
immediate legislation which would at the same time control the future expansion of bank
holding companies and force them to divest themselves of nonbanking business has been
established to the complete satisfaction of your committee.”). The proposed Bank Holding
Company Act of 1947 declared it to be the express policy of Congress “to separate [the]
business of managing and controlling banks from unrelated businesses.” S. 829, 80th Cong.
§2 (1947). The Senate Report supporting S. 829 stated: “The holding-company device . . .
can be used to gather under one management many different and varied enterprises wholly
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reinforced by the 1970 BHCA Amendments to the BHCA, which brought
one-bank holding companies within the scope of the BHCA’s restrictions
on activities311 and required divestiture of impermissible activities or the
bank by December 31, 1980.312
Historically, there has been less separation of banking and
commerce in the savings and loan industry than in the banking industry.
As initially enacted, the SLHCA only restricted the activities of multiple
SLHCs—those controlling two or more insured institutions.313 Unitary
SLHCs remained free to engage in commercial activities. Furthermore,
while the SLHCA required divestiture of unrelated activities, the list of
activities permissible for multiple SLHCs314 included some that were
impermissible for BHCs.315 For example, the SLHCA authorized
multiple SLHCs to conduct insurance agency businesses.316 As initially
enacted, the BHCA did not authorize a BHC to engage in any insurance
activities.317
As the twentieth century progressed, federal laws regulating
BHCs and SLHCs brought increased consistency regarding separation of
banking and commerce through greater overlap in permissible activities
and restrictions on unitary SLHCs. For instance, the Garn-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982 prohibited a BHC from providing
insurance as a principal, agent, or broker, but expanded BHC authority to
engage in insurance activities through specific exceptions, such as
providing life insurance in connection with an extension of credit and
engaging in insurance agency activities in a place with a population not
unrelated to the conduct of a banking business, which the committee feels is inimical to sound
banking practice.” S. REP. NO. 80-300, at 1 (1947).
311. Bank Holding Company Act 1970 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 2, 84 Stat.
1760.
312. Id. § 103, 84 Stat. at 1762, 1763; see generally HELLER, supra note 114, at 182–203.
313. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, §
2(c), 82 Stat. 5, 8 (1968) (amending section 408(c) of the National Housing Act). As initially
enacted, the BHCA only restricted the activities of a company controlling two or more banks.
Pub. L. No. 84-511, §§ 2, 4(a)(2), 70 Stat. 133, 135 (1956). However, the 1970 BHCA
Amendments applied the activity restrictions to one-bank holding companies. Bank Holding
Company Act 1970 Amendments § 2, 84 Stat. 1760 (1970). GUSLHCs controlling one
savings association continue to be free from the activity restrictions of HOLA. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1467a(c) (2018).
314. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967 § 2, 82 Stat. at 8
(amending section 408(c) of the National Housing Act).
315. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 4(a), 70 Stat. at 135.
316. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967 § 2, 82 Stat. at 8
(amending section 408(c)(2)(B) of the National Housing Act).
317. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 4(a), 70 Stat. at 135.
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exceeding 5,000.318 In 1999, further overlap in permissible activities
arose from the GLBA, which authorized a BHC that became an FHC to
engage in insurance underwriting, agency, and brokerage.319 The OTS
interpreted the GLBA to authorize SLHCs to engage in the same
insurance activities.320
Additional federal law regulating SLHCs raised the barriers
separating banking and commerce. In 1987, CEBA narrowed the unitary
SLHC exemption from activities restrictions to companies with a savings
association subsidiary formed before March 5, 1987, which met the QTL
test.321 Therefore, CEBA slightly increased the degree of separation
between banking and commerce with respect to SLHCs, or in other
words, slightly increased convergence in the regulation of BHCs and
SLHCs. In addition, while the GLBA left GUSLHCs free from
restrictions on activities, it also restricted the activities of a company that
formed or acquired a unitary SLHC on or after May 4, 1999.322 In this
way, the GLBA reinforced the separation of banking and commerce with
respect to SLHCs and promoted convergence in the regulation of BHCs
and SLHCs
The GLBA also allowed greater mixing of banking and
commerce by authorizing BHCs and SLHCs to engage in merchant
banking activities. This authority permitted BHCs and SLHCs to control
a company engaged in commercial activities for a limited time.323
Therefore, the GLBA slightly increased the convergence in the regulation
of BHCs and SLHCs.

318. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 601, 96
Stat. 1469, 1536.
319. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 102, 113 Stat. 1338,
1343 (1999).
320. Availability of Information, Public Observation of Meetings, Procedure, Practice for
Hearings, and Post-Employment Restrictions for Senior Examiners; Savings and Loan
Holding Companies, 76 Fed. Reg. 56508, 56510 (Sept. 11, 2011) (“The OTS interpreted
[section 10(c)(9)(A) of HOLA] to be an affirmative grant of authority to all Covered SLHCs
to engage in 4(k) Activities . . . without having to satisfy any of the financial holding companyrelated criteria in the BHC Act.”)
321. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 104, 101 Stat. 552,
568.
322. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) § 401, 113 Stat. at 1435.
323. Id. § 103, 113 Stat. at 1344.
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6. Capital Required on a Consolidated Basis
Finally, in 2010, Congress required the FRB to establish
minimum leverage and risk-based capital requirements for all DIHCs,
including SLHCs, on a consolidated basis not less than generally
applicable requirements in effect for insured depository institutions.324
The FRB’s current risk-based capital standards for BHCs, SLHCs, and
state member banks are codified in Regulation Q.325 Generally, these
institutions must maintain the following consolidated capital ratios: (1) a
common equity tier 1 capital ratio of 4.5%; (2) a tier 1 capital ratio of 6%;
(3) a total capital ratio of 8%; and (4) a leverage ratio of 4%.326 However,
certain BHCs and SLHCs with less than $10 billion in total consolidated
assets can elect to be “Qualified Community Banking Organizations.”
These organizations are considered to have met the above minimum
capital requirements if they maintain a leverage ratio of 9%.327
Furthermore, small BHCs and SLHCs (less than $3 billion in total
consolidated assets) are exempt from Regulation Q.328 Still, each insured
depository subsidiary of a small BHC or SLHC is expected to be wellcapitalized. 329

324. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 171, 124 Stat. 1376, 1436 (2010). Furthermore, the International
Lending Supervision Act mandates each federal banking agency to require banking
institutions to achieve and maintain adequate capital by establishing minimum levels of
capital. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 908, 97 Stat.
1278, 1280 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)(1) (2018)). In addition, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 added section 38(c) to the FDIA, requiring
each federal banking agency to adopt risk-based capital requirements for insured depository
institutions. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (“FDICIA”),
Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 131(a), 105 Stat. 2236, 2254 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(c) (2018)).
325. 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 (2019).
326. Id. § 217.10.
327. Id. § 217.12.
328. Id. § 217.1(c)(1)(ii)–(iii).
329. Id. pt. 225, app. C, § 2.B. A BHC is “well capitalized” if it maintains on a consolidated
basis a total risk-based capital ratio of 10.0% or greater and a tier 1 risk-based capital ratio of
6.0% or greater, while not being subject to any written agreement, order, capital directive, or
prompt corrective action directive issued by the FRB to meet and maintain a specific capital
level for any capital measure. Id. § 225.2(r)(1). A SLHC is “well capitalized” if each of its
depository institutions is well capitalized, while not being subject to any written agreement,
order, capital directive, or prompt corrective action directive issued by the FRB to meet and
maintain a specific capital level for any capital measure. Id. § 238.2(s).
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Remaining Differences

There are very few remaining differences in the regulation of
DIHCs. The most significant differences involve the authority of the
holding company to engage in various activities.
First, a BHC that is not a FHC is prohibited from engaging in an
activity other than managing or controlling banks, unless the activity fits
within one of the narrow, circumscribed exceptions.330 For instance, an
ordinary BHC is not authorized to engage in the underwriting life
insurance or property and casualty insurance.331 However, an ordinary
BHC may act as a principal, agent, or broker for the sale of insurance
related to the extension of credit by the BHC or its subsidiaries (e.g., sell
life credit insurance) or engage in any insurance agency activity in a place
that has a population not exceeding 5,000 (e.g., sell general property and
casualty insurance).332
Second, a BHC or SLHC that qualifies as a compliant FHC may
engage in financial activities and activities incidental or complementary
to a financial activity.333 For instance, a compliant FHC may act as a
principal, agent, broker, or underwriter for any type of insurance, and
underwrite, deal in, or make a market in any type of securities. 334
Third, a company that was not a BHC and becomes an FHC after
November 12, 1999 may continue to engage in activities related to
trading, sale, or investment in commodities that are not generally
permissible activities for BHCs, if the company was engaged in any of
these activities as of September 30, 1997 and meets other specified
conditions.335 The HOLA and its implementing regulations do not
contain a similar provision for a company that becomes an SLHC.

330. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (2018).
331. First Oklahoma Bancorporation, 58 FED. RES. BULL. 571 (1971) (underwriting

general life insurance); NCNB Corporation, 64 FED. RES. BULL. 506 (1978).
332. 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(11)(i), (iii) (2019).
333. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1).
334. Id. § 1843(k)(4)(B), (E).
335. Id. § 1843(o). This statutory authority permits certain FHCs to engage in a broader
set of physical commodity activities than may be otherwise authorized for a FHC under the
complementary authority, such as storing, transporting, and extracting commodities, and
without the conditions that the FRB has placed on engaging in complementary commodities
activities to protect safety and soundness. FED. RESERVE BD. ET AL., supra note 279, at 27.
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Fourth, an ordinary SLHC may engage in activities that are not
authorized for a BHC or FHC, such as general insurance agency336 and
real estate development activities,337 as well as providing services to any
person, so long as the SLHC primarily provides the service to its
affiliates.338 A BHC is prohibited from engaging in general insurance
agency and real estate development activities. 339 A BHC, even if it is a
compliant FHC, is limited to providing audit services for the BHC and its
subsidiaries, but not for any other BHC, bank, savings association, or
company.340
Finally, GUSLHCs and ILC parent companies may engage in
commercial activities.341 BHCs, even if they are compliant FHCs, are
prohibited from engaging in commercial activities, unless the activities
fit within one of limited exceptions to this prohibition, such as merchant
banking.342 It is possible, however, that the exemption of GUSLHCs and
corporate owners of ILCs from restrictions on activities, as well as the
FHC authorization to engage in merchant banking, will be eliminated. In
2016, the FRB recommended to Congress that it:
(i) repeal the exemption that permits corporate owners of
ILCs to operate outside of the regulatory and supervisory
framework applicable to other corporate owners of
insured depository institutions;343

336. SLHCs may engage in insurance agency activities without restriction as to type of
insurance. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(2)(B).
337. 12 C.F.R. § 238.53(b)(4), (6) (2019) (acquiring unimproved real estate for
development and development, subdivision, and construction of improvements of
unimproved real estate for sale or rental).
338. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(2)(F)(ii); 12 C.F.R. § 238.53(b)(3), (6); 12 C.F.R. § 584.21(b)(2), (3) (2019) (An SLHC “may engage in the following activities . . . furnishing or
performing clerical accounting and internal audit services primarily for its affiliates.”).
339. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c); UB Financial Corp., 58 FED. RES. BULL. 428, 429 (1972); First
Security Corp., 61 FED. RES. BULL. 325 (1975); 12 C.F.R. § 225.126(d) (2019) (including
land development); Boatmen’s Bancshares, Inc., 58 FED. RES. BULL. 427, 428 (1972)
(including real estate brokerage). Furthermore, Congress specifically prohibited the FRB
from determining that real estate brokerage or management are permissible for a BHC or
FHC. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 624, 123 Stat. 524, 678.
340. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(1)(C), (k); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.22(b)(i), 225.86.
341. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(3), (9)(C).
342. Id. § 1843.
343. Acceptance of this FRB recommendation by Congress through enactment of new
legislation would limit the activities of ILC parent companies. The recent FDIC proposal to
regulate the activities of the parent companies of ILCs would not limit the activities of ILC
parent companies. Parent Companies of Industrial Banks and Industrial Loan Companies,
85 Fed. Reg. 17771 (Mar. 31, 2020).
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(ii) repeal the exemption for GUSLHCs from the activity
restrictions applicable to all other SLHCs; and
(iii) repeal the authority of FHCs to engage in merchant
banking activities.344
These actions would reinforce the separation between banking
and commerce, subject ILCs to consolidated supervision, and level the
playing field among organizations that control an FDIC-insured
depository institution.345 The repeal of the industrial loan company
exemption from the definition of a “bank” in the BHCA would force the
corporate owners of ILCs to cease engaging in commercial activities or
divest of the industrial loan company. Similarly, the repeal of merchant
banking authority would force FHCs to divest of merchant banking
investments, reinforcing the separation of banking and commerce.
V. DIFFERENTIATION AND CONVERGENCE IN THE SUPERVISION OF DIHCS
During the first half of the twentieth century, federal and state
banking regulators developed slightly different approaches to the
supervision of depository institutions under their jurisdiction. The
supervisors generally agreed that supervision should prevent and correct
unsound situations; however, there were variations in the manner in
which they accomplished that goal.346 As the FDIC began to examine
344. FED. RESERVE BD. ET AL., supra note 279, at 28. The report also recommends repeal
of the grandfather provision of section 4(o) of the BHCA. Id. The report noted:

[The] grandfather provision . . . has permitted two FHCs to engage in a
broad range of activities related to physical commodities such as the
storage, transportation, and extraction of commodities.
This
grandfathered authority raises safety and soundness concerns as well as
competitive issues, as it is currently available to only two firms. In
addition, this grandfather provision is inconsistent with the separation of
banking and commerce.
Id. at 29.
345. Id. at 33–34; see also ILCs-A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Serv., 109th Cong. 17, 81, 88–89 (2006) (statement of Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel,
Federal Reserve Board).
346. See, e.g., 1919 OCC ANN. REP. 6. (proposing adherence to the law, regulation, and
principles of sound banking); 1938 FDIC ANN. REP. 61, (preventing and correcting unsound
situations); 1939 OCC ANN. REP. 40., (correcting unhealthy situations to maintain sound
operating condition); 9 FHLBB ANN. REP. 79 (1941) (encouraging sound business practices
and preventing development of unsound practices); 1946 OCC ANN. REP. 15 (appraising
management and the soundness of policies being followed); 1949 OCC ANN. REP. 13
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banks in the 1930s, it observed diversity in the standards and procedures
for supervision of state chartered banks and sought improvement and
uniformity in standards and procedures among federal and state
supervisory authorities.347 Thereafter, the FDIC, OCC, FRB, and state
supervisors often reached agreement on standard examination policies,
released joint statements on examination and supervisory practices, and
cooperated in the resolution of issues at particular institutions.348
During the second half of the twentieth century, the supervisory
practices of the federal banking regulators became even more similar.
This occurred through continued consultation, cooperation, agreements,
and statements, as well as conferences and training. For instance, in
1952, the OCC, FDIC, and FRB established an Inter-Agency Bank
Examination School, which trained examiners from these three agencies
and many state banking departments.349 In addition, the FRB, OCC, and
FDIC routinely shared bank examination reports.350 Furthermore, the
FRB often conducted joint examinations in cooperation with the state
banking authorities or alternated examinations with state authorities. 351
In 1976, the FDIC began to conduct bank examinations on an alternate
year basis with state authorities.352 In 1978, the federal banking agencies
agreed to a uniform rating system for depository institutions, calling it the
CAMEL rating system.353
(identifying corrections deemed necessary to maintain each bank in sound condition); 1948
FHLBB ANN. REP. 10 (preventing the development of continuance of unsafe and unsound
financial practices).
347. 1938 FDIC ANN. REP. 61.
348. See, e.g., 1937 FRB ANN. REP. 36 (suggesting cooperation of federal and state banking
authorities to work out management issues at banks); 1938 FRB ANN. REP. 37 (explaining the
agreement of OCC, FRB, FDIC, and representatives of state banking departments regarding
revisions to bank examination procedures); 1940 FRB ANN. REP.26 (using FRB policy when
practicable to conduct joint examinations or make alternate examination agreements with state
banking authorities); 1942 FRB ANN. REP. 2, 21 (explaining the joint statement of OCC,
FDIC, FRB, and National Association of Supervisors of State Banks regarding examination
and supervisory policy concerning investments in government securities and loan on such
securities).
349. 1958 FRB ANN. REP. 94.
350. See, e.g., 1960 FRB ANN. REP. 89; 1975 FRB ANN. REP. 299; 1976 FRB ANN. REP.
413.
351.1956 FRB ANN. REP. 57.
352. 1976 FDIC ANN. REP. xiii; 1980 FDIC ANN. REP. 5.
353. Banking Agencies Adopt Uniform Interagency Bank Soundness Rating System, [19781979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,451 (May 10, 1978). The “C” stood
for capital, “A” for asset quality, “M” for management ability, “E” for earnings, and “L” for
liquidity. Examiners assigned numeric values of 1 to 5 to each component and a composite
rating. The agencies did not share their ratings with the supervised institution. Between 1982
and 1988, the agencies allowed examiners to disclose the composite rating to bank
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The supervisory approach of the FHLBB for insured savings
associations developed independent of cooperation with the federal
banking regulators. In 1934, the FHLBB established an Examination
Division to conducted examinations focused on fact-finding, with a
separate group within the FHLBB making supervisory recommendations
related to compliance with law, sound policies, and good management. 354
In the 1940s, the FHLBB examination reports assessed the soundness of
the institution, evaluated the institution’s degree of compliance with legal
management and directors. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Division of Bank Supervision
Memorandum System, Transmittal No. 184, Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System
(Sept. 24, 1982); Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Issuance, EC-238, CAMEL
Disclosure (Mar. 31, 1987); Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Issuance No. SR 8837, Disclosure of Numeric Composite Examination and Inspection Ratings to
Examined/Inspected Institutions (Dec. 28, 1988). In 1996, the agencies updated the rating
system, which included more emphasis on risk management practices, revisions of composite
rating definitions, and the addition of a sixth component addressing sensitivity to market risk,
represented by the addition of “S” to the acronym, making it the CAMELS rating system. 61
Fed. Reg. 67021 (Dec. 19, 1996). The agencies also instructed examiners to discuss with
bank directors and senior management the factors considered in assigning each component
rating, as well as the composite rating. Id. at 67024. However, the ratings remained
confidential and institutions were prohibited from disclosing ratings to the public. 12 C.F.R.
§§ 4.32(b)(2), 4.36(d) (2019) (mandating the OCC prohibition); id. § 309.5(g)(8) (preventing
the FDIC from disclosing ratings); id. §§ 261.2(c)(1), 261.20(g), 261.22(e) (restricting the
FRB); Interagency Advisory: Confidentiality of the Supervisory Rating and Other Nonpublic
Information,
OCC
BULL.
2005-4
(2005),
https://www.occ.gov/newsissuances/bulletins/2005/bulletin-2005-4.html [https://perma.cc/PA5G-Y3E9]; Benjamin B.
Christopher, Recent Developments Affecting Financial Institutions, 2 FDIC BANKING REV.,
No. 1 1989, at 29, 36.
The federal banking regulators also adopted uniform approaches to evaluating the trust,
information technology, consumer compliance, and Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”)
performance of depository institutions. In 1978, the FDIC, FRB, and OCC adopted the
Uniform Interagency Trust Rating System . Federal Agencies Adopt Uniform Rating System
for Bank Trust Departments, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
97,600 (Sept. 21, 1978); see also SR 98-37, Uniform Interagency Trust Rating System (Dec.
23, 1998) (describing revisions related to definitions of components, compliance, and risk
management); Uniform Rating System for Information Technology. Banking Agencies Adopt
Policy on Interagency Data Processor Examination, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,471,
1978-1979 Transfer Binder (Jun. 14, 1978); Uniform Rating System for Information
Technology, 64 Fed. Reg. 3109 (Jan 20, 1999) (modifications related to components and risk
management). In 1980, the FDIC, FRB, and OCC adopted a uniform consumer compliance
rating system, which evaluated an institution’s compliance with consumer protection and civil
rights laws. 1980 FFIEC ANN. REP. 20. In 1978, the federal banking agencies implemented
a uniform CRA ratings system for depository institutions. Community Reinvestment Act of
1977; Implementation, 43 Fed. Reg. 47144 (Oct. 12, 1978); Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd.,
Community Reinvestment Act Examination Procedures (Nov. 22, 1978),
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/ny%20circulars/nycirc_1978_08469a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AA25-AAQQ] (stating that examiners assigned a rating of 1 to 5 for agency
use only based on the institution’s overall CRA performance).
354. 4 FHLBB ANN. REP. 8 (1936); 5 FHLBB ANN. REP. 16–17 (1937).
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requirements, and made suggestions for institution practices and
policies.355 FHLBB examiners used a “standard form” with sections for
comparison of monthly balance sheets, statement of operations, loan
statistics, share accounts, and other real estate owned. Examiners also
reported on record keeping and internal checks and controls used by
associations to safeguard assets. Examination reports concluded with
examiner comments on the condition, operations, and policies of the
association.356 In the 1980s, the FHLBB developed the MACRO rating
system for insured savings associations.357
The formation of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council (“FFIEC”) provided further impetus for convergence in
supervisory practices.358 In 1979, Congress established the FFIEC to
355. 9 FHLBB ANN. REP. 77–79 (1941); 1948 FHLBB ANN. REP. 8; Centralized
Examining Division, 1 FHLB REV., Nov. 1934, at 33; The New Examination Form, 5 FHLB
REV., Jan. 1939, at 8; Subject to Federal Examination, 6 FHLB REV., Jan. 1940, at 110;
Verne C. Bonesteel, The Supervisory Examination – its Purposes and Objectives, 11 FHLB
REV., Sept. 1945, at 344.
356. Bonesteel, supra note 355, at 350.
357. George H.K. Wang & Daniel Sauerhaft, Examination Ratings and the Identification
of Problem/Non-problem Thrift Institutions, 2 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 319, 320–21 (1989); Astoria
Federal Savings and Loan Association v. United States, 80 Fed. CL. 65, 75–76 (Fed. Cir.
2008). In the MACRO rating system, “M” stood for Management, “A” stood for Asset
quality, “C” stood for Capital adequacy, “R” stood for Risk, and “O” stood for Operating
results. Id. Examiners rated each of these areas on a scale of 1 (strong performance) to 5
(poor performance), and then assigned a composite rating based on a subjective weighting of
the categories. Wang & Sauerhaft, supra note 357. The ratings were not disclosed with the
institution or public. In 1988, the FHLBB began to disclose component and composite ratings
savings associations. Christopher, supra note 353, at 36 (“[Thrift] [i]nstitutions will not be
permitted to disclose their [MACRO] ratings ‘in any form’ to the public.”).
358. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-630, §§ 1002, 1004, 92 Stat. 3641, 3694; see also About the FFIEC, FED. FIN.
INSTITUTIONS
EXAMINATION
COUNCIL,
https://www.ffiec.gov/about.htm
[https://perma.cc/Q2SF-UJHK] (last visited May 3, 2018). The FFIEC established a liaison
committee composed of representatives of five state agencies to encourage application of
uniform examination principles and standards by state and federal supervisory agencies.
Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 § 1007, 12 U.S.C. §
3306 (2018). Changes in federal regulatory agencies and greater coordination with state
agencies led to changes in the composition of the FFIEC. In 1991, Congress established the
OTS, which assumed some responsibilities of the FHLBB, including membership on the
FFIEC. . In 2006, Congress made the chair of the liaison committee a voting member of the
FFIEC. Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 714, 120
Stat. 1966, 1995. In 2010, Congress abolished the OTS, and its responsibilities for financial
institutions were transferred to the other federal banking agencies. Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 312, 124
Stat. 1376, 1521 (2010). The CFPB became a member of the FFIEC when it was established
by Congress in 2010. The FFIEC currently consists of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Chairman of the FDIC, a Governor designated by the Chairman of the FRB, the Director of
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prescribe uniform principles, standards, and report forms for the federal
examination of financial institutions and to make recommendations to
promote uniformity in the supervision of financial institutions.359 At that
time, the FFIEC consisted of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Chairman of the FDIC, a Governor designated by the Chairman of the
FRB, the Chairman of the FHLBB, and the Chairman of the NCUA.360
Changes in law and the work of the FFIEC have resulted in a great deal
of uniformity regarding capital, reporting, applications, examination, and
enforcement for financial institutions under the jurisdiction of the federal
banking regulators and state banking agencies.
A.

Examinations
1. Bank Holding Companies

As initially enacted, the BHCA authorized the FRB to conduct
examinations of the holding companies under its jurisdiction.361 The
FRB fulfilled its responsibilities regarding BHCs through evaluation of
reports, on-site inspections, and actions on applications to form or expand
activities.362 In 1978, the FRB began to utilize a new standardized Report
of Bank Holding Company Inspection, which resulted in the on-site
review of 85% of BHCs on an annual basis.363 In 1979, the federal
banking agencies approved policies to enhance interagency coordination
in the inspection of BHCs and examination of lead banks controlled by
BHCs.364
In 1979, the FRB adopted the BOPEC/F-M rating system for
inspections of BHCs.365 The "B" stood for "Bank Subsidiaries," "O"
the CFPB, the Chairman of the NCUA, and the Chair of the state liaison committee. About
the FFIEC., supra.
359. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 § 1002, 92
Stat. at 3694.
360. Id. § 1004, 92 Stat. at 3694.
361. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 5(c), 70 Stat. 133, 137
(1956).
362. 1978 FRB ANN. REP. 357.
363. Id.
364. 1979 FRB ANN. REP. 277.
365. Federal Reserve Board Adopts System for Appraising and Rating Performance and
Financial Condition of Bank Holding Companies, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,708 (Feb. 7, 1979) (evaluating bank holding companies by examining
"Bank Subsidiaries; Other (Nonbank) Subsidiaries; Parent Company; Earnings-Consolidated; Capital Adequacy--Consolidated").
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stood for Other (Nonbank) Subsidiaries, "P" stood for "Parent Company,"
"E" stood for "Earnings-Consolidated," "C" stood for "Capital adequacy-Consolidated," "F" stood for "Financial Composite Rating," and "M"
stood for "Management Composite Rating."366 Examiners assigned a
numeric value to each component on a scale of one to five in descending
order of performance quality. The “F” composite was assigned a numeric
value on the same scale and the “M” composite was assigned "S" for
Satisfactory, "F" for Fair, or "U" for Unsatisfactory. 367 In adopting the
BOPEC/F-M rating system, the FRB noted its concern with the "risk
characteristics of the entire organization,"368 as well as the need for
"capital on a consolidated basis that must serve as the ultimate source of
support and strength to the entire corporation.” 369 Initially, the ratings
were not shared with bank directors or management. However,
examiners were instructed to provide the numeric and alphabetic ratings
to senior management and directors in 1996.370
In 2005, the FRB replaced the BOPEC rating system with the RFI
rating system.371 Under the RFI rating system, each BHC was assigned
component ratings of “R” for Risk Management; “F” for Financial
Condition, and “I” for potential Impact of the parent company and nondepository subsidiaries on the subsidiary depository institution(s); “D”
for Depository Institution; as well as “C” for a Composite rating. The
ratings were presented in this manner: RFI/D(C). The R component was
supported by four subcomponents that reflect the effectiveness of the
banking organization's risk management and controls: (1) Board and
Senior Management Oversight; (2) Policies, Procedures, and Limits; (3)
Risk Monitoring and Management Information Systems; and (4) Internal
Controls.
The F component was similarly supported by four
subcomponents reflecting an assessment of the quality of the banking
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 2.
369. Id. at 10.
370. Fed. Reserve Bd., SR 96-26, Supervision and Regulation Letter on Provision of

Individual Components of Supervisory Rating System to the Officer in Charge of Supervision
at
Each
Federal
Reserve
Bank
(Nov.
15,
1996),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/1996/sr9626.htm
[https://perma.cc/F4YY-PAU5].
371. Fed. Reserve Bd., SR 19-4/CA 19-3, Supervision and Regulation Letter on
Supervisory Rating System for Holding Companies with Total Consolidated Assets Less
Than
$100
billion
(Feb.
26,
2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1904.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ESGMXDJ].
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organization's (1) Capital; (2) Asset Quality; (3) Earnings; and (4)
Liquidity. The composite, component, and subcomponent ratings were
assigned using a one to five numeric scale with one indicating the highest
rating and five the lowest rating. The inspection report included the
composite and component ratings. Contemporaneously, the FRB issued
guidance stating that the ratings were furnished for confidential use and
should not be disclosed to the public.372
In 2019, the FRB adopted the Large Financial Institution (“LFI”)
system.373 The LFI system applies to all domestic BHCs with $100
billion or more in total consolidated assets. The FRB continues to apply
its RFI rating system to BHCs with less than $100 billion in total
consolidated assets.374 The LFI rating system reflects three core areas of
focus: (1) Capital Planning and Positions; (2) Liquidity Risk
Management and Positions; and (3) Governance and Controls. Each LFI
component is rated according to a four-category scale: (1) Broadly Meets
Expectations; (2) Conditionally Meets Expectations; (3) Deficient-1; and
(4) Deficient-2.375
2. Savings and Loan Holding Companies
The FHLBB developed the CORE rating system for use in its
examination of SLHCs. As initially enacted, the SLHCA authorized the
FHLBB to conduct examinations of the holding companies under its
jurisdiction.376 In 1988, the FHLBB adopted the CORE rating system for

372. Bank Holding Company Rating System, 69 Fed. Reg. 70444, 70446 (Dec. 6, 2004);
see also Interagency Advisory: Confidentiality of the Supervisory Rating and Other
Nonpublic Information, supra note 353.
373. 83 Fed. Reg. 58724 (Nov. 21, 2018); 84 Fed. Reg. 4309 (Feb. 15, 2019); see also Fed.
Reserve Bd., SR 19-3/CA 19-2, Supervision and Regulation Letter on Large Financial
Institution (LFI) Rating System to the Officer in Charge of Supervision at Each Federal
Reserve
Bank
and
Large
Financial
Institutions
(Feb.
26,
2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1903.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2JNNRA4]; Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 371.
374. 83 Fed. Reg. 58724 (Nov. 21, 2018). The FRB planned to implementation of the LFI
rating system, applying it to institutions subject to the Federal Reserve’s LISCC framework
effective February 1, 2019 and to the remaining LFIs in early 2020.
375. 83 Fed. Reg. 58724 (Nov. 21, 2018). The new LFI rating system also applies to U.S.
intermediate holding companies of FBOs with $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets
as proposed.
376. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, § 2,
82 Stat. 5, 8 (1968) (codified as amended 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a, 1843 (2018)).
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SLHCs.377 Under the CORE rating system, the “C” stood for Capital,
“O” for Organizational Structure, “R” for Relationship, and “E” for
Earnings. Examiners rated these components on a scale of one to three
in descending order of performance quality and assigned a composite
rating of Above Average, Satisfactory, or Unsatisfactory. 378 FIRREA
transferred responsibility for the supervision of SLHCs and savings
associations from the FHLBB to the OTS. 379 In 2007, the OTS revised
the CORE rating system. The OTS changed the meaning of the “R” to
Risk Management and adopted a numeric rating scale from one to five
for component and composite ratings.380
When the FRB assumed responsibility for the supervision of
SLHCs in 2011, the FRB stated that its intention was to eventually
supervise SLHCs “on a consolidated basis in a manner that is consistent
with the [FRB’s] established risk-based approach regarding bank holding
company . . . supervision.”381 Initially, the FRB assigned “indicative”
ratings to SLHCs using the RFI rating system.382 The frequency and
scope of inspection for BHCs was also applied to SLHCs by the
Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act
(“EGRRCPA”).383 The FRB applied the same off-site surveillance
377. 72 Fed. Reg. 72442, 72443 (Dec. 20, 2007) (The preamble to the rating system states
that the OTS implemented the former CORE rating system in “1988.” However, because the
OTS was not formed until 1989, the former implementation must refer 1989 or action by the
FHLBB in 1988); see also OFFICE OF T HRIFT SUPERVISION, HOLDING COMPANIES HANDBOOK,
SECTION 100, SUPERVISORY APPROACH 100.8 (2009), https://occ.gov/static/ots/holding-cohandbook/ots-hch-000.pdf [https://perma.cc/A35R-T5KU].
378. 72 Fed. Reg. 17618, 17619, fn. 1 (Apr. 9, 2007) (proposed rule).
379. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, §§ 301, 401, 103 Stat. 183, 278, 354 (1989).
380. 72 Fed. Reg. 72442, 72443 (Dec. 20, 2007) (final rule).
381. Fed. Reserve Bd., SR 11-11/CA 11-5, Supervision and Regulation Letter on
Supervision of Savings and Loan Holding Companies (SLHCs) to the Officer in Charge of
Supervision at Each Federal Reserve Bank and To Savings and Loan Holding Companies
Supervised
by
the
Federal
Reserve
2
(July
21,
2011),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1111.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HU4BKF3]. The FRB’s RFI rating system replaced the CORE rating system of the OTS for
SLHCs. Id.
382. Id. at 3. Previously, the OTS used the CORE rating system for SLHCs in which the
“C” stood for Capital, “O” for Organizational structure, “R” for Risk management”, and “E”
for Earnings. 72 Fed. Reg. 72942 (Dec. 20, 2007) (final rule)). The OTS seems to have
implemented CORE system in 1989 when “C” stood for Capital, “O” for Organizational
structure, “R” for Relationship, and “E” for Earnings.
383. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (“EGRRCPA”),
Pub L. No. 115-174, § 207, 132 Stat. 1296, 1312 (2018); see also Fed. Reserve Bd., SR 1321, Supervision and Regulation Letter on Inspection Frequency and Scope Requirements for
Bank Holding Companies and Savings and Loan Holding Companies with Total Consolidated
Assets of $10 billion or Less to the Officer in Charge of Supervision at Each Federal Reserve
Bank and to Holding Companies with Total Consolidated Assets of $10 Billion or Less (Dec.
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program to BHCs and SLHCs.384 In 2019, the FRB began to assign
ratings using the RFI rating system to every SLHC of a depository in
nature with less than $100 billion in total consolidated assets.385
However, the FRB delayed its application of the LFI rating system for
SLHCs that are depository in nature with $100 billion or more in assets
to consider whether the RFI, LFI, or some other rating system is
appropriate on a permanent basis.386 The FRB continued to assign
“indicative” ratings for SLHCs, those large SLHCs, as well as to SLHCs
engaged in significant commercial or insurance activities. 387
Generally, DIHCs of like size and nature are subject to the same
examination standards and rating systems. The FRB assesses the
condition of all SLHCs of a depository nature and BHCs with up to $100
billion in total consolidated assets using the RFI rating system.388 BHCs
and SLHCs between $3 billion and $100 billion in total consolidated
assets are examined annually, while BHCs and SLHCs with less than $3
billion in total consolidated assets are examined every eighteen
months.389 However, the FRB assigns indicative RFI ratings to insurance
SHLCs and commercial SLHCs regardless of size.390

17,
2013),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1321.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GK58-KJ7L] (modified as of Mar. 6, 2019 to reflect frequency and scope
expectations for holding companies with total consolidated assets between $ 1 billion and $3
billion to align with section 207 of EGRRCPA).
384. Fed. Reserve Bd., SR 15-16, Supervision and Regulation Letter on Enhancements to
the Federal Reserve System's Surveillance Program to the Officer in Charge of Supervision
at
Each
Federal
Reserve
Bank
(Dec.
10,
2015),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1516.pdf [https://perma.cc/EMU5XMBN].
385. 83 Fed. Reg. 56081 (Nov. 9, 2018); Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 371.
386. Id.
387. Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 381, at 3. An “indicative” rating indicates how an SLHC
would be rated under the RFI rating system if formally applied to the SLHC. Id.; see also
Fed. Reserve Bd., SR 14-9, Supervision and Regulation Letter on Incorporation of Federal
Reserve Policies into the Savings and Loan Holding Company Supervision Program to the
Officer in Charge of Supervision at Each Federal Reserve Bank (Nov. 7, 2014),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1409.pdf [https://perma.cc/TL23S6Y4].
388. Application of the RFI/C(D) Rating System to Savings and Loan Holding Companies,
83 Fed. Reg. 56081 (Nov. 9, 2018); Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 371.
389. Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 371, attachment 1, at 2; Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note
383.
390. Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 371, at 1. SLHCs are considered “insurance SLHCs” if
they are either insurance companies or hold 25% of more of their total consolidated assets in
subsidiaries that are insurance companies. SLHCs are considered “commercial SLHCs” if
they derived 50% or more of their total consolidated assets or total revenues form activities
that are not financial in nature under section 4(k) of the BHCA. Id.
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Capital

Until the early 1980s, bank regulators used informal standards to
determine the capital of depository institutions. Traditionally, banking
law required a minimum capitalization for organizers to obtain a charter
and begin operations.391 However, banking regulators expected operating
institutions to maintain a higher level of capital than the legal
minimum.392 Federal banking regulators began to use ratios to access
capital adequacy, starting with a capital-to-deposit ratio, then capital-toasset ratios, and eventually risk-based asset ratios.393 Despite regulatory

391. From 1864 to 2000, section 5138 Revised Statutes imposed minimum capital amount
for national banks. However, in 2000, Congress repealed the requirement because it
previously granted the federal banking agencies the authority to establish minimum capital
requirements. American Homeownership and Economic Opportunity Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No, 106-569, § 1233, 114 Stat. 2944, 3037 (2000). Many state laws still impose minimum
capital amounts for banks. See, e.g., 5 DEL. CODE ANN. § 745 (2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1410 (2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 286.3-070 (West 2019). Other state laws grant the
banking commissioner the discretion to establish minimum capital amounts. See, e.g., OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1107.03 (2019); 7 P A. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (West 2019).
392. HOWARD D. CROSSE & GEORGE H. HEMPEL, MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR
COMMERCIAL BANKS 73–74 (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 2nd ed., 1973) (“In recent years as a matter
of policy, supervisory authorities have usually required new banks to start with more than the
legal minimum of capital.”).
393. From 1900 to the late 1930s, bank regulators used the ratio of capital to deposits to
measure capital adequacy. State bank regulators expected a capital to deposits ratio of 10% or
more for healthy institutions. YAIR E. ORGLER & BENJAMIN WOLKOWITZ, BANK CAPITAL 68
(1976); see also 1914 OCC ANN. REP. 21. In 1939, the FDIC criticized the capital-todeposits ratio because banks incur losses on assets rather than deposits. ORGLER &
WOLKOWITZ, supra, at 69. So, the FDIC began to use a capital-to-assets ratio to measure the
soundness of insured banks. 1939 FDIC ANN. REP. 12. In 1947, the FDIC enhanced its
calculations, adding a ratio without cash and U.S. government obligations. 1947 FDIC ANN.
REP. 49. In 1948, the OCC developed a risk-asset ratio as a screening device for assessment
of capital adequacy, which excluded cash, bank balances, and U.S. government obligations.
See, e.g., 1948 OCC ANN. REP. 4. However, the OCC viewed the risk-asset ratio as a
preliminary step and made final determinations of capital adequacy based on its assessment
of factors, particularly management competence and asset quality. CROSSE & HEMPEL, supra
note 392, at 76.
The differences in the risk associated with assets eventually led to the development of
more sophisticated measures of capital adequacy. In 1952, the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York developed a formula assigning weights to balance sheet items in order to calculate
capital adequacy. ORGLER & WOLKOWITZ, supra, at 69; CROSSE & HEMPEL, supra note 392,
at 77; Kenneth J. Gordan, Risk-Based Capital Requirements: The Proper Approach to Safe
and Sound Banking?, 10 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 491, 494 (1991). In 1956, the FRB developed
a revised version of the formula, which became known as the “ABC ratio.” ORGLER &
WOLKOWITZ, supra, at 69; CROSSE & HEMPEL, supra note 392, at 80–83. It provided for
capital based on balance sheet items and additional capital for banks that did not meet a
liquidity test and for banks that engaged in trust activities. CROSSE & HEMPEL, supra note
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attention to capital, federal banking regulators did not impose explicit
minimum capital requirements until the early 1980s.394
1. Bank Holding Companies
The FRB’s authority to impact the capitalization of institutions
under its jurisdiction arises from its authority to act on applications,
promulgate capital standards, and issue capital directives. Under the
BHCA, the FRB is required to take various factors into consideration
when reviewing a BHC’s proposed acquisition of a bank or nonbank
entity, including the impact of the acquisition on the financial resources
of the acquiring and acquired firm. 395 For example, an acquisition may
benefit an acquired firm with access to capital or dilute the capital
position of an acquiring firm. The FRB weighs these and other
considerations in making decisions to approve or deny applications. The
FRB has denied applications based on capital considerations.396
The FRB first issued formal capital guidelines for BHCs in
1981.397 In 1983, the International Lending Supervision Act (“ILSA”)
392, at 81–82. The FRB continued to revise and use its ABC ratio. ORGLER & WOLKOWITZ,
supra, at 71–72; see also id. at 86 app. 4.2 (Form for Analyzing Bank Capital, Feb. 1973).
The FDIC and the OCC also continued to revise their approaches to measure capital
adequacy. The FDIC relied on variants of the capital-to-assets ratio. ORGLER & WOLKOWITZ,
supra, at 71. In 1962, the OCC abandoned its risk-asset approach to capital adequacy, opting
to rely upon a factor analysis. James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency, Address at the
National Bank Division Meeting, American Bankers Association, (Sept. 24, 1962)
(reproduced in 1963 OCC ANN. REP. 321 (1964)). In 1973, the OCC began to experiment
with a ratio of classified assets to total capital to place banks in a category A, B, C, or D.
James E. Smith, Comptroller of the Currency, Address before the National Correspondent
Banking Conference, American Bankers Association, (Nov. 6, 1973) (reproduced in 1973
OCC ANN. REP. 295 (1974)).
By the late 1970s, the FDIC, FRB, and OCC generally accepted a further revised version
of the OCC’s approach to capital adequacy. Joseph J. Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards:
A Legitimate Regulatory Concern for Prudential Supervision of Banking Activities?, 49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1299, 1320 (1989). Furthermore, the federal banking agencies were using trends and
peer group comparisons to determine capital adequacy. Id. In 1978, the FFIEC incorporated
these practices into the CAMEL rating system discussed above. See supra note 353 and
accompanying text.
394. Statement of Policy on Capital, 46 Fed. Reg. 62693 (Dec. 29, 1981) (FDIC); 68 FED.
RES. BULL. 33 (1982) (FRB and OCC).
395. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (2018).
396. Tennessee Valley Bancorp, Inc., 61 FED. RES. BULL. 176 (1975); Donald R. Hakala &
Douglas V. Auston, Denials of BHC Formations and Acquisitions: Has There Been a Shift in
Policy, 99 BANKING L. J. 947, 951 (1982).
397. Capital Adequacy Guidelines, 68 FED. RES. BULL. 33 (1982) (joint policy statement
by the FRB and OCC governing BHCs, state member banks, and national banks). The FDIC
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gave the federal banking regulators explicit authority to establish capital
standards for bank affiliates, including bank holding companies and their
nonbank subsidiaries.398 In 1985, the FRB issued revised capital
adequacy guidelines for BHCs.399 In 1989, the FRB adopted risk-based
capital guidelines for BHCs.400 The OCC and FDIC also adopted capital
adequacy guidelines.401 The capital adequacy guidelines issued by these
three federal banking regulators aligned capital regulation in the United
States with the standards set forth the initial Basel Accord (“Basel I”). 402
issued a regulation addressing capital adequacy. Statement of Policy on Capital, 46 Fed. Reg.
at 62693 (FDIC).
398. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (“ILSA”), Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 908,
97 Stat. 1278, 1280 (1983). Congress enacted the International Lending Supervision Act
(“ILSA”) in reaction to a decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals overturning an OCC
capital directive related to the unsafe and unsound capital level at a national bank. First Nat’l
Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 685 (5th Cir. 1983). ILSA
directed the federal banking agencies to "cause banking institutions to achieve and maintain
adequate capital by establishing minimum levels of capital for such banking institutions."
International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 § 908(a)(1), 97 Stat. at 1280. ILSA further
stated that the "failure of a banking institution to maintain capital at or above its minimum
level . . . may be deemed . . . to constitute an unsafe and unsound practice." Id. § 908(b)(1),
97 Stat. at 1280; see also S. REP. No. 98-122, at 17 (1983) ("[A]ny of the provisions of the
bill may be applied by the appropriate federal banking agency to any affiliate of any insured
bank, including any bank holding company individually or on a consolidated basis for its
nonbank subsidiaries . . . .".); S. REP. No. 100-19, at 36 (1987); 50 Fed. Reg. 16,057, 16,064
(Apr. 24, 1985) (FRB); Wake Bancorp, Inc., 73 FED. RES. BULL. 925 (1987).
399. 50 Fed. Reg. 16057 (Apr. 24, 1985); see also 50 Fed. Reg. 11128 (Mar. 19, 1985)
(FDIC); 50 Fed. Reg. 10207 (Mar. 14, 1985) (OCC). While ILSA allowed each federal
banking agency to establish such minimum capital as it deemed appropriate. International
Lending Supervision Act of 1983 § 908(a)(2), 97 Stat. at 1280. However, the federal banking
regulators adopted uniform standards with common definitions of bank capital. 50 Fed. Reg.
16057, 16067 (Apr. 24, 1985) (FRB); 50 Fed. Reg. 11128, 11140 (Mar. 19, 1985) (FDIC); 50
Fed. Reg. 10207, 10216 (Mar. 14, 1985) (OCC). The agencies established a minimum level
of primary capital to total assets of 5.5% and a minimum level of total capital to total assets
of 6%. 50 Fed. Reg. 16057, 16066 (Apr. 24, 1985) (FRB); 50 Fed. Reg. 11128, 11136 (Mar.
19, 1985) (FDIC); 50 Fed. Reg. 10207, 10216 (Mar. 14, 1985) (OCC).
400. 54 Fed. Reg. 4186 (Jan. 27, 1989).
401. Id. (OCC); 54 Fed. Reg. 11500 (Mar. 21, 1989) (FDIC) (effective Dec. 30, 1990).
402. In 1988, the Governors of the Basel Committee on Banking Regulations and
Supervisory Practices endorsed the Basel Accord. The Basel Committee consisted of central
bank representatives from the Group of Ten countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States)
and Luxemburg. 54 Fed. Reg. 4186, 4186–87 (Jan. 27, 1989). The Basel Committee is
headquartered at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland. The Basel
Accord arose from recognition of the need to "strengthen the soundness and stability of the
international banking system and to remove a source of competitive inequality arising from
differences in national capital requirements." History of Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm [https://perma.cc/5M5F-PWXG] (last
visited Jan. 6, 2020). Action by the Basel Committee does not issue bind member countries
but recommends a regulatory framework for the member countries.
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These guidelines also reinforced the existing policy that organizations
undertaking significant expansion, either through internal growth or
acquisitions, maintain strong capital positions substantially above
minimum levels.403 In 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 gave the FRB the authority to issue capital
directives.404
2. Savings and Loan Holding Companies
The FHLBB’s concern with the capital adequacy of SLHCs was
based on its approach to capital adequacy of insured savings associations,
which focused on the risk associated with assets as it calculated the net
worth of insured savings associations.405 However, in 1985, the FHLBB
shifted its focus from net worth to capital adequacy, stating that it used
minimum net worth requirements to “gauge capital adequacy.” 406 In
1986, the FHLBB amended its regulations pertaining to the calculation
of “regulatory net worth” to refer to the calculation of “regulatory
capital.”407 In 1987, CEBA specifically authorized the FHLBB to set and
enforce regulatory capital requirements.408 FIRREA abolished the
FHLBB and required its successor, the newly created OTS, to establish

403. 54 Fed. Reg. 4186, 4187 (Jan. 27, 1989).
404. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (“FDICIA”), Pub.

L. No. 102-242, § 131, 105 Stat. 2236, 2258 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(f)(2)(A) (2018)).
405. From 1934 to 1980, the National Housing Act required each insured savings
association to hold a reserve of 5% of its insured accounts. 50 Fed. Reg. 6891 (Feb. 19, 1985)
(referring to 12 C.F.R. § 563.13 (1984)). The FHLBB viewed its express statutory authority
under section 403(b) of the National Housing Act as broad authority for it to establish and
define the minimum reserve requirements. Id. at 6893. In 1964, the FHLBB began to include
“risk assets,” “adjusted net worth,” and “scheduled items” in the calculation of the reserve
requirement. 29 Fed. Reg. 44 (Jan. 3, 1964). In 1972, the FHLBB required insured savings
associations to have a net worth equal to the greater of 5% of insured accounts plus 20% of
scheduled items or the amount determined by the so-called “Asset Composition and NetWorth Index.” 37 Fed. Reg. 26579 (Dec. 14, 1972). The Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980 eliminated the specific statutory reserve requirement and
left the determination of the appropriate reserve to the discretion of the FHLBB within the
range of 3 to 6 % of insured accounts. Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-221, § 409, 94 Stat. 132, 160.
406. 50 Fed. Reg. 6891, 6892 (Feb. 19, 1985).
407. 51 Fed. Reg. 33565 (Sept. 22, 1986) (effective Jan. 1. 1987).
408. Thrift Industry Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 406, 101 Stat. 552, 614 (1987).
In issuing and implementing regulations, the FHLBB observed that “adequate capital is of
critical importance to the safety and soundness of insured institutions and the FSLIC deposit
insurance fund. 51 Fed. Reg. 363 (Jan. 6, 1988).
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uniform capital standards for savings associations.409 The OTS did not
promulgate a standardized capital requirement for SLHCs, but considered
the overall risk profile of the consolidated entity on a case-by-case
basis.410
When the Dodd-Frank Act transferred responsibility for the
supervision of SLHCs from the OTS to the FRB,411 the so-called “Collins
Amendment” to the Dodd-Frank Act required the federal banking
agencies to establish minimum leverage and risk-based capital
requirements on a consolidated basis for insured depository institutions,
DIHCs, and nonbank financial companies supervised by the FRB.412 The
409. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, § 301, 103 Stat. 183, 303–04 (amending section 5(t) of HOLA). Specifically,
FIRREA required savings associations to have core capital of 3% of assets, tangible capital
of at least 1.5% of assets, and risk-based capital in amounts required by regulations to be
issued by the OTS that would be at least as stringent as those applicable to national banks. Id.
In its preamble to the implementing regulations, the OTS noted the importance of “levels of
capital . . . related to the risk of activities in which a savings association engages . . . to ensure
that the association can afford to cover losses that may arise from such activities without
becoming insolvent.” 54 Fed. Reg. 46845, 46846 (Nov. 8, 1989). The OTS intended these
standards to be consistent with the capital standards established by Basel I. Id.
410. OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, supra note 377, at 100.8. The OTS described its
process as follows:

This involves assessing traditional analytical measures, including the
overall leverage, the level of short-term debt and liquidity, cash flow and
reliance on thrift and other subsidiary earnings, interest coverage, quality
of earnings, and level of consolidated tangible and equity capital. The
objective is to ensure that the holding company enterprise maintains
adequate capital to support its risk profile and to meet the minimum
capital standards of any regulated financial sector (banking, securities, or
insurance) in which it operates. Another objective is to ensure that an
appropriate equity buffer exists to shield the thrift from unexpected
problems within the enterprise. OTS can require holding company
enterprises to meet individualized capital requirements when capital
adequacy is a concern.
Id.
411. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 312, 124 Stat. 1376, 1521 (2010).
412. Dodd-Frank Act § 171(b)(1)–(2), 124 Stat. at 1436. The leverage and capital
standards were required to be not less than or quantitatively lower than the leverage and riskbased capital requirements applicable to insured depository institutions as of July 21, 2010.
Id. Small BHCs subject to the Small Bank Holding Company Policy Statement of the FRB
were exempt from these requirements. Dodd-Frank Act § 171(b)(5), 124 Stat. at 1437. The
Dodd-Frank Act did not provide a similar exemption for small SLHCs. The FRB, OCC, and
FDIC issued implementing regulations. 78 Fed. Reg. 55340 (Sept. 10, 2013) (FDIC); 78 Fed.
Reg. 62018 (Oct. 11, 2013) (OCC and FRB). These changes became effective from 2014 to
2019. These actions also partially implemented international agreements. BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY
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Collins Amendment delayed effectiveness of the requirement until 2015
for SLHCs.413 The FRB adopted consolidated capital requirements
applicable to SLHCs that became effective January 1, 2014. 414
3. Source of Strength
Historically, the FRB expected BHCs to act as a source of
strength for their bank subsidiaries. 415 As amended in 1984, Regulation
Y provided that a "bank holding company shall serve as a source of
financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary banks."416 Later, an
FRB policy statement provided that "a bank holding company should
stand ready to use available resources to provide adequate capital funds
to its subsidiary banks during periods of financial stress or adversity.”417
The Dodd-Frank Act codified this doctrine, by requiring BHCs,
SLHCs, and any other company that directly or indirect controls an
insured depository institution to act as a source of strength.418 Therefore,
the FRB, OCC, or FDIC, as the case may be, is required to impose the
source-of-strength requirement on companies that control an insured
depository institution, including entities exempt from the definition of a
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2011),
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf [https://perma.cc/WEZ8-VVJE] [hereinafter BASEL
III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING
SYSTEMS]; see also BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
BASEL III: INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIQUIDITY RISK MEASUREMENT, STANDARDS
AND MONITORING (2010), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf [https://perma.cc/FUA9PY5R] [hereinafter BASEL III: INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIQUIDITY RISK
MEASUREMENT, STANDARDS AND MONITORING].
413. Dodd-Frank Act § 171(b)(4)(D), 124 Stat. at 1437.
414. 78 Fed. Reg. 62018 (Oct. 11, 2013).
415. Paul L. Lee, The Source-of-Strength Doctrine: Revered and Revisited – Part I, 129
BANKING L. J. 771 (2012).
416. 49 Fed. Reg. 794, 820 (Jan. 5, 1984) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)). In its preamble
to the proposed rule, the FRB stated: “The provision is derived from section 3(c) of the BHC
Act, which requires the FRB to consider the financial and managerial resources and future
prospects of the company and banks concerned; from section 5(b) of the BHC Act, which
authorizes the FRB to issue regulations; and from the FRB’s authority under the Financial
Institutions Supervisory Act to issue cease and desist orders to prevent unsafe or unsound
banking practices.” 48 Fed. Reg. 23520, 23523 (May 25, 1983).
417. Policy Statement on the Responsibility of Bank Holding Companies to Act as Sources
of Strength to Their Subsidiary Banks, 52 Fed. Reg. 15707 (Apr. 30, 1987); see also Board
of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 251 (1978) (reversing the 7th circuit
decision in First Lincolnwood Corp. Board of Governors, 560 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1977)).
418. Dodd-Frank Act § 616(d), 124 Stat. at 1616 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o-1 (2018));
see also Paul L. Lee, The Source-of-Strength Doctrine: Revered and Revisited – Part II, 129
BANKING L. J. 867 (2012).
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bank under the BHCA or savings association under HOLA, such as a
credit card bank, limited purpose trust entity, or ILC.419
4. Basel II
In 2007, the federal banking agencies adopted a new risk-based
capital adequacy framework for banks, savings associations, and BHCs,
which covered risk-based capital requirements arising from credit risk,
market risk, and operational risk.420 This action partially aligned the
United States with the report released by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (“BCBS”), entitled International Convergence of
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework
(“Basel II”). 421 The framework set forth three pillars for risk-based
capital: (1) credit risk, market risk, and operational risk; (2) supervisory
review of capital adequacy; and (3) market discipline through enhanced
public disclosures.422
5. Stress Tests
The Dodd-Frank Act required the FRB to conduct annual stress
tests on the largest and most complex financial firms to determine
whether they have capital necessary to absorb losses as a result of adverse
economic conditions.423 The FRB conducts Dodd-Frank Act stress tests
for BHCs with average total consolidated assets of $100 billion or more,
U.S. intermediate holding companies of foreign banking organizations,
and any nonbank financial company the Financial Stability Oversight
Council has determined shall be supervised by the FRB.424 Stress test
419. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o-1(b) (2018).
420. 72 Fed. Reg. 69288, 69289 (Dec. 7, 2007); see also BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,

BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (2006),
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf [https://perma.cc/B888-6FER].
421. 72 Fed. Reg. 69288 (Dec. 7, 2007) (covering FRB, FDIC, OCC, and OTS); see also
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 420.
422. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note
420, at 2.
423. Dodd-Frank Act, § 165(i), 124 Stat. at 1430 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i)(1)
(2018)).
424. 12 C.F.R. 252.4(a) (2020). On July 6, 2018, the FRB issued a statement regarding the
impact of EGRRCPA. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act
(“EGRRCPA”), Pub L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018). The FRB stated, consistent with
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models assess whether each firm is “sufficiently capitalized to absorb
losses in stressful economic conditions while continuing to meet
obligations to creditors and other counterparties and to lend to households
and businesses.”425 The stress test models are also used in the
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (“CCAR”), pursuant to the
FRB’s capital plan rule.426
6. Basel III
In 2010, the BCBS released a report entitled Basel III: A Global
Regulatory Framework for a More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems
(“Basel III”), which sought to strengthen bank capital requirements,
increase bank liquidity, and decrease bank leverage. 427 The reforms
embodied in the report aimed to “improve the banking sector’s ability to
absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, whatever the
source, thus reducing the risk of spillover from the financial sector to the
real economy.”428
The FRB issued Regulation Q to implement Basel III for BHCs,
SLHCs, and state member banks.429 Regulation Q raised minimum
capital requirements.430 It also required all institutions regulated by the
FRB to maintain a capital conservation buffer to avoid restrictions on
capital distributions and discretionary bonus payments to executive
officers.431 In addition, Regulation Q required certain BHCs to maintain
a leverage buffer432 and institutions using “advanced approaches” to
calculate of risk-based assets to maintain a countercyclical buffer. 433
the EGRRCPA, that it will not take action to require BHCs with total consolidated assets
greater than or equal to $50 billion but less than $100 billion to comply with the FRB’s capital
plan rule (12 C.F.R. § 225.8) or the FRB’s supervisory stress test and company-run stress test
rules (12 C.F.R. pt. 252, subparts E–F). Fed. Reserve Bd. et al., Interagency Statement
Regarding the Impact of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection
Act
(EGRRCPA)
(July
6,
2018),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20180706a1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2T6Q-HCC9].
425. 84 Fed. Reg. 6664 (Feb. 28, 2019).
426. 12 C.F.R. § 225.8 (2019).
427. BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR A MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND
BANKING SYSTEMS, supra note 412.
428. Id. at 1.
429. 78 Fed. Reg. 62018 (Oct. 11, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 (2019)).
430. 12 C.F.R. § 217.10.
431. Id. § 217.11(a).
432. Id. § 217.11(d); 79 Fed. Reg. 24528 (May 1, 2014).
433. 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.11(b), 100(b)(1).
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Furthermore, Regulation Q imposed public disclosure requirements on
certain large institutions.434 Regulation Q does not apply to BHCs and
SLHCs governed by the Small Bank Holding Company Policy
Statement435 or SLHCs substantially engaged in insurance underwriting
or commercial activities.436
C.

Reporting

As initially enacted, the BHCA and SLHCA authorized the FRB
and FSLIC, respectively, to require periodic reports from supervised
institutions.437 The scope and number of reports increased over time with
the increased size and complexity of financial institutions. Generally, the
reports assist the federal banking agency in fulfilling their responsibilities
for the supervision and regulation of financial institutions.438 Currently,
the FRB has authority to require reports from BHCs and SLHCs.439 The
FRB requires BHCs and SLHCs to file annual reports and changes in
organizational structure reports as they occur.440 Depository institutions
that engage in transactions with affiliates, such as a parent BHC or SLHC,
are required to file a report.441 Generally, BHCs and SLHCs file financial

434. Id. §§ 217.61–217.63.
435. Id. § 217.1(c).
436. Id. §§ 217.1(c), 217.2.
437. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, § 2,

82 Stat. 5, 7 (1968) (federal savings associations); Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub.
L. No. 84-511, § 5(c), 70 Stat. 133, 137 (BHCs).
438. See, e.g., Financial and Regulatory Reporting, FED. RES. BOARD,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/reporting.htm
[https://perma.cc/H9R4-25NB] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (“Data collected from regulatory
reports facilitate early identification of problems that can threaten the safety and soundness
of reporting institutions; ensure timely implementation of the prompt corrective action
provisions required by law; and serve other legitimate supervisory purposes.”).
439. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a(b)(2), 1844(c) (2018).
440. FED. RESERVE BD., INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF ANNUAL REPORT OF HOLDING
COMPANIES, FORM FR Y-6 (2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_Y620191231_i.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G57-SWNJ]; FED. RESERVE BD., INSTRUCTIONS FOR
PREPARATION OF REPORT OF CHANGES IN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, FORM FR Y-10
(2016),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_Y-1020191231_i.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PRE9-3XWC].
441. FED. RESERVE BD., GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF HOLDING COMPANY
REPORT OF INSURED DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS’ SECTION 23A TRANSACTIONS WITH
AFFILIATES, FORM FR Y-8 (2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_Y820180630_i.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6SZ-UUEK].
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statements with the FRB.442 However, SLHCs engaged primarily in
commercial or insurance activities are exempt from filing the same report
but are required to file similar reports.443
D.

Applications

Current federal law requires BHCs and SLHCs to file
applications with the FRB seeking the approval of acquisitions. For
instance, the BHCA requires the prior approval of the FRB for any action
(1) that causes a company to become a BHC; (2) that causes a bank to
become a subsidiary of a BHC; (3) by which a BHC acquires direct or
indirect control of more than 5% of the voting shares of a bank; (4) by
which a BHC acquires all the assets of a bank; or (5) by which a BHC
merges or consolidates with another BHC.444 Similarly, the HOLA
requires the prior approval of the FRB for an SLHC to acquire a
subsidiary savings association, acquire voting shares of a savings
association, purchase assets of a savings association, or merge or
consolidate with another SLHC.445 The form for a BHC to acquire a
savings association differs from the form used by an SLHC to acquire a
savings association.446 While there are minor differences in the
information requested by the forms,447 the core statutory factors for
442. FED. RESERVE BD., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR HOLDING COMPANIES
–
FR
Y-9C
(2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_Y9C20191231_f.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SEF-66NC].
443. FED. RESERVE BD., QUARTERLY SAVINGS AND LOAN HOLDING COMPANY REPORT—FR
2320 (2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_232020191231_f.pdf
[https://perma.cc/92JM-KZPG] [hereinafter QUARTERLY SAVINGS AND LOAN HOLDING
COMPANY REPORT—FR 2320]; FED. RESERVE BD., SAVINGS ASSOCIATION HOLDING
COMPANY
REPORT—FR
LL-(B)11
(2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_LL-(b)1120200102_f.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AL7V-7NMD] [hereinafter SAVINGS ASSOCIATION HOLDING COMPANY
REPORT—FR LL-(B)11].
444. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(2)(2018); 12 C.F.R. § 225.11(b) (2019).
445. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(e)(1); 12 C.F.R. § 238.1.
446. FED. RESERVE BD., INSTRUCTIONS FOR NOTIFICATION BY A BANK HOLDING COMPANY
TO ACQUIRE A NONBANK COMPANY AND/OR ENGAGE IN NONBANKING ACTIVITIES, FORM FR
Y-4 (2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_Y-420180731_i.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N8SR-KUEQ] [hereinafter INSTRUCTIONS FOR NOTIFICATION BY A BANK
HOLDING COMPANY TO ACQUIRE A N ONBANK COMPANY AND/OR ENGAGE IN NONBANKING
ACTIVITIES, FORM FR Y-4]; FED. RESERVE BD., FORM H-(E) (2008),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/slhc/OTS_FormHe_20190131.pdf
[https://perma.cc/797V-7QM6] (SLHC) [hereinafter FORM H-(E)].
447. For example, for SLHC acquisitions, Form H-(E) requests information about
transaction expenses and tax treatment that are not requested by the FR Y-3 for BHC
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review of proposed acquisitions under the BHCA and HOLA are
substantially the same. Under both statutes, the FRB must consider the
impact of the acquisition on: (1) competition; (2) financial and
managerial resources and future prospects; (3) the deposit insurance fund;
and (4) convenience and needs of the community to be served. 448 The
forms filed with the FRB to seek approval of acquisitions reflect the
requirements of the underlying statutes and the historical development of
the forms under different federal banking regulators, even though the
FRB now has jurisdiction over both types of transactions.449
E.

Enforcement

The agencies may take informal and formal enforcement actions
against institutions for violations of laws, rules, or regulations, unsafe or
unsound practices, and violations of written commitments. 450 Informal
enforcement actions are non-binding, good faith actions. Examples of
informal actions include commitments, board resolutions, and
memoranda of understanding. Formal actions are legally binding and
enforceable actions. The appropriate enforcement action for a particular
institution depends upon the severity of the problems, the institution's
ratings, supervisory confidence in management, and other factors.
Formal actions that the federal banking agency may take include
cease and desist orders, written agreements, and orders assessing civil
money penalties. The agencies may seek a cease and desist order when
a supervised institution or an institution-affiliated party is engaging, has
acquisitions. See FORM H-(E), supra note 446, at items 110.70, 130. Conversely, the FR Y3 asks for more information about nonbanking activities than the H(e). Compare FED.
RESERVE BD., INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF APPLICATION TO BECOME A BANK HOLDING
COMPANY AND/OR ACQUIRE AN ADDITIONAL BANK OR BANK HOLDING COMPANY FR Y-3, at 2
(2018),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_Y-320180731_i.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FT7P-P85G] with FORM H-(E), supra note 446, at item 410.10.
448. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a, 1843.
449. Id. § 1467a (effectuating § 10 of HOLA for SLHC acquisitions through filing Form
H-(e)); id. § 1843 (effectuating § 4 of the BHCA for BHCs acquisitions through filing Form
FR Y-4).
450. The often-cited definition of “unsafe and unsound practice” is “any action, or lack of
action, which is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent operation, the possible
consequences of which, if continued, would be abnormal risk or loss or damage to an
institution, its shareholders, or the agencies administering the insurance funds.” 112 CONG.
REC. 26,474 (1966) (remarks of Senator Robertson) (adopting the testimony of John Horne,
Chairman, Federal Home Loan Bank Board); see also Gulf Federal Savings and Loan
Association v. FHLBB, 651 F.2d 259, 263 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).
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engaged, or is about to engage in an unsafe or unsound practice in
conducting the business of a supervised institution.451 The agencies may
impose civil money penalties for (1) violation of law or regulation,
written agreement or cease and desist order; or (2) recklessly or
knowingly engaging in unsafe and unsound practices likely to cause
substantial institutional loss or leading to individual pecuniary gain. 452
The amount of the penalty is tied to a number of factors, as set forth in
interagency guidance.453 The agencies are required to disclose these
formal actions to the public.454
When an agency pursues an enforcement action it usually
attempts to obtain consent to the action. If consent is not obtained, the
agency prepares a notice of charges.455 The notice of charges is served
on the affected party or parties. If the party continues to contest the
action, a public hearing is held before administrative law judge, who
issues a recommendation to the agency. The agency then issues a final
451. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b). The agencies may also issue a temporary cease and desist order
in certain circumstances. Id. § 1818(c).
452. Id. § 1818(i).
453. Assessment of Civil Money Penalties, 63 Fed. Reg. 30227 (June 3, 1998) (Fed. Fin.
Insts. Examination Council). Amounts adjusted annually for inflation. 12 C.F.R. §
263.65(b)(2) (2019). For 2018, the penalties are tiered from $9819 to $49,096 to $1,963,870
per day. Id.
454. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(u). The agencies are also authorized to take enforcement action
against current and former institution-affiliated parties of institutions under their jurisdiction.
These actions include removal and prohibition orders and orders assessing civil money
penalties. Id. § 1818(e),(i). The agencies may suspend, remove, or prohibit an institutionaffiliated party from participation in the conduct of the affairs of a supervised institution based
upon (i) violation of law or regulation, breach of fiduciary duty or unsafe or unsound practice
(ii) when there is an institutional loss, prejudice to depositors or personal gain to the party,
and (iii) personal dishonesty or willful or continuing disregard for safety and soundness. Id.
§ 1818(e). Furthermore, any person convicted of any criminal offense involving dishonesty
or a breach of trust or money laundering or who entered into a pre-trial diversion in connection
such an offence may not (i) become or continue as an institution-affiliated party with respect
to any insured depository institution (ii) own or control, directly or indirectly any insured
depository institution or otherwise participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the
affairs of any insured depository institution, unless the obtain the prior written consent of the
FDIC. Id. § 1829; see also Modifications to the Statement of Policy Pursuant to Section 19
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act Concerning Participation in the Conduct of the Affairs
of an Insured Institution by Persons Who Have Been Convicted of Crimes Involving
Dishonesty, Breach of Trust or Money Laundering or Who Have Entered Pretrial Diversion
Programs for Such Offenses, 83 Fed. Reg. 38143 (Aug. 3, 2018); Modifications to Statement
of Policy for Section 19 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 74849 (Dec. 18,
2012); FDIC Policy Statement, 63 Fed. Reg. 66184 (Dec. 1, 1998).
455. FED. RESERVE BD., BANK HOLDING COMPANY SUPERVISION MANUAL § 2110.0.2.1
(2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/bhc.pdf [https://perma.cc/ETY83UD8].
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decision and order.456 Within the next ten days, the affected party may
appeal the determination to an appellate court.457
Noncompliant FHCs are subject to a type of formal enforcement
action. FHCs are noncompliant if they fail to meet capital, management,
and community reinvestment requirements.458 A noncompliant FHC
must either decertify as an FHC and cease engaging in activities only
permissible pursuant to BHCA Section 4(k), or enter into an agreement to
correct its noncompliance within 180 days.459 The FRB does not
generally publicly disclose the existence of these enforcement
agreements. However, a BHC or SLHC with securities registered pursuant
to the Securities Exchange Act may decide that it must disclose the
agreement upon advice of its legal counsel to decrease the risk of insider
trading liability because execution of the agreement is a material event
under federal securities laws.460
F.

Consolidated Supervision

The FRB developed the practice of consolidated supervision to
understand BHC structure, activities, resources, and risks, as well as
address deficiencies before they pose a danger to subsidiary depository
institutions.461 The consolidated supervision of BHCs and SLHCs takes
place within the framework of legal authority established by Congress.462
456. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(1).
457. Id. § 1818(h)(2).
458. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 4(l), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l).
459. Id. § 4(m), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m) (BHCs); Home Owners’ Loan Act § 10(c), 12

U.S.C. § 1467a(c) (SLHCs).
460. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (prohibiting use of a “manipulative and deceptive device” in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2019) (stating
that “manipulative and deceptive devices” includes the purchase or sale of an issuer’s
securities on the basis of material non-public information).
461. Fed. Reserve Bd., SR 08-9/CA 08-12, Supervision and Regulation Letter on
Consolidated Supervision of Bank Holding Companies and the Combined Operations of
Foreign Banking Organizations to the Officer in Charge of Supervision at Each Reserve Bank
and to Domestic and Foreign Large Complex Banking Organizations, Regional Banking
Organizations, and U.S. Offices of Multi-Office Foreign Banking Organizations Supervised
by
the
Federal
Reserve
(Oct.
16,
2008),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2008/SR0809.htm
[https://perma.cc/T2BG-F5T5] (“Consolidated supervision of a BHC encompasses the parent
company and its subsidiaries, and allows the Federal Reserve to understand the organization’s
structure, activities, resources, and risks, as well as to address financial, managerial,
operational, or other deficiencies before they pose a danger to the BHC’s subsidiary
depository institutions.”).
462. Id.
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The key authorities needed to practice consolidated supervision are the
authority to require reports, conduct examinations, establish capital
requirements, and take enforcement action.463
The FRB’s concern with the impact of affiliates on depository
institutions has a long history. In 1933, the FRB obtained authority to
require reports from any affiliate of a member bank, and require such
affiliates to submit to examination as a condition of the FRB’s approval
of an application of a holding company affiliate of a member bank to vote
stock of a member bank. In connection with its consideration of
applications for voting permits, the FRB sought a “comprehensive picture
of the entire group” and “information concerning various relationships
within the group.”464
In 1956, the FRB obtained the power to require reports from and
conduct examinations of multi-bank holding companies.465 In 1970, the
FRB obtained the authority to require reports and conduct examinations
of one-bank holding companies. 466 In 1974, Congress authorized the
FRB to take enforcement action against BHCs and their nonbank
subsidiaries through issuance of a cease-and-desist order. 467 In 1978,
Congress granted the FRB the explicit authority to order a bank holding

463. ILCs-A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 109th Cong. 83
(2006) (statement of Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, Federal Reserve Board) (“The
hallmarks of this consolidated supervisory framework are broad grants of authority to examine
and obtain reports from bank holding companies and each of their subsidiaries, establish
consolidated capital requirements for bank holding companies, and take supervisory or
enforcement actions against bank holding companies and their nonbank subsidiaries to
address unsafe or unsound practices or violations of law. Consolidated capital requirements
help ensure that bank holding companies have real capital to support their group-wide
activities, do not become excessively leveraged, and are able to serve as a source of strength
for their subsidiary banks.”).
464. 1934 FRB ANN. REP. 54 (“In connection with the consideration of applications of
holding company affiliates for voting permits, arrangements were completed, wherever
practicable, to have the various banks controlled by the same holding company affiliate
examined as nearly as practicable as of the same date in order that a comprehensive picture
of the entire group might be obtained and information concerning various relationships within
the group be developed.”).
465 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 137; Bank Holding
Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 176..
466. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 § 101, 84 Stat. at 176 (providing
authority to require reports and conduct examinations obtained through amendment of the
definition of a bank holding company).
467. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 110, 88 Stat. 1500, 1506 (1974).
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company to divest a nonbank subsidiary or cease activity.468 In 1983,
Congress gave the FRB explicit authority to set capital requirements. 469
Therefore, the FRB had accumulated all the powers necessary to practice
consolidated supervision related to BHCs by 1983.
In 1999, the GLBA repealed prohibitions on affiliations between
bank, securities, and insurance firms and authorized FHCs to engage in
financial activities, as well as activities incidental or complementary to a
financial activity.470 Subject to limitations, the GLBA also extended the
supervisory and enforcement powers of the FRB to FHC subsidiaries
engaged in securities, insurance, and commodities activities.471
Furthermore, the FRB obtained the authority to require divestiture of a
depository institution subsidiary of a BHC.472 Therefore, in 1999, the
FRB possessed the authority, albeit subject to some limitations, to assess
FHC risk on a group-wide basis and take enforcement action to address
threats to a depository institution subsidiary from its nonbank affiliates.
In 2011, the Dodd-Frank Act transferred responsibility for the
supervision of SLHCs from the OTS to the FRB.473 While the OTS did
not practice consolidated supervision, the FRB began to apply its
consolidated approach to supervision to SLHCs in 2011, after the transfer
of responsibility for the supervision of SLHCs from the OTS to the
FRB.474 Congress also required the FRB to establish consolidated capital
requirements for SLHCs by 2015.475 The FRB set forth its capital
requirements for SLHCs, as well as BHCs, in rules that became effective
in 2014.476
468 Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-630, § 105(a), 92 Stat. 3646.
469 International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 908, 97 Stat.
1280.
470. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (”GLBA”), Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338,
1341 (1999).
471. Id. § 113, 113 Stat. at 1369.
472 Previously, the FRB could only issue a cease-and-desist order against a depository
institution subsidiary or order the divestiture of a nonbank subsidiary. See Financial
Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 § 105(a), 92 Stat. at 3646;
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 19 (1978).
473. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 312, 124 Stat. 1376, 1521 (2010).
474. Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 381.
475. Dodd-Frank Act, § 171(b)(1), (b)(4)(D), 124 Stat. at 1436–37 (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 5371 (2018)); Insurance Capital Standards Clarification Act of 2014, Pub. L.
No. 113-279, 128 Stat. 3017 (amending Dodd-Frank Act section 171).
476. 78 Fed. Reg. 62018 (Oct. 11, 2013) (effective Jan. 1, 2014).
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Remaining Differences in Supervision

Only a few differences remain in the supervision of DIHCs. First,
there are differences in the rating system used to evaluate DIHCs of the
same size. The FRB assesses BHCs with total consolidated assets of
$100 billion or more using the LFI rating system; however, the FRB
assesses SLHCs of a depository nature with $100 billion or more in total
consolidated assets using the RFI rating system.477 The FRB also assigns
“indicative” RFI ratings to SLHCs that are engaged in significant
commercial or insurance activities rather than actual RFI ratings. 478
Second, there are differences in the capital requirements
applicable to BHCs and SLHCs based upon the activities in which they
are engaged. Generally, all top-tier BHCs and SLHCs domiciled in the
United States are subject to the same capital requirements.479 However,
SLHCs domiciled in the United States and substantially engaged in
insurance underwriting or commercial activities are not currently subject
to the FRB’s consolidated capital requirements. In 2019, the FRB issued
a notice of proposed rulemaking to establish a “Building Block
Approach” to capital requirements for DIHCs that are significantly
engaged in insurance activities, which adjusts and aggregates existing
legal requirements to determine an enterprise-wide capital
requirement. 480
Third, there are different forms for routine reports and approval
of acquisitions of the same type of institution. For example, SLHCs
engaged primarily in commercial or insurance activities are exempt from
filing form FR Y-9 filed by BHCs and most SLHCs. Instead, they file
form FR 2320 and FR LL-(b)11 reports.481 As a further example, the
acquisition of a savings association by a BHC requires the filing of form

477. 83 Fed. Reg. 58724 (Nov. 21, 2018); 84 Fed. Reg. 4309 (Feb. 15, 2019); see also Fed.
Reserve Bd., supra note 371; Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 373. The FRB plans to apply the
LFI rating system to these SLHCs in the future. Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 371.
478. Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 381, at 3.
479. 78 Fed. Reg. 62018 (Oct. 11, 2013).
480. 84 Fed. Reg. 57240 (Oct. 24, 2019).
481. QUARTERLY SAVINGS AND LOAN HOLDING COMPANY REPORT—FR 2320, supra note
443; SAVINGS ASSOCIATION HOLDING COMPANY REPORT—FR LL-(B)(11), supra note 443.
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FR Y-4,482 while the acquisition of a savings association by a SLHC
requires the filing of form H(e).483
Finally, there are differences in the FRB’s supervision of mutual
BHCs and mutual SLHCs. The FRB has statutory responsibilities related
to mutual SLHCs that it does not have with respect to mutual BHCs.
Because Congress preempted state law related to the chartering and
regulation of mutual SLHCs, the FRB has exclusive authority to charter
and regulate mutual SLHCs.484 Congress has not preempted state law
related to mutual BHCs. Several states charter mutual BHCs.485 In any
event, the FRB supervises all SLHCs through examination, capital,
reporting, source of strength, and other requirements.486 Furthermore, the
FRB acts upon the applications of mutual SLHCs to convert to stock
form.487 The FRB also acts upon the requests of mutual SLHCs to waive
dividends.488 The FRB’s responsibilities with respect to charters,
482. INSTRUCTIONS FOR NOTIFICATION BY A BANK HOLDING COMPANY TO ACQUIRE A
NONBANK COMPANY AND/OR ENGAGE IN NONBANKING ACTIVITIES, FORM FR Y-4, supra note
446. However, the filing must be modified to satisfy the same information and publication
requirements that would apply if the savings association to be acquired was a bank. Id.
483. FORM H-(E), supra note 446.
484. Section 10(o)(7) of HOLA provides that a “mutual holding company shall be
chartered by the Director of the [OTS] and shall be subject to such regulations as the Director
may prescribe.” 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(o)(7) (2018) (emphasis added). This language was added
to HOLA by FIRREA. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 301, 103 Stat. 183, 337 (1989). The preamble
to the implementing regulations issued by the OTS explains the OTS’ position that section
10(o)(7) preempts state law authorization for state-chartered thrifts to establish and operate
mutual SLHCs. 58 Fed. Reg. 44105, 44106 (Aug. 19, 1993) (“Congress intended section
10(o) to expressly preempt state law with regard to the creation and regulation of mutual
holding companies.”). The preamble went on to state that “[t]he explanatory statement that
accompanied the amendments when they were offered at a House Banking Committee markup of the FIRREA legislation stated that the amendments “would provide a clear regulatory
framework for MHCs, and unquestionable regulatory authority to the [OTS] by providing that
MHCs will be chartered by the [Director of the OTS] and subject to (OTS] regulation.” Id.
485. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 167H, §§ 1–12 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1116.05 (2019) (Ohio); 7 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 115.1 (West 2019).
486. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(b)(1) (register with the FRB); id. § 14167a(b)(2) (submit reports);
id. § 1467a(b)(4) (submit to examination); id. § 5371(b) (capital requirements); id. § 1831o1 (source of strength).
487. 12 C.F.R. pt. 239, subpart E (2019).
488. Consistent with statutory standards and its orders, the FRB imposes conditions on its
approval of dividend waivers. Fed. Reserve Bd., Interpretive Letter to Kevin M. Houlihan,
Elias, Matz, Tiernand, & Herrick LLP (May 28, 1997), as reprinted in 1997 Fed. Res. Interp.
Ltr. LEXIS 63 (Greater Delaware Valley Holdings); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 625, 124 Stat. 1376,
1637 (2010) (adding § 10(o)(11) to HOLA). Section 239.8 of Regulation MM implements
this provision of law. 12 C.F.R. § 239.8 (2019). The preamble to the interim final regulation
creating Regulation MM provides an explanation of the inherent conflict of interest in
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conversions, and dividend waivers are unique to its role as the primary
federal regulator of mutual SLHCs.
VI. CONCLUSION
The separate regulation and supervision of BHCs and SLHCs
arises from the charters of the depository institutions controlled by these
companies.
BHCs control banks and SLHCs control savings
associations.489 During the first half of the twentieth century, banking
organizations were authorized to engage in very different lines of
business. Banks were authorized to accept demand deposits, make
consumer, residential, and commercial loans and provide trust
services, 490 while savings associations were authorized to accept time
deposits and finance home loans.491 These differences in authorized
activities existed when Congress authorized the comprehensive
regulation of BHCs in 1956 and SLHCs in 1968.492
As the twentieth century progressed, the regulation of banking
organizations became more and more similar. Congress eliminated
almost all differences in the authorized activities of banks and savings
associations, as well as permissible activities for BHCs and SLHCs. For
example, Congress authorized federal savings associations to accept
demand deposits, make consumer and commercial loans, and provide
trust services.493 Congress also authorized BHCs to acquire savings
associations494 and authorized SLHCs to engage in activities permissible
directors of a mutual SLHC waiving its receipt of dividends with distribution of dividends to
the directors and other insiders. 76 Fed. Reg. 56508, 56512 (Sept. 13, 2011).
489. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a(a)(1)(D), 1841(a)(1).
490. See, e.g., National Bank Act, ch. 106, § 8, 13 Stat. 99, 101 (1864) (authorizing the
national association to receive deposits, loan money on personal security); Federal Reserve
Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 11(k) 38 Stat. 251, 262 (1913) (authorizing FRB to permit national
banks to provide trust services); McFadden Act, 69-639, § 16, 44 Stat. 1224, 1232 (1927)
(authorizing national associations to make loans secured by first lien upon improved real
estate).
491. See, e.g., Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-42, § 5(b)–(c), 48 Stat.
128, 132 (federal savings and loan associations authorized to accept deposits related to
borrowed money and make loans on security of first liens on homes).
492. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133; Savings and
Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, 82 Stat. 5 (1968).
493. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-221, §§ 401–403, 94 Stat. 132, 153–156; Garn-St. German Depository Institutions Act,
Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 312, 96 Stat. 1469, 1496 (1982).
494. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, § 601, 103 Stat. 183, 408.
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for BHCs.495 When Congress transferred responsibility for the regulation
and supervision of SLHCs from the OTS to the FRB in 2011496 the DoddFrank Act also required the FRB to establish minimum leverage and riskbased capital requirements for SLHCs on a consolidated basis not less
than generally applicable requirements in effect for insured depository
institutions.497
As regulation of banking organizations became more and more
similar, the supervisory practices of the federal banking agencies also
converged. The agencies adopted similar approaches to capital adequacy,
examinations, reports, application forms, and enforcement. The FRB
also began to supervise SLHCs on a consolidated basis in a manner
consistent with its supervision of BHCs.498 In 2011, the FRB began to
assign indicative ratings to SLHCs using the RFI rating system developed
for BHCs.499 In 2019, the FRB started to assign actual RFI ratings to
SLHCs of a depository nature with less than $100 billion in total
consolidated assets.500
The number of BHCs and SLHCs grew throughout most of the
twentieth century. At the beginning of the twentieth century, it appears
that no companies controlled depository institutions.501 At the time of
enactment of the BHCA in 1956, there were sixty-nine BHCs.502 In 1957,
only two companies were known to control savings and loan
associations.503 In 1966, there were ninety-eight SLHCs.504 During the
1970s and 1980s, the number of BHCs and SLHCs grew dramatically. 505

495. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 104(b), 101 Stat.
552, 568.
496. Dodd-Frank Act Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank
Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 312, 124 Stat. 1376, 1521 (2010).
497. Id. § 171, 124 Stat. at 1436.
498. Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 381. The FRB’s RFI rating system replaced the CORE
rating system of the OTS for SLHCs.
499. Id.
500. 83 Fed. Reg. 56081 (Nov. 9, 2018); Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 371.
501. Group Banking in the United States, 24 FED. RES. BULL. 92, 97 (1938).
502. 1957 FRB ANN. REP. 71.
503. S. REP. NO. 86-810, at 1–5 (1959).
504. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967: Hearings on H.R. 1322,
H.R. 8696, and H.R. 12025 Before the Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the Committee
on Banking and Currency of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong. 1st, Sess. 1 (Aug. 2122, 1967) (statement of John E. Horne, Chairman, FHLBB), at 10 (“By the end of 1966 . . .
there were 98 holding companies controlling 184 associations representing 12.5 percent of
the whole industry.”).
505. See supra Figures 3 and 4 and accompanying footnotes.
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At their height, there were 6,474 BHCs in 1988.506 The number of BHCs
began to decrease near the end of the twentieth century.507 The number
of SLHCs crested at 893 in 2008.508 When the FRB assumed
responsibility for the regulation and supervision of SLHCs in 2011, there
were 427 top-tier SLHCs.509 At the end of 2019, there were 3,725 toptier BHCs and 187 top-tier SLHCs.510
The convergence in the regulation and supervision of BHCs and
SLHCs, decrease in the number of SLHCs, and consolidation of
responsibility for the regulation and supervision of BHCs and SLHCs
with the FRB suggest that it is time to unify statutory framework for the
regulation of DIHCs. Congress could consolidate regulation of all
holding companies controlling an FDIC-insured depository institution
under one statute of uniform application. One way to create a unified
statutory framework would be to transfer the regulation of SLHCs from
HOLA to a revised version of the BHCA entitled the “Depository
Institution Holding Company Act” (“DIHCA”)
A unified statutory framework for the regulation of holding
companies controlling FDIC-insured depository institutions could have a
number of benefits.511 First, a unified statutory framework for the
regulation of DIHCs would reinforce the separation of banking from
commerce. The separation of banking from commerce generally prevents
companies controlling an insured depository institution from obtaining a
funding advantage over companies that do not.512 The separation also
prevents extension of the federal safety net, ultimately backed by
taxpayers, to commercial entities.513 However, several exceptions to

506. 1988 FRB ANN. REP. 169.
507. See supra Figures 3 and 4 and accompanying footnotes.
508. National Information Center, supra note 213.
509. 2011 FRB ANN. REP. 90.
510. 2019 FRB ANN. REP. 44–45.
511. The unified statutory framework would only apply to holding companies controlling

FDIC-insured DIs. It would not apply to credit unions for two reasons. First, natural person
credit unions are not controlled by holding companies, but by their share account holders
(depositors). This article addresses holding companies. Second, the deposits of credit unions
are federally insured through the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund administer by
the NCUA. See supra introductory text in Part II.
512. INDEP. COMTY. BANKS OF AMERICA, supra note 218, at 3–4.
513. The federal safety net consists of deposit insurance and access to credit and payment
services from Federal Reserve Banks. ILCs-A Review of Charter, Ownership, and
Supervision Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the
H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 109th Cong. 83 (2006) (statement of Scott G. Alvarez, General
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separation currently exist. BHCs and SLHCs that become FHCs are
authorized to engage in merchant banking activity—investing in
commercial companies for a limited period of time.514 Furthermore, the
parent companies of ILCs may engage in commercial activities. They are
not subject to restrictions on their activities because ILCs, while insured
by the FDIC, are excluded from the definition of a bank in the BHCA.515
In addition, GUSLHCs may engage in commercial activities because they
are not subject to restrictions on their activities by the HOLA.516 The
separation of banking and commerce would be reinforced by the repeal
of FHC authority to engage in merchant banking activity, elimination of
the exclusion of ILCs from the definition of a bank in the BHCA, and
elimination of the GUSLHC exemption from the restriction on activities
in HOLA.517 The FRB has recommended Congress take these actions. 518
Second, a unified statutory framework would level the
competitive playing field among DIHCs. This could be accomplished by
establishing a standardized list of permissible activities for DIHCs. The
permissibility of activities for BHCs and SLHCs developed in a
patchwork manner in response to market developments and policy
choices. The underlying rationale for differences in permissible activities
may have made sense in the market for financial services at the time they
became authorized. In the contemporary market, the authority of SLHCs
and BHCs to engage in an activity may differ for no reason other than the
charter of the underlying depository institution. For example, ordinary
SLHCs are authorized to engage in real estate development, while
ordinary BHCs and FHCs are not authorized to engage in real estate
development activities.519 This may have made sense when savings

Counsel, Federal Reserve Board) (stating that protections of the federal safety net consist of
deposit insurance and access to the Federal Reserve's discount window and payments system).
514. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(k)(4)(H) (2018).
515. Id. § 1841(c)(2)(H).
516. Id. § 1467a(c)(3), (9)(C).
517. The FRB views merchant banking, the ILC exclusion, and the GUSLHC exemption
as undermining the separation of banking from commerce. In the FRB’s view, the ILC
exclusion and GUSLHC exemption create an uneven playing field among organizations that
control an FDIC-insured depository institution and increase risk to the federal safety net. The
FRB has recommended the repeal of merchant banking authority as well as elimination of the
ILC exclusion and GUSLHC exemption. FED. RESERVE BD. ET AL., supra note 279, at 28.
518. Id.
519. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 238.53(b)(4), (6) (2019) (SLHCs may acquire
unimproved real estate for development and develop, subdivide, and improve unimproved
real estate for sale or rental). UB Financial Corp., 58 FED. RES. BULL. 428, 429 (1972); First
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associations were the principal means of home financing. Today, banks,
savings associations, and government sponsored enterprises all play a
role in making home mortgage loans. In enacting a unified statutory
framework for the regulation of DIHCs, Congress could set forth a
standardized list of permissible activities after weighing the risks and
benefits associated with specific activities, such as real estate
development.
Third, a unified statutory framework would expand the ability of
the FRB to address dangers to depository institutions posed by their
affiliates by subjecting all DIHCs to consolidated supervision. This
would be accomplished by eliminating the exclusion of ILCs from the
definition of a bank in the BHCA and elimination of the GUSLHC
exemption from the restriction on activities in HOLA. With these
actions, depository holding companies not currently subject to
consolidated supervision would become subject to consolidated
supervision. One of the primary purposes of consolidated supervision is
to assess risk and address deficiencies on a consolidated group basis
before they pose a danger to a holding company’s subsidiary depository
institutions.520 Expanding the FRB’s jurisdiction to cover GUSLHCs and
the parent companies of ILCs would help mitigate potential dangers to
subsidiary depository institutions and the federal safety net.
Finally, a unified statutory framework for the regulation of
DIHCs could improve supervisory efficiency through eliminating
unnecessary complication. There would be many opportunities to
standardize and simplify statutory language in a DIHA. The definitions
applicable to the regulation of DIHCs could be standardized. For
instance, the definition of “control” could be standardized for
determinations of control related to a bank, savings association, BHC,
SLHC, or other company.521 In addition, simplification could flow from
the deletion of statutory language that is no longer applicable, such as
grace periods for divestiture of impermissible activities. 522 Furthermore,
statutory language could be eliminated that incorporates authorized
activities by reference, such as language in Section 10 of HOLA

Security Corp., 61 FED. RES. BULL. 325 (1975); 12 C.F.R. § 225.126(d) (BHCs not authorized
to engage in real estate development).
520. Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 461, at 2.
521. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a(a)(2), 1841(a)(2).
522. Id. § 1842(a).
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authorizing SLHCs to engage in activities permissible for BHCs under
Sections 4(c) and 4(k) of the BHCA.523
In light of regulatory convergence, consolidation of supervisory
responsibility, declining numbers of holding companies, and the benefits
of a unified statutory framework, it is now time for Congress to
consolidate the regulation and supervision of companies controlling an
FDIC-insured depository institution under a unified statutory framework.

523. Id. § 1467a(c)(2)(F)(i), (c)(2)(H).
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APPENDIX A – TERMS AND ACRONYMS
This article uses many terms and acronyms to refer to types of
financial institutions, banking regulators, and federal laws. Key words
and phrases are defined below. Acronyms are defined when first used in
this article and are collected below.
Acronym/Word/Phrase
Meaning
1933 Act
≡ Banking Act of 1933
1970 BHCA
≡ Bank Holding Company Act
Amendments
Amendments of 1970
Activities
≡ Broad categories of things done by a
financial institution, such as
accepting deposits, making loans,
selling securities, or providing
insurance. Activities may be
authorized by the institution’s
charter or enabling legislation and
may automatically apply or require
notice or approval by a regulator.
Bank
≡ Unless noted, the definition of bank
in the BHCA is used when referring
to a “bank.” The BHCA defines a
bank as an institution organized
under the laws of the United States
that (1) is an FDIC-insured
institution; or (2) receives demand
deposits and makes commercial
loans.524
524. Id. § 1841(c)(1). Generally, a demand deposit is payable as a matter of right on
demand. HELLER, supra note 114, at 5–6. Broadly speaking, commercial loans are secured
or unsecured loans to companies or individuals for other than personal, family, or household
purposes. Id. at 10. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act defines a bank as any national or state
bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(1). A state bank is any bank, trust company, savings bank, or
similar institution that is in the business of receiving deposits (other than trust funds) and is
incorporated under the laws of any state. Id. § 1813(a)(2). Under the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, a bank does not include nationally-chartered savings banks and savings
associations, as well as state savings associations. Id. § 1813(a)(1). However, as depository
institutions, they may obtain deposit insurance if they met the definition of a depository
institution set forth in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(c), 1815(a).
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Acronym/Word/Phrase
Meaning
Banking organization
≡ An institution that performs banking
functions, such as accepting deposits
and making loans, as well as the
companies that own or control such
institutions, which includes banks,
savings associations, BHCs, SLHCs,
and ILCs.
Basel I
≡ international accord reached by the
BCBS in July 1988
Basel II
≡ international accord reached by the
BCBS in June 2004
Basel III
≡ international accord reached by the
BCBS in November 2010
BCBS
≡ Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision
BHC(s)
≡ bank holding company(ies)
BHCA
≡ Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
BMA
≡ Bank Merger Act
CCAR
≡ Comprehensive Capital Analysis
and Review
CEBA
≡ Competitive Equality Banking Act
of 1987
CRA
≡ Community Reinvestment Act of
1977
Depository institution
≡ Institution whose deposits were or
are insured by the FDIC, FSLIC, or
NCUA.525
DIHC
≡ Depository Institution Holding
Company, which includes a BHC
and SLHC.
DIHCA
≡ Depository Institution Holding
Company Act

525. The FSLIC provided federal deposit insurance for savings associations, but it was
abolished by FIRREA in 1989. The NCUA provides federal deposit insurance for state and
federal credit unions.
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Acronym/Word/Phrase
Meaning
Dodd-Frank Act
≡ Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010
EGRRCPA
≡ Economic Growth, Regulatory
Relief, and Consumer Protection Act
FDIA
≡ Federal Deposit Insurance Act
FDIC
≡ Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation
Federal banking agency ≡ Refers to the OCC, FRB, FDIC,
or regulator
FHLBB, or OTS.
FFIEC
≡ Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council
FHC(s)
≡ financial holding company(ies)
FHLB
≡ Federal Home Loan Bank
FHLBA
≡ Federal Home Loan Bank Act
FHLBB
≡ Federal Home Loan Bank Board
FHLB System
≡ Federal Home Loan Bank System
Financial institution
≡ An institution that provides financial
services, such as a bank, thrift,
industrial loan company, securities
firm, insurance company, or
commodities broker
FIRIRCA
≡ Financial Institutions Regulatory
and Interest Rate Control Act of
1978
FIRREA
≡ Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989
FISA
≡ Financial Institutions Supervisory
Act of 1966
FR Act
≡ Federal Reserve Act
FRB
≡ Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System
FR System
≡ Federal Reserve System
FSLIC
≡ Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation
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Acronym/Word/Phrase
Meaning
GAAP
≡ Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles
GLBA
≡ Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
Glass-Steagall Act
≡ Section 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the
1933 Act
Guidance or Guidelines ≡ General, nonbinding agency
expectations, priorities, or views
related to compliance with law,
regulation, or safe and sound
practices.526
GUSLHC(s)
≡ Grandfathered Unitary Savings and
Loan Holding Company
HOLA
≡ Home Owners Loan Act
ILC(s)
≡ industrial loan company(ies)
Insured depository
≡ Institution whose deposits were or
institution
are insured by the FDIC or
FSLIC.527
Laundry list
≡ List of permissible activities for
BHCs included in Regulation Y
LFI
≡ large financial institution
NB Act
≡ National Bank Act
NCUA
≡ National Credit Union
Administration
Nelnet
≡ Nelnet, Inc.
NHA
≡ National Housing Act

526. Fed. Reserve Bd. et al., SR 18-05/CA 18-7, Supervision and Regulation Letter on
Interagency Statement Clarifying the Role of Supervisory Guidance to the Officer in Charge
of Supervision at Each Federal Reserve Bank, Attachment, at 1 (Sept. 11, 2018),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1805.htm
[https://perma.cc/4M2R-K95K] (“Unlike a law or regulation, supervisory guidance does not
have the force and effect of law, and the agencies do not take enforcement actions based on
supervisory guidance. Rather, supervisory guidance outlines the agencies’ supervisory
expectations or priorities and articulates the agencies’ general views regarding appropriate
practices for a given subject area.”); see also Peter Weinstock & Marysia Laskowski, “If it
Walks Like a Duck. . . .”: The Demise of the Guidance Masquerade, 135 BANKING L. J. 215
(2018).
527. The FSLIC provided federal deposit insurance for savings associations, but it was
abolished by FIRREA in 1989.
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Acronym/Word/Phrase
Meaning
OCC
≡ Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency
OTS
≡ Office of Thrift Supervision
Permissible activities
≡ Activities authorized for an
institution by legislation, charter,
regulation, or order.
Powers
≡ Activities authorized for an
institution by legislation or charter.
QTL
≡ qualified thrift lender
Regulation
≡ Written rules by which a financial
institution should conduct its
business – laws enacted by
legislatures and rules codified by
banking regulators.528
Riegle-Neal Act
≡ Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994
SLHC(s)
≡ savings and loan holding
company(ies)
SLHCA
≡ Savings and Loan Holding Company
Amendments of 1967
Square
≡ Square, Inc.
Supervision
≡ Practices of regulators related to the
monitoring, reporting, inspecting,
and examining of financial
institutions.529
Thrift(s)
≡ Various forms of institutions that
historically encouraged savings,
such as savings banks, savings and
loan associations, building and loan
associations, cooperative banks, and
homestead associations.
UDFI
≡ Utah Department of Financial
Institutions

528. FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 74 (10th
ed. 2016) (discussing the Federal Reserve System’s supervisory and regulatory functions).
529. Id.

